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Introduction 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis deals with the economic implications of price volatility in energy markets,
in particular its transmission channels at the macroeconomic level. Broadly speak-
ing, the aim to contribute by focusing on the qualitative and quantitative analysis
of the consequences of volatility in energy prices. In Chapter 2, I consider the effect
of oil price volatility on GDP growth, while accounting for the change in a country’s
dependency on oil, which is done with the help of several different approaches to
depict price fluctuations. Chapters 3 and 4 seek to complement theoretical models
of real business cycle frameworks, by integrating the consumption of energy by both,
households and firms, int he model. In a further extension, another dimension is
added, by allowing for some goods and input factors to be energy-depend, while
others are not. In the model I describe in Chapter 3, energy is endogenously gener-
ated from finite and renewable sources. However in chapter 4, I assume exogenous
energy price shocks for my model analysis, and instead I incorporate heterogeneous
agents.
Today, except for very few large oil-producers, the energy sector occupies a rather
small share of a country’s economic output. At the same time, energy is an indispens-
able input in the production of almost any product or service, all over the modern
world. The availability and affordability of energy has essentially transformed every
single industry, since the days of the industrial evolution. The magnitude of the
economic impact of the energy sector is therefore a lot larger than its share in GDP.
Looking back into history, and in particular the Industrial Revolution, it remains
without doubt that energy plays a decisive role in the development process of a coun-
try’s economy. In the 18th century, four factors drove economic welfare and growth:
the availability of labor force, the availability of capital, the advances in technol-
ogy, and energy. Instead of defining energy as part of technological advancement,
I distinguish between them, which enables me to describe how the one influences
the other. The increase in productivity by pioneering innovations and discoveries,
such as the steam engine or the light bulb, have for example triggered an enormous
increase in the demand for primary energy. Hence, energy can be seen as the fuel of
technological development, as well as an essential input for most products. Particu-
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larly with the start of mass industrialization, economic development started to fully
depend on the availability of energy and its price. As a consequence, the ability of
a country to access energy has ever since defined its economic future.
The importance of oil is underlined by real life examples of unstable energy sup-
ply due to a weak energy infrastructure and energy sector, as known from many
developing countries. Such struggling economies production sectors may be unable
to produce sufficient final goods, either to be consumed or exported, and conse-
quently they don’t grow. In other cases, such as Venezuela, power outages turn a
political crisis into humanitarian crisis. This makes energy a crucial element among
the driving forces of economic growth to promote welfare and high standards of
living.
The term ’energy’ is aﬄicted with various meanings and products, like primary
energy products such as oil, gas, coal, or other renewable energy sources, but also
final generated energy such as electricity or gasoline. An outstanding role is often
ascribed to electricity as the universal carrier of energy. In this thesis, when not
further specified, the term energy refers to primary energy and its various sources.
Over time, different sources of energy have been dominating. While initially,
wood has been used as a multi-functional raw material for everything, its predom-
inant position has been replaced by coal, in the Industrial Revolution, followed by
oil, with the rapid growth in automobile production in the beginning of the 20th
century. Today, oil still covers the largest proportion of all primary energy sources,
at least for most industrial countries, such as Germany and the USA, as is shown in
Chapter 2.
The first models of economic growth have neglected resources or energy. But
when the oil crisis of the mid 1970s hit in, this triggered economists to developed
theoretical models that incorporate the role of resources, including energy, in the
growth process. Despite stable supply of labor and capital, non-declining output
could no longer be guaranteed, as instead it was shown to depend on both the
nature of technology and institutional arrangements (Solow, 1974; Stiglitz, 1974).
By considering energy as a further input for economic growth, multiple new paths
and outcomes became plausible, especially when recognizing finite resources (Das-
gupta and Heal, 1974). In order to find an optimal depletion rate of non-renewable
resources, an aim of much of this literature is to determine, whether, and under
what circumstances, technical progress is effective in ensuring sustained growth and
consumption in an economy (Bretschger, 2005). Furthermore, the finite nature of
non-renewable resources, but also the externality problem in terms of pollution,
which affects current utility as well as future economic development, have increased
awareness for transition to alternatives, such as renewable resources.
Research on the role of energy has not been limited to growth economics alone.
Because of the particular link of energy to other factors in the economy, changes
in the quantity and price of energy impacts the macroeconomic conditions, and a
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country’s development and welfare. These effects can even spread globally, given the
fact that energy resources are not uniformly distributed among countries (e.g. oil),
which means that effects spread with trade. With the emergence of excessive oil
price shocks along with the oil crises in the mid and end 1970s, price fluctuations
in the global oil market and resulting sensitivities of economies have led to a large
interest in research on the role of oil, at least with respect to the macroeconomy and
in the short term.
Numerous reasons may underlie the fluctuations of oil price, which may be of
economic, political, or other nature. But forecasts from microeconomic theory, the
general principal of pricing, according to which prices are a result of the equilibrium
of supply and demand, cannot always be applied to this commodity. Since a number
of recessions have happened in the aftermath of extraordinary oil price peaks, the
relationship between prices and economic output is a hot topic.
There are several approaches to investigate the relationship between energy
prices, in particular oil prices, and the macroeconomy. Although different meth-
ods of analysis have yielded different results, economists have acknowledged changes
in the price of energy, as a considerable source of economic fluctuations. Accord-
ing to Blanchard and Gali (2007), such changes have the potential to cause global
shocks, as many economies are affected simultaneously, due to their dependency and
lack of alternative resources in the short run.
Empirical studies have assessed the effects of oil price shocks on economic activ-
ity, in particular since the oil crises. Initially, linear models have shown a significant
negative relationship between oil price changes and GDP growth, but this link has
lost in significance since the mid-1980s. As a consequence, literature has shifted to
several non-linear and asymmetric transformations by using new econometric tools
(Hamilton, 1996; Lee et al., 1995; Mork, 1989). Recent studies confirm non-linearity
for most industrial countries including Germany (Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez,
2005) but simultaneously question asymmetry (Kilian and Vigfusson, 2013).
Chapter 2 has been published as a paper in ’Energy Economics’ in 2019. In
this chapter, I re-estimate a vector-autoregressive (VAR) model similar to those of
Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005), by extending the analysis to a time span
including the years of the financial crisis and up to 2016. Furthermore, I consider
the suggestion by Hooker (1996), claiming that the degree of correlation between
oil price changes and economic output is not constant but rather weakening over
time. I hypothesize that a reduction of the oil-to-energy share, which results in less
dependency on oil, leads to this weakens relationship between oil price changes. In
order to incorporate this in a formal model, I examine the existence of significant
moderator effects, by making use of a moderated regression analysis in form of an
interacted VAR (IVAR). But other than the interacted panel VAR by Towbin and
Weber (2013), in which all variables interact with the moderator variable, the IVAR
model presented in Chapter 2 is further developed and restricts this interaction for
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price variables only. For the purpose of testing this model, I have constructed a
balanced panel dataset of twelve industrialized countries (three oil-exporting and
nine oil-importing countries), covering a time horizon of 45 years. Of course, next
to the novel modeling approach, the construction of this dataset and the empirical
results are rather minor contributions of this chapter. For the analysis, I consider
four different approaches of price determination.
The results of this chapter confirm the assumption that changes in oil prices
Granger cause GDP growth for most observed countries. Although I cannot confirm
rejection of asymmetry such as proposed by Kilian and Vigfusson (2013), I indicate
that effects of negative oil price movements are more important than what has so far
been assumed in previous studies. Furthermore, I can examine a high significance in
the existence of moderator effects. As a result, oil price increases have a lower effect
on GDP growth the lower the oil-to-energy ratio, which is in line with the theoretical
assumption that a higher dependency on imports of fossil energy resources makes a
country more vulnerable to price fluctuations. As a side outcome of this chapter, I
have presented an enhanced version of an IVAR model to test for moderator effects
for selected variables only.
Studies that analyze the theoretical relationship between macroeconomic vari-
ables often include RBC models. In principle, these models investigate the external
influence through shocks on the modeled economy, and decompose the effects on
the different variables. RBC models are popular because the methodology attempts
to explain aggregate economic phenomena on the basis of macroeconomic models
derived from microeconomic principles. However, there are some major drawbacks.
In particular the role of technological shocks is often not reflected properly. These
shocks take a dominant role in affecting the models’ dynamics, that are not al-
ways confirmed by microeconomic evidences. In this context, McCallum (1988) has
identified energy as an essential factor on the supply side, which helps explaining
those fluctuation, to which too little attention has been paid thus far. As a con-
sequence, several RBC models that include oil price shocks have been developed,
mostly treating energy prices as determined exogenously, and exclusively affecting
the production side (Finn, 1995; Kim and Loungani, 1992; Rotemberg and Wood-
ford, 1996). Most recently, there are efforts to allow for full-endogeneity of energy
generation in RBC models, and revealing that endogenizing energy prices improves
the prediction of business cycles (Argentiero et al., 2018; Huynh, 2016). However,
these existing frameworks do not distinguish between different energy resources and
lack in quality regarding their predictions of business cycles. Consequently, fur-
ther research is necessary to cope with these problems, which is exactly what I am
concerned with in Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis.
In Chapter 3, I contribute to energy literature by constructing a multi-sector
RBC model, whereby endogenizing energy generation and distinguishing between
finite and renewable energy resources. Despite this more complex way of modeling
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the energy sector, this model is close to Dhawan and Jeske (2008), and considers
two types of consumption goods. First, more consumption goods mean an expanded
investment portfolio for households. Second, it includes additional transmission
channels of energy shocks because energy is consumed by both households and firms.
It is a complementary component with respect to durable goods and capital. In an
extended version of the model, I allow for constrained replenishment of the finite
resource stock. In the real world, this reflects the possibility to transform resources to
available and mineable reserves by doing costly R&D e.g. of new mining devices. The
model is calibrated to fit the German economy and estimates most of the parameters
using Bayesian estimation techniques.
The Bayesian estimation in Chapter 3 confirms a complementary relationship
between durable goods and energy in the households sector, as well as between cap-
ital and energy in the final production sector. Furthermore, the model confirms the
dominant role of volatility in total factor productivity, which is widely accepted as
the main force behind business cycles. Nevertheless, this study provides essential
improvements in explaining theoretical moments, by distinguishing between durable
and non-durable goods, taking energy consumption into account, and also by endo-
genizing energy generation from two different resources.
A further criticism of traditional neoclassical RBC models concerns the assump-
tion of a representative agent always behaving perfectly rational, and operating in
perfectly competitive good, factor, and asset markets. These homogeneous frame-
works ignore the existence of heterogeneity in human beings and human decision
making, which adds to biased outcomes regarding inequality. However, even when
allowing for idiosyncratic behavior of agents, inequality is still eliminated because of
the self-regulating (complete) markets. Only in case of incomplete markets, where
agents cannot fully insure against idiosyncratic risk, inequality may arise.
In Chapter 3, I intend to complement theoretical RBC literature by including
energy in a model, using a heterogeneous approach that combines properties of
’incomplete market models’ and ’limited asset market participation models’. The
model I construct is close to those of Chapter 4, but considers energy prices as de-
termined exogenously. This simplification is based on the assumption that from a
global perspective, Germany is a small country in terms of energy consumption, and
has little market power in affecting the world price of energy. Heterogeneity arises
through distinguishing between two types of agents (Ricardian households and rule-
of-thumb households) and idiosyncratic shocks in labor supply. As agents face an
occasionally-binding budget constraint, there is an incomplete capital market with
limited risk insurance. In order to solve cross-section capital distribution, I apply
the explicit aggregation approach, based on Den Haan and Rendahl (2010), assum-
ing that agents’ decisions on capital accumulation only depend on first moments of
wealth distribution. In addition to the analysis of the variables’ responses to aggre-
6 Introduction
gate technology shocks and energy price volatility, I also study how inequalities in
income and wealth compare to observations from Germany.
With respect to energy price shocks, inequalities in income and wealth decrease,
which can mainly be traced back to the complementary relationship of energy with
durable goods and capital. I conclude that it is not the low-income agent who ben-
efits from volatility in energy prices, but instead it is the high-income agent who
looses both in terms of income and wealth, due to higher absolute sunk costs. Sub-
sequently, I consider policy implication with respect to income redistribution from
Ricardian to rule-of-thumb agents. The results are in line with empirical findings,
showing a significant reduction of income inequality at the cost of a slight increase
in wealth inequality.
The simulation of the models in Chapter 3 and 4 were performed with the help
of Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011). Dynare is a software platform based on MAT-
LAB routines, which can handle a wide class of economic models, such as dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models and overlapping generations models. For the
purpose of my research, I have written several MATLAB scripts in order to cope with
the explicit aggregation algorithm in Chapter 4. Additionally, I have also developed
a toolbox that can numerically simulate the model for heterogeneous agents with
idiosyncratic shocks, in order to analyze the evolution of their income and wealth
distribution. In this toolbox I also integrated routines for robustness checks and
for detailed analyses of various inequality metrics and graphical illustrations. For
the purpose of future non-commercial research, I am willing to share the code upon
request.
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Chapter 2
Oil Price Shocks and GDP
Growth: Do Energy Shares
Amplify Causal Effects?∗
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the effect of oil price fluctuations on GDP growth using
several linear and nonlinear VAR models. In particular, an IVAR approach is ap-
plied to consider moderator effects in the relationship between oil price changes and
GDP growth. It has long been assumed that events in the monetary or in the oil
markets contribute to the outset of economic recessions. The monetary market is
often characterized by interventions in the credit market that are meant to influence
investment behavior and may cause financial frictions. These interventions ham-
per or accelerate economic growth and magnify business cycles. The oil market,
or the fluctuation in the oil price, influences economic development through several
channels. On the one side, oil prices have a direct negative effect on the output
of an economy by increasing production costs. On the other side, oil price fluctua-
tions generate uncertainty which influences investment behavior in future projects
(Bernanke, 1980). Expectations regarding the price evolution impact business out-
looks and often lead to a deferral of new investments, which, in the medium and
long run, dampens future business development. On an aggregate level, this affects
economic growth.
In the literature, along with theoretical explanations, historical data have been
analyzed to identify specific properties regarding oil prices, and alongside related
behavior of other macroeconomic variables. When based on data from the 1980s
or before, linear models have shown a significant negative relationship between oil
price changes and GDP growth (Gisser and Goodwin, 1986; Hamilton, 1983; Mork,
1989). However, starting with the mid-1980s, oil price decreases have not had the
∗This chapter has been published in Energy Economics (2019) 80:1010–1040.
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predicted influence on macroeconomic performance, as economic models of the time
were outdated. Following a drop in oil prices, GDP growth does not longer increase
by the same amount as it would decrease after an equivalent rise in oil price. This
new type of relationship has been modeled by changing the analysis in favor of an
asymmetric relationship between oil price fluctuation and GDP growth. Starting
with Mork (1989), several economists have considered this by adopting the theory
of the asymmetric relationship to non-linear models. These new models allow for dis-
tinguishing between impacts of positive and negative oil price changes, introducing
separate coefficients for both of them (Hamilton, 1996; Lee et al., 1995).
Other insights have become possible by investigating data of a growing time
span. For example, it was suggested that the degree of correlation between oil
price changes and economic output is not constant but rather weakened over time
(Hamilton, 1996; Hooker, 1996). Depending on the respective degree of correlation,
the economy has been vulnerable, to a decreasing extend, to fluctuations in the oil
market over time. There is an ongoing debate on why the impact of oil is diminishing.
The change may either be caused by a higher flexibility in absorbing price shocks
through other macroeconomic channels, such as monetary policy. Alternatively, the
dependency on oil may have decreased in favor of a dependency on other sources of
energy, resulting in a loss of the importance of oil for the respective economy. Indeed,
since the 1970s, oil shares have decreased in many economies, in particular in oil
demanding countries without own meaningful oil production, as will be investigated
in this study.
The present paper contributes to existing literature in two ways. First, we inves-
tigate the weakening relationship between oil price changes and GDP growth. We
hypothesize that a lowering of the oil-to-energy share, which comes with a decreasing
dependency on oil, leads to this weakening relationship between oil price changes
and GDP growth. Thereby, we look at the effect of a change in the oil-to-energy
share as a moderator effect. Second, we extend the time horizon to 2016, enabling
the re-estimation of previous studies. In particular, the data include the transition
into the 21st century, with strong increases in oil prices up to levels beyond those of
the 1970s.
These objectives have gained importance as extreme fluctuations of oil prices, as
well as major reforms regarding new ways of energy production have taken place in
many countries in recent years. Hence, our study contributes to existing literature
by extending the analysis to a time span including the years of the financial crisis and
up to 2016, thereby addressing the latter of the two previously described objectives.
In turn, the first of the two objectives has partly been dealt with by Jime´nez-
Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005). Nevertheless, our study adds further contribution
to this objective. It is, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper to describe
and quantify moderator effects on the relationship between oil price changes and
GDP growth. In doing so, we consider the possibility of the existence of asymmetric
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effects of oil price changes on GDP growth and thus do not limit the analysis to
linear models.
The results of this paper confirm the assumption that changes in oil prices
Granger cause GDP growth for most countries. This holds for both, net-oil-consuming
and net-oil-producing economies. By allowing for asymmetry in the effect of positive
and negative price movements on economic growth, we further indicate that effects
of negative oil price movements are more important for some countries than assumed
before. In spite of that, magnitudes of positive or negative responses are not equal
which supports the original assumption of asymmetric effects by oil price changes.
However most important, we find evidence for the existence of a non-linear moder-
ator effect, with the oil-to-energy share acting as the moderator variable. Thereby,
our paper makes an important contribution to existing literature, as this significant
moderator effect explains that a decline in the oil-to-energy share weakens the causal
effect of oil price changes on economic growth.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of existing litera-
ture examining the relationship between oil prices and GDP growth. It summarizes
models which assume asymmetric effects of oil prices, explaining the focus on non-
linear instead of linear models. Section 3 reflects the historical development of oil
shares in different countries to determine whether their paths have been changing.
Section 4 describes the present dataset and introduces the functional form of the
model including the moderator effect. Section 5 presents the empirical results and
analyzes them. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Effects of Oil Price Changes on Economic Growth
Price fluctuations in the global oil market and resulting sensitivities of economies
have led to a large interest in research on the role of oil with respect to the macroe-
conomy. This large body of literature has a particular focus on questions related to
the two oil crises in the mid and end 1970s. Reasons for oil price fluctuations may
be economic, political, or other. But unlike forecasted by microeconomic theory, the
general principal of pricing, saying that prices are a result from the equilibrium of
supply and demand, cannot always be applied to this commodity. Since a number
of recessions have been preceded by extraordinary peaks in the oil price market, it
is a topical issue covered in research of economic development and growth dealing
with the relationship between prices and economic output.
Side by side, theoretical and empirical studies have been evolved to analyze the
role of exhaustible resources such as oil and coal over the business cycle. On the
theoretical side, noticeable work has been published by Stiglitz (1974) who imple-
ments a general non-renewable resource to a basic Cobb-Douglas economy solving
for the optimal growth path. Noteworthy, the analysis by Dasgupta and Heal (1974)
examines how depletion of a finite product should optimally set when allowing for
10 Oil Price Shocks and GDP Growth
substitution between exhaustible resources and other reproducible inputs. Bernanke
(1980) and Bernanke et al. (1997) analyze the effects of fluctuations of resource prices
on investment behavior and related responses by monetary authorities. Davis and
Haltiwanger (2001) pick up new empirical findings to analyze job creation and de-
struction with respect to oil price changes in the US manufacturing sector between
1972 and 1988. They find that oil price fluctuation causes twice as much variability
in employment growth as monetary shocks. Summing up, the theoretical results
explain the effects of changes in oil prices either by influencing the production and
consumption of an economy directly or by intensifying uncertainty such as on the
investment behavior.
2.2.1 Symmetric and linear effects of oil prices
On the empirical side, an influential study has been published by Hamilton (1983)
based on the six-variable system by Sims (1980). He extends the model observing
the relationship of several main macroeconomic variables and movements in the
oil price. Hamilton finds a strongly significant negative correlation between rising
oil prices and seven out of eight post-war recessions in the USA between 1948 and
1972. Accordingly, he concludes that the main oil price shocks have had a significant
impact on aggregated economic levels. However, there is no significant evidence
that it is oil price shocks alone, that Granger cause economic downturns. Instead,
he names other macroeconomic channels, such as monetary interventions, who may
have played a role as well. Nevertheless, due to its simplicity but also its explanatory
power, Hamilton’s linear model has a strong influence on business cycles theory and
its way to simulate models such as Eichenbaum and Singleton (1986), Gisser and
Goodwin (1986), and McCallum (1988).
2.2.2 Asymmetric and nonlinear effects of oil prices
Until the early 1980s, when oil prices have pushed mainly in an upwards direction,
linear models have performed reasonably well. But with frequent ups and downs as
well as considerable drops in prices in the 1980s, the theory of linearity between oil
price changes and economic growth has been revised. Despite decreasing oil prices,
economic growth has not reflected the prediction. In fact, it turned out that there
is a non-symmetric relationship between both variables. Price declines have been
followed by only weak enhances or even negative economic developments. Meet-
ing that, Mork (1989) finds strong significance for asymmetric impacts on economic
growth in the USA between 1949 and 1988. On the one side, he identifies large
negative effects of oil price increases, but on the other side oil price decreases do
not show any significant effect. His study (hereafter called: asymmetric approach)
distinguishes between positive and negative linear changes in the oil price with no
further modification. The results have been confirmed for the majority of other
industrial countries (Mork et al., 1994). However, it has been sporadically criticized
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that the usage of asymmetric linear approaches is not consistent to explain the role of
oil in the macroeconomic business cycle (Hooker, 1996). In fact, the main criticism
has been to weight the pre-1980 period too much in disfavor of the 1980s and 1990s,
leading to an underrepresentation of observations for the latter. Subsequently, other
economists proposed alternative methods to match asymmetric behavior. Similar to
Mork, two leading contributions by Lee et al. (1995) and Hamilton (1996) handle
asymmetry by exploiting nonlinearities. They construct nonlinear transformations
of oil prices while at the same time maintaining Granger causality to other macroe-
conomic variables. It is commonly argued in the literature that these approaches do
not replace the symmetric methodology but are also valid for the pre-1980 period.
However, this period lacked of information by facing only price increases and consid-
erably less fluctuation wherefore both, linear and non-linear asymmetric instruments
lead to significant results.
To be more specific, Lee et al. (1995) incorporate changes in oil prices by nor-
malizing these with regard to price variability. This transformation, called scaled
specification, is obtained by a GARCH model. The measurement allows to distin-
guish between oil price movements which appear sharply but frequently and move-
ments which are small but sporadic. Hence, the degree to which an oil shock affects
the economy is measured according to its appearance with respect to time and am-
plitude. The degree of impact from an equal oil price shock is higher in a stable
environment with unexpected movements than in a noisy one. The authors argue
that the failure of linear relationship stems from the price volatility since the 1980s
which has not been observed before. Much better forecasts of GDP growth are
obtained by using transformed oil prices considering recent price volatility.
Hamilton (1996) replies to the criticism from Hooker (1996) by comparing the
actual oil price with the maximum value from the previous four quarters. If the
current value is higher, then the percentage change over previous year maximum is
plotted, otherwise it is zero. Hence, this transformation, called net oil price increase,
does not deal with quarterly price changes generally. This allows to consider many
price changes as a correction to earlier price adjustments without directly affecting
economic growth.
Both transformations have in common that they aim to modify the determination
of price changes rather than just precluding negative or positive price changes by
their sign. In the following years, these three methods have been established in
various studies extended by further economies and time periods. Despite criticism,
recent literature has repeatedly confirmed the nonlinear relationship between oil
price changes and economic growth (Ferderer, 1997; Herrera and Pesavento, 2009;
Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez, 2005). Ferderer’s focus is on price volatility of
oil measured on a daily variance with respect to monthly averages. Additionally,
he focuses on the extend of reaction of monetary policy due to oil price volatility.
Ferderer confirms asymmetric results which have been found in previous studies.
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Moreover, his study confirms the theory stating that monetary policy is sensitive
to oil price changes between 1970 and 1990 but contradicts that these reactions
are more restrictive following an oil price increase. Consequently, monetary policy
does not explain the asymmetry puzzle. Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez confirm
asymmetry by focusing on European countries. Using a variance decomposition
analysis, they argue that oil price shocks are a considerable source of volatility for
many macroeconomic variables. Their analysis is close to our study by looking at
a similar selection of countries as well as covering some common methods. Herrera
and Pesavento (2009) investigate, among others, in how far changes in the dynamic
response of GDP growth by oil price shocks can explain the decline in volatility
of the US economy. Herrera and Pesavento (2009) find that magnitude but also
duration of the response of GDP growth by oil price shocks have diminished during
1980s and 1990s.
We will revert to the three main transformation methods by Mork (1989), Lee
et al. (1995), and Hamilton (1996) in our study. An evaluation of different modifi-
cation methods has been done by Hamilton (2003). He investigates some existing
asymmetric solutions to identify which specification is the best. To do this, he ap-
plies several tests for stability of coefficients on oil prices. He concludes that the
scaled specification by Lee et al. works out the best with regard to historical US
data, performing slightly better than the net oil price increase covering three years.
This paper finds similar results.
A problem to deciphering causal effects of oil price movements to economic
growth lies in the wide acceptance of oil price formation being endogenous with
respect to other macroeconomic forces. To consider this, Hamilton (2003) isolates
the exogenous components of the oil price with respect to its effect on growth by
identifying and controlling for a number of military conflicts in the observed time
horizon. These events are assumed to be exogenous with regard to the US economy
and resulted to a shortage of oil affecting the supply side of the economy. However, a
weak assumption says that the lack of exogeneity should not be overvalued due to the
lagged response of oil prices with respect to changes in macroeconomic conditions.
Kilian (2008) remarks that recursively identified VAR is a well-selected approach
to deal with the relationship of oil-prices and economic growth, independent of the
degree of transformed prices.
The concept of asymmetry is still ambiguous. Whereas non-linearity has never
been questioned after its implementation in specifications like Lee et al. (1995) and
Hamilton (1996), the support of asymmetry has decreased. Recently, occasional em-
pirical studies have reconsidered the concept of combined non-linearity and asymme-
try in the relationship between oil prices and other macroeconomic variables. Kilian
and Vigfusson (2013) re-estimate US real GDP from oil prices, using an asymmetric
approach and net oil price increases. By applying a modification of these methods,
they confirm non-linearity but contradict asymmetry. They conclude that the em-
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pirical success of the Hamilton approach is due to nonlinearity features rather than
to asymmetry. Alternatively, they find significant support for non-linear symmetry
by focusing on the question whether oil prices deviate from their most recent ex-
treme values instead of distinguishing between positive or negative oil price changes,
called net oil price change.1
2.3 Historical Development of Oil Shares
The literature covering the relationship between oil price changes and economic
growth with respect to a dynamic energy mix is rare. By considering energy ratios,
the literature mainly refers to the proportion of energy relative to other production
factors such as labor or capital, hence, energy intensity. Kilian (2008) points out
that the energy share, defined as the nominal valued added in oil and gas extraction
divided by nominal GDP, is irrelevant in regression estimates because they do not
fluctuate sufficiently on a quarterly basis. Hooker (2002) concludes that the sharp
decline in the pass-through to core inflation caused by oil price changes results
from the declining energy intensity. However, the oil-to-energy ratio has not been
considered, and consequently the possibility of substitution of oil with respect to
alternative energy sources.
In contrast, the relationship between energy consumption and economic growth
has been dealt with in a wide range of literature. On the one side, the substitution or
complementation between both variables is considered in several studies (Acaravci
and Ozturk, 2010; Belke et al., 2011; Griffin and Gregory, 1976). The findings show
mixed evidence on the causal relations of both variables depending on the econo-
metric methodology or specific conditions concerning the selection of the observation
sample. Among others, these include manifold consumption patterns or variations
in the structure and stage of economic development. According to Payne (2010) this
disunity does not allow for a classification of individual groups of countries to be
energy dependent or energy-neutral. Stern (2011) provides an overview over several
studies which analyze the causality between energy and GDP by applying cointegra-
tion methods with differing results according to time frames, methodologies, regions
and measures. Despite inconsistent results, he concludes that both, energy use and
output are tightly coupled, especially when putting more weight on the most recent
studies.
On the other side, it is indisputable that sustained growth over a longer period
goes along with a growing demand for energy. From the theoretical viewpoint, a
production process is usually described by consisting of input factors such as capital
and labor. In mainstream economic growth theory it is often underestimated that
energy also accounts for part of the production. However, considering recent devel-
opment it is hard to deny that the intensity of energy relative to GDP has decreased
1Hamilton (1996) combines extreme deviation from most recent extreme values but does not
exclude to distinguish between positive and negative changes.
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Figure 2.1: Oil-to-energy share of Germany and the USA
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Data consists of ratio of oil supply and total primary energy supply from IEA.
over time. Hence, it accounts for a lower proportion in the production function to-
day due to technological progress and more efficient usage of energy. Consequently,
an increase in aggregated output does not automatically mean a proportional rise
in the usage of energy.
While overall energy demand has shown a long-term increasing trend, especially
since its appreciation and usage in the industrial revolution through coal and oil, its
composition with regard to non-renewable and renewable raw resources has varied
over time. Numerous factors have had influence on this shifting such as availability
of resources, technological progress, innovations, or market- and political influence.
The ecological economists Tahvonen and Salo (2001) have investigated the develop-
ment of energy transition of finite and renewable energy resources in an economic
growth model. They find that, at an early stage, an economy gathers its energy from
renewable energy sources. Later, with an increasing economic growth, it changes to
a balanced demand for both renewable and non-renewable resources whereas at the
most developed stage, it decreases its share of depletable resources. The whole pro-
cess mirrors an inverted U-curve of the share of fossil energy resources, similar to
the Environmental Kuznets Curve (Grossman and Krueger, 1995) which represents
the environmental degradation with increasing per capita income.
In this paper, we concentrate on oil as a specific representative for fossil energy
resources. Firstly, this resource covers the largest proportion of all non-renewable
energies, at least for most industrial countries such as Germany and the USA (see
Figure 2.B.1). Secondly, its general price setting is easily ascertainable by taking the
world reference prices into account. The limited geographic availability of oil and
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oligopoly formations like OPEC have led to consistent prices by all oil-exporters.
A historical investigation of the development of oil shares shows some common
properties between groups of countries. Concerning economies which are categorized
as industrial countries and hence countries at a highly developed economic stage,
these face a downward sloping oil-to-energy share for the past forty years.
Figure 1 shows oil shares relative to the overall energy use for two of the major
industrial countries, namely the USA and Germany. It reflects a persistent decreas-
ing trend in the importance of oil within the economy. Concerning the observed
period of 40 years, the US economy has had an average annual decline of about 0.26
percentage points. Other industrial countries face similar trends (see Figure 2.B.2).
However, some countries underwent apparent structural breaks such as slow-downs
in the speed of decline. As in the example Germany’s decline of oil-to-energy ratio
has been temporary interrupted by the Germany reunification at the beginning of
the 1990s but went back on track again after a few years. Nevertheless, all countries
have experienced a significant decline in their oil-to-energy shares, ranging from
around 15% for the USA to 60% for Sweden in the long run. However, we will look
at moderator effects of static oil-to-energy shares in the analysis later on. Hence,
we do not consider possible structural changes.
Overall, the development of oil shares confirms theoretical considerations on the
composition of the overall energy mix as indicated by Tahvonen and Salo (2001).
Further, the negative trend has been stable over a longer period which can be seen to
be less affected by significant and unexpected events happening in a short time hori-
zon such as price pressures due to economic or political events, or natural disasters.
Substituting oil in favor for other alternative energy resources is not feasible instan-
taneously, but it is rather subject to long-term orientations due to restructuring of
large investments in e.g. infrastructure.
2.4 Methodology and Data
Before analyzing the relationship between oil price fluctuation and GDP growth and
the influence of the oil-to-energy share, we give an overview of how to proceed. At
the beginning, we set up a linear vector autoregression (VAR) model similar to Mork
(1989) as a general basement for the comparative analysis.2
Next, we set up asymmetric VAR models by distinguishing between positive and
negative oil price changes to analyze but also to compare the behavior of asymmetric
effects of oil prices changes. Here, we follow three approaches provided in existing
literature. Firstly, we differentiate only between positive and negative price changes
without making any adjustments similar to Mork et al. (1994). Secondly, we use
the Scaled Specification Scheme by Lee et al. (1995). Thirdly, we pick up the Net
2In fact, Mork (1989) uses a seemingly unrelated regression framework which is a special form
of a VAR-model with the restriction to allow for correlation between the error terms of each time
series. Due to the more complex structure, we use general VAR.
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Price Increase method by Hamilton (1996). After investigating the general baseline
model and the three further approaches, the moderator effects are introduced and
model extensions are explained and tested.
2.4.1 Symmetric linear model
Similar to Hamilton (1983) and Mork (1989), the variables of the first baseline model
are based on the version of the six-variable system which has been set up by Sims
(1980). Despite its simplicity, it provides a good approximation of macroeconomic
activities. The VAR is a seven variable model which includes economic growth in
form of real GDP growth. Robustness checks indicate a better outcome by taking
four lagged exploratory variables. Next, changes in the oil price are taken into
consideration. Further variables are added to control for macroeconomic effects not
caused by changes in the oil price. These are the CPI (Consumer Price Index)
to measure inflation, interest rate, unemployment rate, the IPI (Industry Producer
Index), and expenses for oil relative to GDP.3 The latter is considered to take into
account the weight of dependency on oil relative to the overall economic outcome.
Consequently, a country, whose industry relies strongly on fossil energy sources is
more affected by cost fluctuations in oil prices than a country with lower shares.
The general linear baseline model is constructed as a VAR(p) model of order
p = 4. Respectively, for the asymmetric approach, this model is described by the
reduced form
yt = c+
4∑
j=1
αjyt−j + εt (2.1)
where c is the (7x1) interception vector, αj is the j
th (7x7) matrix of autoregres-
sive coefficients and yt is a (7x1) vector of endogenous variables described below. εt
is the generalization of the uncorrelated white noise process with zero mean.
Different from Hamilton (1983), we use the interest rate representing the finan-
cial sector by the monetary channel through adjustments of the interest rate instead
of the control of money supply (M1). For most of the countries, we take the short
term interest rate. This complies with the current literature. As a proxy for do-
mestic prices and the inflation rate, we add the CPI. We consider the IPI as an
approximation for economic development outside the country. Positive effects on
the growth rate can result from an increase in the net export rate which might have
its origin abroad. Hence, this variable is included to measure exogenous export
demand. In this regard, it is the industrial production index for the G7 countries4
which covers the main trade partners of most countries. The original models by Sims
(1980), Hamilton (1983), and Mork (1989) use import prices whereas Mork et al.
3See Appendix 2.A for a detailed description.
4This measurement includes the G7 countries until 2015: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
UK, and the USA.
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(1994) show that this index represents foreign business cycles more properly and
that the coefficients of the two do not differ significantly. Alternatively, this vari-
able can been regarded as an indicator of the general state of the global economy
as it covers 1/3 of global economic activities. As all of the observed countries are
highly integrated in the global market, the state of the global economy can has an
exogenous effect on the domestic economy which is measured by the IPI G7 index.
For further definitions and descriptions of the variables see Appendix 2.A.
Using an orthogonalized system aims to avoid that error terms are correlated
with each other in the IRFs. By triangularizing the reduced VAR, we get orthogo-
nalization of the residuals which also yields to a recursive structure. This process is
also known as using the Cholesky decomposition in the reduced VAR as suggested
by Sims (1980). Along with triangularization, the order of the endogenous variables
becomes important as it determines the restriction of influence of the variables. The
first predicted variable is determined by all lagged regressors, whereas the second
variable is furthermore contemporaneously affected by the current first variable, and
so on. In this model, we use the order: GDP growth, oil price changes, changes in
CPI, interest rate, unemployment rate, IPI, and oil-to-GDP ratio. By setting the
order of the first three variables, we assume that oil-prices do not contemporane-
ously affect GDP but inflation instead. This is in line with the literature, such as
Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005), as oil price settings are often ascribed to
have a certain degree of exogenous behavior, dissociated from general price devel-
opments. Giving that it has a higher ranking also considers its influences in the
production process through affecting the price level or interest rate.5 Ordering in-
terest rate as the forth variable implies that the former values react with a distinctive
lag, similar as the IPI and oil-to-GDP ratio.
2.4.2 Asymmetric nonlinear model
We extend our analysis by applying a non-linear approach through the estimation
of three different methods of price determination. The i) asymmetric approach,
the ii) scaled specification approach, and the iii) net oil price increase approach.
These three approaches were selected because of their widespread use in existing
literature. All three specifications only differ with respect to the determination of
the oil price, hence, the overall model structure including the growth rates along with
the control variables does not change. This allows for comparing the symmetric with
the asymmetric as well as the non-linear models to examine different properties of
the behavior of oil price changes on economic growth. The three specific approaches
have all been chosen as they are very frequently used in existing literature, and
hence enable a direct comparison of our work to the literature.
5Alternatively, we have also considered alternative ordering such as allowing oil price changes
for contemporaneous impacts on GDP growth which are not reported here. Similar to Jime´nez-
Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005), it is only the contemporaneous effect that changes. With respect to
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The asymmetric approach by Mork (1989) distinguishes between positive and
negative oil price changes. Consequently, the oil price variable is split up into two
parts with no further modification in level values,
∆oil+ =
∆oil if ∆oil > 00 otherwise
∆oil− =
∆oil if ∆oil < 00 otherwise
(2.2)
The scaled oil price increase (SOPI) approach by Lee et al. (1995) follows price
normalization with regard to its variability using an autoregressive process. The
model is based on a GARCH structure which includes a four lagged autoregressive
process with a one lagged AR process of its variance.
∆oilt = α0 +
4∑
i=1
βi∆oilt−i + ǫt, ǫt | It−1 ∼ N(0, ht)
ht = γ0 + γ1ǫ
2
t−1 + γ2ht−1
SOPIt = max
(
0, ǫˆt/
√
hˆt
)
SOPDt = min
(
0, ǫˆt/
√
hˆt
)
(2.3)
where information about ǫt is contained in information set It−1.
This AR(4)-GARCH(1,1) specification follows Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez
(2005) and the approach by Lee et al. (1995), but has also been verified by sensitivity
analysis in our case.6 The final scaled oil price is determined by the expected error
of the AR change in oil price formation and the expected standard error of its
variance. From intuition, this means that during both a period of stable prices
changes as well as a period of high volatility the scaled price change is fluctuating
less compared to the case in which a smooth period is followed by a sudden peak in
price changes. Hence, the impact of shocks contributes stronger than a continuous
trend. In addition to the initial proportion by Hamilton (1996), we also observe the
model with scaled oil price decreases (SOPD).
6We obtain the lag-order selection of the autoregressive model from the Akaike information
criterion. To test for ARCH effects, we perform the Engle Lagrange multiplier test, where ARCH(1)
is valid for all countries except Japan and the USA. For these two countries, we perform two analyses:
one with ARCH(1) effects and one without. As the results do not vary significantly, we uniformly
consider ARCH(1) effects for all countries.
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The net oil price increase (NOPI) approach has been proposed by Hamilton
(1996), including an AR(4) process of oil prices in levels. It only permits the current
oil price to change and to have an impact on the economy if it exceeds the highest
price from the previous four periods. Otherwise, the NOPI value is assigned to be
zero. Consequently, the change in oil prices reflected by NOPI is not equal to a
quarterly oil price change. For j = 1, 2, 3, 4 hold
NOPIt = max(0, 100 ∗ {ln(oilt)− ln[max(oilt−j)]}). (2.4)
2.4.3 Oil share as moderator
Next to investigating the effect of oil price changes on GDP growth, we are further
interested in whether this effect is different when the economy is faced with various
oil-to-energy shares. All four baseline models are extended to allow for the investi-
gation of the role of oil and energy shares within the aggregated economy. To do
that, we make use of a moderated regression analysis in form of an Interacted VAR
(IVAR) which is an otherwise VAR model but in which an interaction term substi-
tutes the original price predictor. The interaction term is determined by the variable
which will be shocked and the conditional variable. In theory, this term measures
a moderation effect that affects the strength of the relation between a predictor
variable and a criterion variable. If there is significant relationship of the predictor
variable on the dependent variable, moderation is supported. In that case, we find
evidence that the moderator influences the effect of the independent and dependent
variable, either by amplifying or weakening the relationship between both.
IVAR have been recently introduced in several studies to analyze the impact
of structural characteristics on the response of other variables to a macroeconomic
shock. Towbin and Weber (2013) investigate the transmission of an external shock
on output and investments with the influence of varying foreign currency debt,
raw materials and exchange rate regimes. Leroy and Lucotte (2019) study the
effect of competition in the financial sector on credit procyclicality. Caggiano et al.
(2015) use an IVAR to examine the role of uncertainty at the zero lower bound by
fully endogenizing the conditioning variables. The current study is based on the
Interacted Panel VAR by Towbin and Weber (2013).7
For each oil price determination approach respectively, the recursive form of the
IVAR is described by
7We thank Towbin and Weber for providing their MATLAB codes of the toolbox for Interacted
Panel VAR estimations (based on Towbin and Weber, 2011).
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

1 0 . . . 0
α2,10,t 1 . . . 0
... α3,20,t
. . .
...
α7,10,t . . . α
7,6
0,t 1


yt (2.5)
=c+
4∑
j=1


α1,1j,t α
1,2
j,t . . . α
1,7
j,t
α2,1j,t α
2,2
j,t . . . α
2,7
j,t
... α3,2j,t
. . . α3,7j,t
α7,1j,t . . . α
7,6
j,t α
7,7
j,t


yt−j + εt εt ∼ N(0,Σ)
where the impact matrix on the left hand side is a lower triangular matrix. The
error terms are, by construction, uncorrelated across equations and orthogonalized
to each other with a diagonal covariance matrix Σ. This has the advantage that the
full system can be solved sequentially using OLS. As we use the same identification
scheme as before, the variables remain in the same order. c is the intercept and εt
describes the error term of the equation.
The baseline VAR-models from the previous section only include endogenous
variables which respond to each other respectively. In contrast to that, variables
describing a structural condition are assumed to be exogenously given and inde-
pendent of the remaining variables in the IVAR model. This is reasonable in the
short term horizon since a direct response of the oil-to-energy share includes changes
of structural infrastructure and other investments whose implications have effects
in the long run. Observing the historical development of the oil-to-energy shares
whose speed of change has been slow, supports this assumption. Furthermore, the
coefficients in this model are allowed to vary with these deterministic structural
characteristics. In other words, the autoregressive αw,qj,t coefficients are functions of
the cross-time-varying level of oil-to-energy shares:
αw,qj,t = β
w,q
j + η
w,q
j,1 · st + η
w,q
j,2 · s
2
t (2.6)
where βw,qj,t and η
w,q
j,1 are vectors of coefficients and st is the oil-to-energy share. The
dynamic responses of the endogenous variables to the oil-price shock are condition-
ally linear. However, only oil prices are restricted to interact with the oil-to-energy
share: For all remaining αw,qj,t coefficients
αw,qj,t = β
w,q
j,t for all but q = 2
holds.8
After estimating the IVAR, a structural analysis is conducted based on varying
structural characteristics to measure the consequences of a high and low oil-to-energy
8The baseline model can be obtained by assuming that (2.7) holds for all q.
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share. In more detail, we observe the effect of oil-price changes on GDP growth for
the individual 30th and 70th percentiles of the oil-to-energy share for each country.
To verify robustness of our results, we analyze the order of integration using a
unit root test (see Table 2.B.1). According to the Dickey-Fuller test, stationarity
has been confirmed for GDP, CPI, IPI, interest rate, unemployment rate, and oil-
prices in their first log-differences. For all further variables (oil-to-GDP share and
oil-to-energy share9) level-values are used.10 We choose the number of lags in the
VAR based on the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) and the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) according to the sensitivity analysis. Along with that, we use lagged
values of four quarters of a year for each variable to be able to consider variations
which appear over a year. For GDP and the oil price defining variables including its
interaction term with oil shares, we also consider the current values.
From a balanced panel dataset, the sample period of all models covers 184 quar-
ters, a time period from 1971:I to 2016:IV for 12 different countries, namely Aus-
tralia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden, the UK, and the USA. As a result, it covers the oil crises in 1979/80 as
well as the oil price increase in the 2000s and in part the sharp decrease in 2012 on-
wards. Results from a seemingly unrelated regression as a model framework similar
to Mork (1989) and Mork et al. (1994) do not essentially deviate from our finding
in the VAR-model.11
2.5 Empirical Results and Discussion
In this section, we will analyze the linear model as well as the three asymmetric ap-
proaches. Hereby, the study of moderator effects of oil shares will be done separately
from the general analysis of oil prices in the macroeconomic context. This will ease
the analysis by clearly distinguishing between the general study as it has been done
by previous researches e.g. Hamilton (1983) or more recently Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez
and Sa´nchez (2005), and the extended part which focuses on a new feature in the
relationship between oil prices and economic growth. Moreover, compared to other
9According to Wagner and Hong (2016), there is no definite answer in the econometric literature
to deal with the concept of integrated and cointegrated processes to the nonlinear environment as
it takes place in the oil-to-GDP ratio. As a minimum requirement for a useful extension of this
concept they suggested to exclude cointegration, which is why we use level-values.
10For the interest rate and the unemployment rate, the Dickey-Fuller test indicates stationarity
only for a few level values. However, in the majority of the existing literature (Hamilton, 1996;
Hooker, 1996; Lee et al., 1995; Mork, 1989; Mork et al., 1994) models are estimated with level
values. To make our results more comparable to the literature, we have performed two analyses:
one with level values and one with first difference values for interest and unemployment rate (as it
is done by Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez, 2005). Despite these differences in control variables,
the relevant results for the analysis of the moderator effect are largely robust and do not vary
significantly. Hence, we stick to the results based on our dataset by using first difference values.
The complete specification of the model is available upon request by e-mail.
11A SUR is a special form of a VAR-model with the restriction that the error terms of each time
series are correlated with each other. This allows us to deal with white noise that can affect all
local economies commonly which is assumed to be included in all error terms. As a side effect, the
amount of estimates are increased compared to the general VAR-model.
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studies, we will put more emphasis on Granger causality between oil prices, energy
shares, and aggregate growth, to find evidence for the possible role of oil shares
emitting moderator effects.
After classifying countries into groups of oil-consuming and oil-producing coun-
tries, we look at the models’ relative explanatory power using the information crite-
rion. Subsequently, causal relation as well as quantitative influence of oil prices on
economic growth are investigated. In the first instance, this is done for the general
models followed by their modified versions. For the sake of simplicity, we identify
an oil price shock as a positive change in the oil price. Correspondingly, a negative
price movement will be called a negative price shock.
2.5.1 Classification of oil-importing vs. oil-exporting country
We distinguish between oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. A country is re-
garded an oil-exporter when it displays a production-consumption ratio larger than
unity (see Figure 2.B.3). According to this definition, three out of twelve coun-
tries investigated in this study are categorized as oil producing countries. Norway
has constantly been an oil-exporting country, with an oil production exceeding con-
sumption ten times in 2013. Canada made the transformation to a pure oil-exporting
country in 1980. Since then, the average ratio has amounted to 1.5. The UK has
switched from being an oil-exporting (from 1980 onwards) to being an oil-importing
country in 2005, with a peak in the productions-consumption ratio at 1.6. However,
as the UK is classified as a net-oil-exporter during half of the observed time series
and clearly different from the remaining oil-importing countries, we consider the UK
as an oil-exporting country. The USA have faced a different development. Due to
new technologies to extract shale oil and gas, the country could increase its own
oil production significantly since the mid of 2000s. The oil-to-energy share could
be increased from 0.4 to 0.75 between 2008 and 2016 and is still showing a further
increasing trend. Nevertheless, the USA is categorized as an oil-importing country
as, in contrast to Canada, it has never had an oil-to-energy ratio lager than one
in the observed time series. Likewise ,the remaining eight countries are classified
as oil-importing countries. However, in total, the dependency on oil imports varies
largely, from 0.03 for Japan to 0.75 for the USA in 2016.
2.5.2 Model selection
Since the four models are non-nested, we cannot use the likelihood-ratio test to make
a statement about the quality of the models in comparison to each other. Therefore,
we mainly refer to the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) which impose no restrictions on. Both criteria measure the goodness
of fit of one model compared to another model. Hence, they do not make any
proposal regarding the general quality of an individual model, but rather weight
the explanatory power relative to that of other models. According to Burnham and
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Anderson (2004), the AIC has theoretical advantages compared to the BIC. Among
others, the amount of parameters are penalized less strongly using the AIC than
using the BIC. Additionally, and particularly in the case at hand, the results might
be altered due to the high number of parameters in our models setup. However,
considering differences between the standard and extended setups, the results do
not vary strongly.
Table 2.1: Information Criteria
Symmetric Asymmetric + Asymmetric - SOPI SOPD NOPI
AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
AUS 13.771 17.442 12.845 16.516 12.851 16.522 11.773 15.444 11.808 15.479 12.301 15.973
BEL 11.487 15.088 10.530 14.131 10.558 14.159 9.061 12.662 9.137 12.738 10.201 13.802
CAN 12.685 16.286 11.776 15.377 11.645 15.246 10.729 14.330 10.638 14.239 11.333 14.934
FIN 13.094 16.695 12.160 15.761 12.096 15.697 10.740 14.341 10.761 14.362 11.776 15.377
FRA 8.497 12.098 7.581 11.182 7.534 11.135 6.112 9.713 6.183 9.784 7.123 10.724
GBR 13.112 16.783 12.126 15.797 12.150 15.821 10.818 14.489 10.926 14.597 11.636 15.307
GER 9.930 13.531 8.927 12.528 9.116 12.717 7.502 11.103 7.714 11.315 8.540 12.141
JPN 10.608 14.209 9.765 13.366 9.812 13.413 8.113 11.714 8.138 11.739 9.311 12.912
NLD 12.273 15.874 11.306 14.907 11.418 15.019 9.985 13.586 9.977 13.578 10.655 14.256
NOR 18.124 21.795 17.242 20.913 17.065 20.737 16.251 19.922 16.240 19.911 16.859 20.530
SWE 13.204 16.805 12.362 15.963 12.165 15.766 10.910 14.511 10.940 14.541 12.066 15.667
USA 10.683 14.284 9.743 13.344 9.779 13.380 8.476 12.077 8.414 12.015 9.299 12.900
AIC: estimator of the relative quality of the statistical model based on the Akaike information criterion
BIC: estimator of the relative quality of the statistical model based on the Bayesian information criterion
Table 2.1 shows the results for the baseline models. We investigate both, the
AIC and BIC. The results are consistent for all countries. Concerning the standard
setup, the NOPI model and the asymmetric linear model, considering price increases
only, provide similar results, whereas the former performs slightly better. They are
both preferred over the symmetric linear approach. However, all specifications are
strictly dominated by the scaled approach considering price increases only. This is in
line with other studies such as Hamilton (2003) and Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez
(2005) who tend to prefer the SOPI approach. Nonetheless, the results also reflect
that all information criteria of these four approaches are on a similar level within
each country in our estimations. However, it is notable that in case of Norway, the
information criteria are considerable larger which can lead to an overestimation.
Concerning the relative performance of the models, graphical results of respec-
tive impulse response functions confirm similar classification (see Figures 2.2–2.7).
The graphs show the impact of oil price changes on GDP growth without moder-
ator effects. Comparing the confidence bands, we can figure out the precision of
estimation with respect to each other.
Altogether, it has to be assumed from these results that besides choosing be-
tween using a symmetric and a non-symmetric model structure, the environment of
a model, together with its advantages and disadvantages, has to be considered as
well. This is even more important when dealing with the special structure when
including moderator effects of oil-to-energy shares. Furthermore, a modeled envi-
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ronment, which considers country specific properties and additional properties such
as asymmetry and non-linearity, are valued higher regarding the consequences for
GDP growth than in the simple linear-symmetric approaches.
2.5.3 Granger causality and response to price shock
Before analyzing the influence of changes in oil prices on aggregated economic growth
and the relationship between the two qualitatively and quantitatively, we investi-
gate the causal relationship between oil price changes and GDP growth. Hereby, we
distinguish between direct and indirect causality, resulting from oil price changes.
At first, we carry out a conventional F-test for each model separately. To be more
precise, we investigate whether Granger-causality of oil prices on economic growth
is significant by performing a Wald test. According to the latter, we test the null-
hypothesis whether all oil price coefficients of each country are jointly zero. For the
asymmetric models, these tests are performed individually for positive and negative
changes. The results are shown in Table 2.2. In the following, we assume confir-
mation of a causal relationship at a 10% significance level. By considering indirect
causality from oil price changes to GDP growth by third variables, we are able to
identify possible channels which are beyond the direct oil-price to GDP growth re-
lationship. We use a structural VAR model, imposing a few constraints, to test
whether all oil price coefficient are jointly zero, but in its own equation. The results
are summarized in Table 2.3.
Subsequent to the causality test, we analyze the qualitative and quantitative
impact of an oil price shock by considering its effects on GDP growth. Table 2.4
comprises the accumulated price effect for each model in period 4 to 12 after the
shock. In addition, the results are prepared graphically as orthogonalized impulse
response functions (IRF) in Figures 2.2–2.7, looking at a time horizon of 20 pe-
riods. The size of a shock is the same for all models (100% increase/decrease in
oil price), with these shocks occurring unexpectedly. Subsequently, we discuss the
results separately for oil-importing and oil-exporting countries.
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Table 2.2: Direct Causality - base models
Symmetric Asymmetric Scaled Prices Net Prices
Price +/- Price + Price - SOPI SOPD NOPI
AUS 0.737 0.649 0.716 0.397 0.564 0.312
BEL 0.025** 0.001*** 0.127 0.022** 0.160 0.016**
CAN 0.004*** 0.199 0.001*** 0.487 0.000*** 0.112
FIN 0.606 0.197 0.046** 0.357 0.066* 0.115
FRA 0.082* 0.046** 0.126 0.152 0.310 0.023**
GBR 0.245 0.113 0.450 0.118 0.332 0.071*
GER 0.056* 0.005*** 0.205 0.031** 0.250 0.016**
JPN 0.535 0.040** 0.001*** 0.041** 0.031** 0.018**
NLD 0.066* 0.026** 0.585 0.357 0.547 0.001***
NOR 0.089* 0.077* 0.346 0.254 0.520 0.279
SWE 0.299 0.373 0.120 0.726 0.378 0.833
USA 0.410 0.163 0.658 0.028** 0.490 0.317
H0: all lagged oil-price change coefficients are jointly equal to zero (αoil1 = α
oil
2 = α
oil
3 = α
oil
4 )
Values present two-sided p-value corresponding to the F-statistic result.
Table 2.3: Indirect Causality - base models
Symmetric Asymmetric Scaled Prices Net Prices
Price +/- Price + Price - SOPI SOPD NOPI
AUS 0.004*** 0.093* 0.000*** 0.053* 0.003*** 0.021**
BEL 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.001***
CAN 0.023** 0.033** 0.014** 0.215 0.013** 0.187
FIN 0.001*** 0.016** 0.001*** 0.013** 0.005*** 0.098*
FRA 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.041** 0.000***
GBR 0.035** 0.041** 0.074 0.101 0.248 0.215
GER 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000***
JPN 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005***
NLD 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
NOR 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.184 0.014 0.000***
SWE 0.121 0.597 0.000*** 0.828 0.006*** 0.138
USA 0.013** 0.064* 0.001*** 0.152 0.021** 0.232
Indirect causality is checked by testing for block exogeneity.
Y1,t = C1 + A
′
1X1,t + A
′
2X2,t + ǫ1,t
Y2,t = C2 + B
′
1X1,t +B
′
2X2,t + ǫ2,t
where vector Y1 contains all variables except changes in oil prices and Y2 contains the oil-price
changes. X1 is the vector of all lagged variables of Y2 and correspondingly X2 contains all
lagged values of Y2
H0: all lagged oil-price change coefficients are jointly equal to zero in all equation of the
system except its own, here A′2 = 0
Consequently, the history of the block Y2 (oil-price changes) does not help in forecasting the
variable Y2.
A restricted SVAR tests for over-identifying restrictions according to the model above. The
test is computed as:
LR = 2(LLvar − LLsvar)
where LR is the value of the test statistic against the null hypothesis that the over-identifying
restrictions are valid, LLvar is the log likelihood from the underlying VAR(p) model, and
LLsvar is the log likelihood from the restricted SVAR model. The results are presented as
two-sided p-value corresponding to the asymptotically distributed χ2(q) where q corresponds
to the number of restrictions.
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Table 2.4: Accumulation of price effects
Symmetric model with shock in ∆oil
quarters AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
4 -0.010 -0.007 0.002 -0.009 -0.008 -0.011 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 0.009 0.012 -0.020*
6 -0.010 -0.016* -0.004 -0.028 -0.015* -0.020* -0.011 -0.006 -0.008 0.009 0.001 -0.025*
8 -0.009 -0.014* -0.004 -0.036 -0.019* -0.021* -0.014 -0.005 -0.011 0.008 -0.002 -0.024*
10 -0.004 -0.012 -0.001 -0.038 -0.017* -0.019 -0.013 -0.004 -0.012 0.008 -0.002 -0.020
12 -0.003 -0.013 0.000 -0.037 -0.015* -0.015 -0.012 -0.003 -0.012 0.008 0.000 -0.019
Asymmetric price model with shock in ∆oil+ and ∆oil−
quarter AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil−
4 -0.026* 0.005 0.004 -0.020 -0.008 0.016 -0.011 -0.007 -0.014 -0.003 -0.022 -0.002 -0.006 0.009 -0.031 0.013 -0.011 -0.006 -0.005 0.033* 0.016 0.015 -0.050* 0.004
6 -0.021 -0.001 -0.016 -0.022 -0.019 0.014 -0.035 -0.030 -0.024* -0.012 -0.038* -0.014 -0.025 0.004 -0.029 0.011 -0.019 -0.002 -0.010 0.035 -0.007 0.013 -0.065* 0.009
8 -0.022 0.002 -0.012 -0.021 -0.016 0.012 -0.041 -0.046 -0.029* -0.015 -0.036* -0.019 -0.032 -0.001 -0.025 0.010 -0.023 -0.004 -0.010 0.034 -0.012 0.010 -0.065* 0.014
10 -0.014 0.006 -0.007 -0.021 -0.012 0.014 -0.041 -0.052 -0.028* -0.013 -0.032 -0.019 -0.027 -0.001 -0.022 0.012 -0.022 -0.006 -0.010 0.034 -0.011 0.009 -0.060* 0.017
12 -0.010 0.007 -0.010 -0.020 -0.010 0.015 -0.038 -0.051 -0.025* -0.010 -0.028 -0.015 -0.023 -0.002 -0.021 0.012 -0.022 -0.006 -0.010 0.034 -0.009 0.010 -0.058* 0.018
Scaled price model with shock in ∆SOPI and ∆SOPD
quarter AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD
4 -0.052* 0.003 0.012 -0.036 -0.034 0.020 -0.071 -0.013 -0.035 -0.004 -0.080* -0.022 -0.042* 0.018 -0.099 0.055 -0.052 0.005 0.007 0.050 0.005 0.015 -0.114* 0.009
6 -0.048* -0.004 -0.021 -0.039 -0.046 0.007 -0.140* -0.060 -0.056* -0.019 -0.094* -0.043 -0.056* 0.007 -0.098 0.056 -0.044 0.018 0.006 0.049 -0.035 0.005 -0.144* 0.014
8 -0.047* 0.000 -0.019 -0.034 -0.047 0.001 -0.165* -0.089 -0.071* -0.025 -0.090* -0.053 -0.071* 0.001 -0.093 0.057 -0.059 0.015 0.007 0.052 -0.042 -0.004 -0.156* 0.023
10 -0.035 0.007 -0.013 -0.033 -0.044 0.003 -0.173* -0.103 -0.072* -0.023 -0.082* -0.050 -0.061 0.000 -0.086 0.060 -0.057 0.010 0.007 0.052 -0.041 -0.005 -0.154* 0.028
12 -0.029 0.008 -0.018 -0.033 -0.042 0.006 -0.168* -0.101 -0.066* -0.017 -0.077* -0.043 -0.061 -0.002 -0.085 0.061 -0.055 0.009 0.007 0.052 -0.038 -0.003 -0.151* 0.032
Net price model with shock in ∆NOPI
quarter AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
4 -0.027 -0.014 -0.009 -0.025 -0.024* -0.024 -0.016 -0.065* -0.016 -0.001 0.006 -0.055*
6 -0.020 -0.042* -0.032 -0.044 -0.038* -0.048* -0.042* -0.062* -0.040* -0.011 -0.022 -0.079*
8 -0.025 -0.030* -0.027 -0.050 -0.043* -0.045* -0.047* -0.053* -0.046* -0.012 -0.028 -0.076*
10 -0.014 -0.019 -0.017 -0.047 -0.040* -0.037 -0.041 -0.050* -0.044* -0.012 -0.025 -0.065*
12 -0.011 -0.024 -0.012 -0.041 -0.034* -0.029 -0.035 -0.050* -0.043* -0.012 -0.022 -0.061*
Table includes accumulated response of GDP growth after a one-standard-deviation in oil prices according to the respected model.
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Figure 2.2: Orthogonalized IRF of GDP growth to a one-standard-deviation
positive symmetric oil price shock
−0.1
0.0
0.1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(a) Australia
−0.2
−0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(b) Belgium
−0.2
−0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(c) Canada
−0.2
−0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(d) Finland
−0.1
0.0
0.1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(e) France
−0.2
−0.1
0.0
0.1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(f) United Kingdom
−0.2
−0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(g) Germany
−0.2
−0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(h) Japan
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(i) Netherlands
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(j) Norway
−0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(k) Sweden
−0.2
−0.1
0.0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
(l) United States
Figure 2.3: Orthogonalized IRF of GDP growth to a one-standard-deviation
positive asymmetric oil price shock
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Black (solid) line indicates point estimate and blue (sticked) lines indicate 90% confidence band.
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Figure 2.4: Orthogonalized IRF of GDP growth to a one-standard-deviation
negative asymmetric oil price shock
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Figure 2.5: Orthogonalized IRF of GDP growth to a one-standard-deviation
positive scaled oil price shock (SOPI)
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Black (solid) line indicates point estimate and blue (sticked) lines indicate 90% confidence band.
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Figure 2.6: Orthogonalized IRF of GDP growth to a one-standard-deviation
negative scaled oil price shock (SOPD)
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Figure 2.7: Orthogonalized IRF of GDP growth to a one-standard-deviation
positive net oil price shock (NOPI)
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Black (solid) line indicates point estimate and blue (sticked) lines indicate 90% confidence band.
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2.5.3.1 Oil-importing countries
Considering a positive oil price shock shows an inconsistent economic response
among the oil importing countries with respect to Granger causality. Under the
assumption of symmetry, a change in oil prices is significantly Granger causing eco-
nomic growth through the direct channel in only three out of nine oil importing
countries, namely Belgium, Germany, and Japan. However, the indirect channel
through a third variable takes a more important role, being highly significant for
all countries except Canada.12 Regarding the GDP growth responds after an oil
price shock, the majority of countries have a similar development in their responses.
A direct increase in GDP growth is followed by a drop in its growth rate which
fades out after a few quarters (Figure 2.2). In contrast to that, Japan’s economy is
faced by frequent fluctuations in GDP growth which neutralize each other. These
developments are also visible in the accumulated responses of the price shock. In
total, all oil-importing countries face a negative impact whereas it is significantly
weaker in Japan, accounting for -0.9% after two years (-3.8% for Finland, -2.9 for
the USA, and -2.1% for France; see Table 2.4). Although Sweden’s economy is also
negatively affected in the second year after the price increase, these effects are offset
by its initial positive response. The special case of Japan will be discussed in Section
2.5.4.1.
In the asymmetric framework, the results of the linear-asymmetric, scaled-, and
net-price models are qualitatively equal, at least for oil price increases (see Figures
2.3, 2.5, and 2.7). Similar to the symmetric approach, all countries experience
negative accumulated impacts on GDP growth after two years. But in contrast to the
symmetric approach, also Sweden and Japan experience by clearly negative effects
from the second year onwards. The non-European countries Australia, Japan, the
USA experience immediate drops in GDP growth which are delayed by a few quarters
for the remaining oil-importing countries. Overall, this is consistent with regard to
their oil dependency. However, (direct) Granger-causality cannot be confirmed for
all countries. Similar to the linear symmetric approach, only a few countries have
Granger causality from oil-price changes to GDP growth directly. Alone Belgium and
Germany show significant results throughout the three approaches, the Netherlands
lacks in significance in the scaled price approach, whereas Japan and the USA have
significant results in the scaled price approach only. In contrast to that, indirect
influence of changes in oil-prices on GDP growth though at least one of the remaining
aggregated macroeconomic indicators are mostly valid for all countries except for
Canada.
Regarding the magnitudes, the countries differ partially depending on the model
selection. It is noticeable that the USA and Japan face the highest impacts on GDP
12In contrast to other literature such as Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005), we could not find
a significant indirect causal effect in all five models (for both positive and negative price change)
for Canada.
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growth. Especially for Japan, these strong consequences are not surprising since
it has had by far the highest dependency on oil imports of above 96%. For the
USA, it can be explained that the US economy experienced by real exchange rate
appreciation which has been pointed out by Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005).
In other words, as oil is traded in US dollars on the world market, the USA cannot
counteract changes in oil prices by adjusting their currency, in contrast to other
countries. Furthermore, it is worth to mention that the most recent development in
shale oil extraction have not been explicitly covered in this paper as the time range
concerned is only 15% of the whole time series. We leave this to further research.
On average, the linear asymmetric approach generates lower magnitudes while
the scaled approach has slightly larger results than the NOPI model. Moreover, the
asymmetric models generate higher magnitudes than the symmetric approach. Both
are in line with former studies. Although the price shock is qualitatively the same
within all models, its effect is enhanced in the net price and above all in the scaled
model as both approaches act more sensible to previous price trends. For example,
Germany experiences an accumulated GDP growth loss of 1.3% in the symmetric
approach, 2.5% in the asymmetric linear approach, 3.7% in the NOPI model, and
4.6% in the scaled price approach.
Observing negative oil price movements, the results contradict with the vast
literature which mainly reject any relationship of negative oil price changes with
GDP growth. From the F-test, analyzing the direct influence of oil-price changes
on GDP growth, we find significant effects for Finland (not SOPD), France, Japan,
and Sweden (not SOPD). Indirect channels can be highly identified for all coun-
tries. Each of them experiences a positive response in GDP growth rates after price
increases turning to become negative in the second year, until it fades out in the
subsequent years. The size of the magnitude seems to be inconsistent, leading to
clearly positive accumulated results for Australia, Germany, Sweden, and the USA
but negative results for Belgium, Finland, and France for both of the negative price
approaches. Only Japan and the Netherlands have inconsistent accumulated effects,
being negative in the linear-asymmetric approach and positive in the scaled model.
The accumulated negative response for some countries ranging from -0.4% for
Japan up to -4.4% for Finland in the linear approach contradicts with the assumption
that an economy profits from lower costs on the demand side of economic players. A
possible explanation for this unusual effect is that the few sharp oil price decreases
have taken place along with low economic growth rates (in the 1980s) up to a reces-
sion (2008). Consequently, the countries have been confronted with these shocks at
a time period where the domestic economy has been more vulnerable to economic
downturns which overall has had stronger negative effects. According to the accu-
mulated IRFs, it is worth to mention that the respective reaction of GDP growth
rates after price drops is not as strong as in the case of a positive oil price shock.
With the exception of Sweden in the linear model and Belgium in both models, all
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remaining countries show a lower accumulated magnitude, which is confirmed by
the IRF figures (see Figure 2.4 and 2.6).
To conclude, the results after positive shocks on oil prices are in compliance
with the literature, saying that overall, countries’ GDP growth reacts negatively.
However, in contrast to previous studies, decreasing oil prices have significant effects
on GDP growth as we have seen for a few countries. Moreover, as the more preferred
scaled oil price model (followed by the net price approach) has higher magnitudes in
its price coefficients, it seems that the consequences of an oil price shock on economic
growth are larger in a volatile economy than in a stable one. This finding prevails
throughout this study. It confirms the assumption that economic uncertainty or
unexpected sharp price changes which are intensified in the non-linear approaches,
induce higher pressure on the economy.
2.5.3.2 Oil-exporting countries
For oil-exporting countries, the F-test mirrors the results of the oil-importing coun-
tries, namely that there is almost no support for a direct causal effect from oil-price
movements on GDP growth, with the exception of the UK (in NOPI only). Only for
Canada, we find some effects but they are limited to oil-price decreases. However, as
seen before, the main influence by oil-price changes takes place in indirect channels
which also holds for the UK and Norway. For Canada alone, we cannot confirm any
significant indirect causal effect which can be traced back to oil price changes only.
Qualitatively, the UK and Norway are similarly affected by oil price shocks showing
a positive response in GDP growth in the first periods which becomes negative af-
terwards. Overall, the accumulated price effects are negative after three years as the
initial positive development is preponderated by the negative response. Only in the
symmetric and scaled price approaches, Norway deviates by experiencing a positive
accumulated pressure on GDP growth. At first glance, the adverse effects seem to be
unexpected since the oil extracting sector is generally profiting from higher prices.
But Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005) find the same results for the UK linking
it to the exchange rate appreciation which has been a side effect of oil price hikes.
In our model, the effective exchange rate is not used as a separate variable but
integrated in the country’s specific oil price. Furthermore, Canada has been an oil-
demanding country since the 1970s, and the UK is one since 2008 an oil-demanding
country. As such, it is not surprising to find a response resembling that of the oil-
importing countries analyzed in the previous section. Considering the magnitude
of IRFs, the largest accumulated effects after an oil price shock is in the British
economy. In the linear-asymmetric approach, a 100% increase in oil prices leads to
an accumulated reduction of economic growth of 2.3% for UK whereas the decrease
in growth of Norway values only 1.6%. This trend continues in the other price
structures as well.
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Table 2.5: Existence of moderator effect - extended models
Moderator Symmetric Asymmetric Scaled Prices Net Prices
Price +/- Price + Price - SOPI SOPD NOPI
AUS 2.345*** 2.494*** 2.220*** 2.504*** 2.315*** 2.450***
BEL 1.200 1.013 1.617** 1.144 1.462** 0.309
CAN 1.808*** 1.899*** 1.582** 1.887*** 1.609** 2.011***
FIN 1.784*** 1.856*** 2.149*** 1.955*** 2.005*** 1.918***
FRA 1.385* 1.193 1.726*** 1.499*** 2.153*** 1.104
GBR 3.873*** 3.949*** 4.119*** 3.691*** 4.045*** 4.195***
GER 1.208 1.121 0.893 1.025 0.895 0.995
JPN 2.454*** 2.503*** 2.639*** 2.399*** 3.048*** 2.270***
NLD 2.883*** 2.473*** 3.317*** 2.398*** 3.630*** 2.561***
NOR 1.404* 1.370* 1.268 1.332* 1.362* 1.477**
SWE 2.670*** 3.009*** 2.543*** 2.983*** 2.601*** 2.628***
USA 2.641*** 2.562*** 2.392*** 2.628*** 2.463*** 2.688***
H0: all lagged interaction term coefficients are jointly equal to zero
(ηw,21,1 = η
w,2
2,1 = η
w,2
3,1 = η
w,2
4,1 = η
w,2
1,2 = η
w,2
2,2 = η
w,2
3,2 = η
w,2
4,2 1 ≤ w < 7, w ∈ N)
Coefficient are taken from (2.6): αw,qj,t = β
w,q
j + η
w,q
j,1 · st + η
w,q
j,2 · s
2
t
Values present F-statistics, corresponding significance levels are 1.33 (10%), 1.44 (5%), and 1.66 (1%).
2.5.4 Granger causality with moderator effects
The modified version of the model includes interaction effects of changes in oil prices
and the quarterly moving average oil-to-energy share to incorporate a possible mod-
erator in the explanation of economic growth. Hence, with the F-test, checking for
Granger causality, it is tested whether all moderator coefficients are jointly zero. A
significant result indicates that the oil-to-energy share has an impact on how the
oil-price affects economic growth. The results are summarized in Table 2.5. As in
the baseline model, we consider the accumulated effect of price changes as well as its
development over the periods in an IRF graph. The structural characteristic in the
interaction term which is represented by the oil-to-energy share, is kept constant and
enters the model exogenously. Concerning the accumulated effect, we take the 50th
percentile of each individual countries’ oil-to-energy share. This yields an approxi-
mate average of the oil-to-energy development over the investigated time period. For
the non-accumulated orthogonalized IRF analysis of GDP growth after and oil price
shock, we further calculate the respective results for the 30th and 70th percentile
as depicted in the Figures 2.8–2.13. The black (solid) line indicates the estimated
points, while the blue (sticked) line indicates the 70th percentile of oil-to-energy
share and the red (dotted) line indicates the 30th percentile of oil-to-energy share.
This provides an insight into the relationship between variations in oil prices and
economic growth, and how this relationship is affected depending on the shares of
different energies it is faced with. Again, we look at oil-importing and oil-exporting
countries separately. In doing so, we first discuss the causal relation of oil price
changes to GDP growth, followed by investigating the price effects including the
moderator variable stemming from the changes in the oil-to-energy share.
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2.5.4.1 Oil-importing countries
Using the explanatory power of a F-test, it is investigated whether the inclusion of
oil-to-energy shares as moderator variables makes a significant difference and hence,
whether including them improves the model. Table 2.5 shows the corresponding
results for all countries. We find evidence for Granger causality of the interaction
coefficients with GDP growth and according to that the existence of moderator
effects. For the majority of oil-importing countries, causality can be confirmed at
the 1% significance level. Alternatively, to rule out any misspecification regarding
the functional form of our models, we also check the fit of a linear function to
determine the oil-price coefficients, allowing for linearity in the moderator effect.
However, for most countries, there is a lack of significance, confirming that non-
linearity is an essential assumption, as non-linearity reflects the intensification effect
of oil-price changes. In sum, the extension of standard oil-price–GDP models by
adding the behavior of oil-to-energy share but also its non-linear interaction with
oil-prices over time lead to an improvement in estimation results. Considering the
linear price approaches, it is striking that all oil-importing countries experience
similar responses in GDP growth after a positive oil price shock. With exception
of Germany and the USA, the initial reaction is an increase in growth, followed by
up-and-down movements which slowly fade out.
The accumulated responses of GDP growth are presented in Table 2.6. In the
linear approaches which are less valued according to the IC criteria, all countries are
negatively affected by price shocks from the second year onwards with the exception
of Australia and the Netherlands in the symmetric model, and Belgium and France
in the asymmetric model. Surprisingly, we find a positive response of GDP growth
for Japan in all models which contradicts the results from the baseline model. Com-
pared to the other countries, it further seems that the positive pure price effects are
persistent at higher levels (1.2% in the symmetric approach and 4.4% in the asym-
metric approach). These unusual outcomes for Japan have already been discussed
in previous papers (Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez, 2005; Mork et al., 1994). In
their studies, economic growth in Japan was positively affected by oil price increases
which has been explained with a more resilient Japanese economy. The country
overcame the second oil price crisis after 1980 much better than the first crisis (73–
74), in particular compared with other oil importing countries. As Japan could not
benefit significantly from oil price drops in the 1980s, the resilient effect is even am-
plified in our symmetric model. But unlike Mork et al. and Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and
Sa´nchez, this finding can also be obtained from our model. The inclusion of oil-to-
energy shares could be the reason why this outcome cannot be found in the baseline
model. According to the results, the higher resistance to oil price shocks has existed
especially in periods with higher dependency on oil for example the 1970s. At that
time, ratios have been far above the shares of remaining oil-importing countries ex-
cluding Sweden. Comparing these results to those of low oil-to-energy shares, their
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accumulated responses of GDP growth have declined, or have even become negative.
Hence, as the response of GDP growth has become worse in the subsequent years
and the role of oil within the economy has lost in magnitude it can be concluded
that resilience could not be maintained by Japan over the time.13
In the non-linear models, the response patterns of GDP growth are very similar.
Firstly, the SOPI acts as an amplified version of the NOPI as the qualitative mag-
nitudes of response in the IRF graphs for each country respectively are very similar
(compare Figures 2.11 and 2.13). The negative responses are also confirmed by the
accumulated output as the qualitative results are mainly equal. Only for Belgium
and France, we find positive results in the scaled approach but in both cases, the
accumulated effects are negligible. Secondly, there is great variety among countries.
As an early reaction, GDP growth undergoes negative pressure in Australia, Fin-
land, the Netherlands and the USA, which turns to become positive with the times.
Common features in this group can be constituted in a significant lower dependency
in oil-imports, except for Finland. However, the latter does not recover notably as
the remaining countries. Contrary to that, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, and
Sweden initially react positively but undergo negative pressure in GDP growth from
the second year which offsets the previous gains. Hence, these economies have a
delay in facing the concrete consequences which follow from an oil price shock.
The response of GDP growth to a negative oil price shock is similar to the results
from the respective baseline models. All oil-importing countries experience positive
effects except for Belgium, Finland and France. Again, this is argued with the timing
of negative price changes and the state of the economy at that time. Only for the
USA, we find diverging qualitative outcomes as their accumulated growth rates
become negative (1.3% in the linear approach, 3.1% in the scaled approach). This
is in line with Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005) whereas the author cannot
confirm it for the scaled approach. It should be noted that when lowering its oil-
to-energy share, the US economy’s positive and negative responses neutralize each
other, leading to results resembling those of Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez.
Additionally, the response of the economy to various oil-to-energy shares are
calculated. In particular, the 30th and 70th percentiles of each individual country’s
oil-to-energy share are used to show their different effects on GDP growth. The
results are enclosed in the IRF graphs and can be gathered from Figure 2.8–2.13.
Two trends that go along with high or low oil-to-energy shares can be found. Firstly,
an oil-importing country experiences a more negative pressure on its GDP growth
when it has a higher oil-to-energy ratio. This makes intuitive sense as in such a
case the expenditures for its oil-imports increase. However, this also means that the
13In another study, Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2012) investigate macroeconomic responses
of oil price shocks with respect to structural breaks. Among others, they identified breaks in the mid
of 1970s and mid of 1990s in interest rate, wage and exchange rate considering a time series from
1970 to 2008. In models controlling for these breaks, they found that the effects oil price changes
are less visible in most recent episodes. Our outcomes does not contradicts with their results as the
oil-to-energy share can be seen as another variable to incorporate structural changes.
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Figure 2.8: Orthogonalized IRF of GDP growth to a one-standard-deviation
positive symmetric oil price shock with moderator
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Figure 2.9: Orthogonalized IRF of GDP growth to a one-standard-deviation
positive asymmetric oil price shock with moderator
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Black (solid) line indicates point estimate of GDP growth to a one-standard deviation oil price shock with a consistent oil-to-energy share equal to the country’s 50th percentile,
blue (sticked) line indicates a consistent 70th percentile of oil-to-energy share, and red (dotted) line indicates a consistent 30th percentile of oil-to-energy share Black (solid) line
indicates point estimate, blue (sticked) line indicates 70th percentile of oil-to-energy share, and red (dotted) line indicates 30th percentile of oil-to-energy share.
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Figure 2.10: Orthogonalized IRF of GDP growth to a one-standard-
deviation negative asymmetric oil price shock with moderator
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Figure 2.11: Orthogonalized IRF of GDP growth to a one-standard-
deviation positive scaled oil price shock (SOPI) with moderator
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Black (solid) line indicates point estimate of GDP growth to a one-standard deviation oil price shock with a consistent oil-to-energy share equal to the country’s 50th percentile,
blue (sticked) line indicates a consistent 70th percentile of oil-to-energy share, and red (dotted) line indicates a consistent 30th percentile of oil-to-energy share Black (solid) line
indicates point estimate, blue (sticked) line indicates 70th percentile of oil-to-energy share, and red (dotted) line indicates 30th percentile of oil-to-energy share.
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Figure 2.12: Orthogonalized IRF of GDP growth to a one-standard-
deviation negative scaled oil price shock (SOPD) with moderator
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Figure 2.13: Orthogonalized IRF of GDP growth to a one-standard-
deviation positive net oil price shock (NOPI) with moderator
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Black (solid) line indicates point estimate of GDP growth to a one-standard deviation oil price shock with a consistent oil-to-energy share equal to the country’s 50th percentile,
blue (sticked) line indicates a consistent 70th percentile of oil-to-energy share, and red (dotted) line indicates a consistent 30th percentile of oil-to-energy share Black (solid) line
indicates point estimate, blue (sticked) line indicates 70th percentile of oil-to-energy share, and red (dotted) line indicates 30th percentile of oil-to-energy share.
O
il
P
rice
S
h
o
ck
s
a
n
d
G
D
P
G
ro
w
th
39
Table 2.6: Accumulation of price effects with moderators
Symmetric model with shock in ∆oil
quarters AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
4 0.006 0.007 0.018 0.008 0.006 -0.011 0.005 0.025* 0.017* 0.020 0.011 -0.008
6 -0.006 0.000 0.002 -0.006 0.001 -0.017 0.004 0.025 0.013 0.010 0.006 -0.016
8 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.013 -0.001 -0.021 -0.002 0.026 0.011 0.008 0.001 -0.021
10 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.019 -0.002 -0.019 -0.002 0.028 0.009 0.010 0.002 -0.020
12 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.019 -0.002 -0.017 -0.006 0.025 0.010 0.009 0.003 -0.019
Asymmetric price model with shock in ∆oil+ and ∆oil−
quarter AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil− ∆oil+ ∆oil−
4 -0.017 0.013 0.016 -0.003 0.008 0.037*** 0.008 0.010 0.018 -0.002 -0.035* -0.006 0.009 0.008 0.025 0.016 -0.002 0.033** -0.011 0.024 0.002 0.023 -0.026* 0.011
6 -0.036* -0.002 0.010 -0.010 -0.002 0.018 0.002 -0.031 0.015 -0.011 -0.067*** -0.005 0.006 0.010 0.036** 0.006 -0.014 0.032** -0.023 0.023 0.002 0.006 -0.030 0.006
8 -0.010 0.000 0.011 -0.011 -0.009 0.020 -0.005 -0.055 0.005 -0.014 -0.065** -0.013 -0.002 0.005 0.040* 0.001 -0.011 0.025 -0.035 0.021 -0.004 -0.002 -0.039* 0.0097
10 -0.011 0.003 0.010 -0.010 -0.012 0.023 -0.016 -0.068* -0.002 -0.012 -0.056** -0.018 -0.004 0.004 0.042 0.005 -0.013 0.020 -0.038 0.022 -0.006 0.000 -0.04 0.016
12 -0.015 0.001 0.009 -0.010 -0.011 0.024 -0.021 -0.073* -0.007 -0.010 -0.051** -0.019 -0.008 0.002 0.038 0.005 -0.013 0.020 -0.042 0.020 -0.006 0.002 -0.037* 0.019
Scaled price model with shock in ∆SOPI and ∆SOPD
quarter AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD ∆ SOPI ∆ SOPD
4 -0.061 0.014 0.033 -0.002 -0.008 0.064 -0.045* 0.024 0.007 0.001 -0.099*** -0.017 0.010 0.011 0.040 0.042 -0.064* 0.086** -0.014 0.040 -0.013 0.025 -0.071** 0.043
6 -0.093* -0.006 0.025 -0.016 -0.029 0.017* -0.094 -0.040* -0.006 -0.013 -0.158*** -0.017 -0.011 0.018 0.052 0.033 -0.070* 0.085** -0.009 0.046 -0.036 0.004 -0.099** 0.043
8 -0.052 -0.003 0.023 -0.015 -0.038 0.017* -0.107 -0.084* -0.021 -0.020 -0.150*** -0.031 -0.034 0.010 0.050 0.028 -0.073* 0.074* -0.028 0.040 -0.041 -0.007 -0.114*** 0.043
10 -0.048 0.000 0.021 -0.012 -0.044 0.027* -0.127 -0.113* -0.026 -0.018 -0.130** -0.038 -0.049 0.003 0.062 0.031 -0.079* 0.0659 -0.031 0.047 -0.044 -0.006 -0.111*** 0.052
12 -0.054 0.000 0.017 -0.011 -0.042 0.036 -0.125 -0.120* -0.026 -0.013 -0.119** -0.038 -0.061 -0.005 0.062 0.035 -0.076* 0.064* -0.032 0.042 -0.047 -0.002 -0.112** 0.059
Net price model with shock in ∆NOPI
quarter AUS BEL CAN FIN FRA GBR GER JPN NLD NOR SWE USA
4 -0.026* 0.013*** 0.002 0.010 0.016 -0.039* -0.005 0.031* -0.014 -0.016 -0.002 -0.019
6 -0.058*** -0.003 -0.011 -0.006 0.009 -0.073* -0.006 0.046 -0.042 -0.045* -0.002 -0.025
8 -0.015 -0.004 -0.020 -0.019 0.001 -0.074* -0.013 0.035 -0.039 -0.056** -0.005 -0.045
10 -0.018 -0.001 -0.023 -0.027 -0.012 -0.056 -0.015 0.034 -0.040 -0.062* -0.005 -0.049*
12 -0.023 -0.003 -0.023 -0.034 -0.022 -0.042 -0.022 0.030 -0.043 -0.065* -0.004 -0.050
Table includes accumulated response of GDP growth after a one-standard-deviation in oil prices according to the respected model.
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higher share amplifies the effect of oil price changes on economic growth. Secondly,
there is higher fluctuation in GDP growth the higher the oil-to-energy share. This
result is in line with the theoretical assumption that a higher dependency on imports
of fossil energy, such as oil, makes a country more vulnerable to price changes. All
countries have in common that they experience a prevailingly declining oil-to-energy
share over the whole observed time span. In line with our results it can be concluded
that the (declining) moderator effect weakens the effect of oil prices on economic
growth.
However, the graphical results also show that countries do not respond equally to
changes in the oil-to-energy ratio. In case of an oil-price shock, all countries would
improve, in terms of GDP, by lowering their oil-dependency. However, while Aus-
tralia and Belgium would hardly experience any changes, countries such as Finland,
France, the Netherlands, and Sweden would face dramatic drops in GDP growth. It
is likely that this depends on the respective country’s potential to adjust its oil-to-
energy ratio, but also on the country’s general development so far. For the latter
group of countries, the energy shares have varied between 30 (France) and up to
60 percentage points (Sweden). As we set the structural characteristic according to
the countries’ individual development, this makes it hard to directly compare them
quantitatively.
To conclude, the decline of oil-to-energy shares has contributed to a decreased
magnitude with which GDP growth reacts to oil price fluctuations. Due to lower
(negative) effects, the consequences of uncertainty regarding the short-term develop-
ment of price changes has also improved. As in the baseline model, oil price increases
have a larger magnitude of response to GDP growth compared to the magnitude of
response to oil price decreases. In other words, the effects of oil price decreases do
not always reflect the mirror image of comparable oil price increases. Consequently,
asymmetric frameworks still outperform symmetric ones. We conclude that the
change in the energy mix may also be seen as a possible determinant to a changed
causal relationship between oil prices and GDP growth.
2.5.4.2 Oil-exporting countries
The results of a F-test to check for the significance of the interaction terms within
the functions determining the price coefficients are summarized in Table 2.5. For
Canada and the UK, the moderator effect from the oil-to-energy share is consistent
and highly significant in all four price models. For Norway, the existence is slightly
weaker but still confirmed at the 10% significance level.
Qualitatively, the response of GDP growth to a positive oil price shock does not
differ from the baseline model, excluding Norway. The results provide a picture,
largely uniform for all countries which are mainly suffering from an increase in
prices, even for the case of Norway. Aggregated economic growth responds with
instantaneous drops, with Canada’s economic response occurring with a short time
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lag. Overall, the inclusion of the interaction term seems to improve the model
by making the results more consistent. However, for an oil-exporting country, the
negative response might be surprising, as—theoretically—the terms of trade profit
from higher exporting prices. However, Canada and the UK do have something in
common concerning their import-export ratio of oil: In 1980, Canada has changed
from a former oil importing, into an oil exporting country. Ever since, it has been
an importer, even throughout most of the oil crises, making it particularly difficult
to classify the effects based on our observations. Moreover, Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and
Sa´nchez (2005) point out an exchange rate appreciation in the Canadian economy
after oil price increases which can justify the negative reaction of GDP growth after
1982 despite exporting crude oil.
The UK has experienced the opposite transformation in the 2000s after having
been an oil-producing country since the 1980s. Therefore, it shares structural prop-
erties similar to those of oil-importing countries, at least for half of the observed
time period, including positive shocks in the 1970s. In contrast to the cases of
Canada or the UK, Norway has always been an oil-exporting country, with extrac-
tion of oil exceeding domestic consumption multiple times. The unusual response
of Norway can be explained with an appreciation of the exchange rate, similar to
the case of Canada. Additionally, the Norwegian response can be explained with
the development of its oil-to-energy share over the observed time. In contrast to
all other countries, Norway has not experienced a steady decrease in its ratio but
achieved its bottom of around 30% in early 2000s. Afterwards, the share has in-
creased significantly by more than 13 percentage points. The subsequent phase of
oil price increases has taken place simultaneously with low aggregate growth rates
due to world recession in 2008. As we calculate the accumulated effects of positive
oil price shocks taking the 50th percentile, the results might give a distorted picture
of the true effects. Therefore, we consider the varying responses by taking different
structural characteristics into account.
In case of various oil-to-energy ratios, Canada’s and the UK’s responses deviate
significantly from Norway. Comparing the 50th and 70th percentiles, higher shares
along with oil price shocks do not only impair their economic growth with larger
magnitudes but also increase the volatility of GDP growth rates notably. The last
reaction particularly applies to Canada. By contrast, Norway’s economy is more
resilient to changes in its oil-to-energy ratio.
The response of negative oil price shocks on GDP growth is similar as in the base-
line model in spite of taking the country’s specific oil-to-energy ratio into account.
As we can confirm moderation effects, accumulated growth responds positively in
Canada and Norway whereas the UK suffers from sharp oil-price declines. However,
by analyzing the development of the response, Canada’s economy is less robust to
price drops compared to Norway which leads to greater negative responses in later
periods which even offset the earlier gains in the scaled approach. This contradicts
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with Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez (2005) who found reverse results for Canada
and no significant outcome for Norway.14 As it can be seen from IRF Figures 2.10
and 2.12, this response is intensified by considering higher oil-to-energy shares. In
the case of Canada, larger oil-to-energy shares generate larger magnitudes, especially
in the negative range, along with increased variabilities.
To conclude, using the presented models, and thus taking oil-to-energy shares
into account when analyzing the response to price changes, does make a considerable
difference, especially for the three oil-exporting countries. Overall, accumulated neg-
ative effects of oil price increases, as observed in the baseline model, are confirmed
for all countries. However, the development and dimension of the same do differ
between countries. This is partly due to the historical development in oil-to-energy
shares, but also due to the structural alteration of the economies, either from an
oil-importing towards an oil-exporting economy (Canada) or due to an economy
with two oil-import periods (the UK). Consequently, this group of countries has to
be evaluated more sensitively, especially when it comes to cross-country compar-
isons. Concerning the magnitudes of responses to price increases and decreases, we
can confirm the previous findings for oil-importing countries, namely that the price
decreases have a smaller effect on aggregated growth.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the role of oil price movements on GDP growth considering
four different models of price determination. It shows that oil consuming countries
are negatively affected by positive oil price shocks. These results are consistent with
the literature. Even by enlarging the sample size by adding new countries to the
model and extending the time horizon to 2016, the results remain valid.
Moreover, our results confirm the exclusion of symmetry in the relationship of
oil prices and GDP as it has been assumed since the 1980s. However, in contrast
to previous studies, the role of decreasing oil prices should not be ignored as we
have seen for a few countries. Most strikingly, the paper analyzes the existence of
moderator effects caused by a decline in the oil-to-energy share which weakens the
causal effect of oil prices on economic growth. In all twelve countries, this moderator
is highly significant. We find that oil price increases have a lower effect on GDP
growth the lower the oil-to-energy ratio. Hereby, oil-importing countries clearly
profit from a decreasing oil-to-energy share whereas oil-exporting countries show a
more variable behavior. Furthermore, the response of GDP growth are significantly
weakened along with lower oil shares. This result is in line with the theoretical
assumption that a higher dependency on imports of fossil energy resources such
as oil makes a country more vulnerable to price variations. Since all countries
14In their study looking at multivariate correlation between GDP growth and oil-price decreases,
Mork et al. (1994) confirm a positive result for Canada and negative outcome for the UK using the
same variables.
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face declining oil-to-energy ratios, it helps to explain why direct consequences of
fluctuations in oil prices on GDP growth have decreased during the past 40 years.
Since this paper only investigates aggregated macroeconomic activities, hetero-
geneous and detailed changes within the economy such as on the more detailed
sector-level are not addressed. Hence, it is probably worthwhile to take a deeper
look to sectoral or even firm specific variables to allow for dissimilar developments
of energy consumption. A broader analysis helps to control for diverse technical
progress on the micro-level which are offset on the macro-level and therefore not vis-
ible in our study. Additional insights from more refined models remain on the agenda
for further research. Furthermore, the recent development in new technologies to
extract shale oil have lowered the dependency on oil imports for some countries, in
particular for the USA. Although, this has not been considered due to its short time
range, this progress should be recognized in subsequent analysis covering a longer
time series. Last, another theory which has not been regarded within this paper is
worth to mention. A low oil-to-energy share may also imply a relative advantage
within alternative resources and/or technologies. In situations when oil prices are
upward moving, this advantage can lead to an increasing demand from countries
suffering more from higher prices. This additional stimulus can offset higher costs
for fossil energy resources.
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Appendix
2.A Definition of Variables
• ∆ GDP growth: Variable describes the quarterly growth of real Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP, using expenditure approach) of a country compared to
the previous quarter. The data is seasonally adjusted and measured in per-
centage terms.
Source: OECD (2012) - Subject B1 GE
• CPI: Variable describes quarterly Relative consumer price indices of a country.
It is seasonally adjusted and indexed with the base year 2010=100
Source: OECD (2012) - Subject CCRETT01
• interest rate: The variable describes the quarterly short-term interest rates
of a country per annum based on 3-months.
Source: OECD (2012) - Subject IR3TIB
• unemployment rate: The variable describes the quarterly Harmonized un-
employment rate. It represents the number of unemployed persons as a per-
centage of the labor force.
Source: OECD (2012) - Subject LRHUTTTT
• IPI: The variable describes the quarterly Industry Producer Index of the G7
countries. It is indexed with the base year 2010=100
Source: OECD (2012) - Subject INDPROD
• oil demand relative to GDP: The variable describes all net oil imports
relative to GDP.
Source: OECD (2012) - Subject OILIMPGDPPPP and TPESGDPPPP
• PPI: The variable describes quarterly total producer prices compared to the
previous quarter.
Source: OECD (2012) - Subject PIEAMP01
• ∆ oil price: The variable describes averaged quarterly growth of oil prices of
a country compared to the previous quarter. Nominal costs of OPEC countries
crude oil are adjusted by PPI.
Source: EIA (2015) - FOB Costs of OPEC Countries Crude Oil
• oil-to-energy share: The share is measured by the ratio of total oil supply
and total primary energy supply which sums up production and imports of
energy subtracted by exports and storage changes. It is calculated as the
moving average of current the previous three quarters.
Source: IEA - Subject TPES and OILTPES
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2.B Additional Figures and Tables
Figure 2.B.1: Country-specific composition of energy products, 1970–2016
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Figure 2.B.2: Country-specific oil-to-energy share, 1970–2016
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Data consists of ratio of oil supply and total primary energy supply from IEA. In 1984, miner’s
strike led to a substitution of coal by alternative resources such as oil to ensure security of supply
of energy resources. As a consequence, the oil-to-energy share temporary increases from 36% to
44%.
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Figure 2.B.3: Oil Production vs. Oil Consumption 1980–2014
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
od
uc
tio
n/
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
12
00
1980 1990 2000 2010
Time
(a) Australia
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
.
05
.
06
Pr
od
uc
tio
n/
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
1980 1990 2000 2010
Time
(b) Belgium
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
Pr
od
uc
tio
n/
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
50
00
1980 1990 2000 2010
Time
(c) Canada
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
Pr
od
uc
tio
n/
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
1980 1990 2000 2010
Time
(d) Finland
.
04
.
05
.
06
.
07
.
08
Pr
od
uc
tio
n/
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
1980 1990 2000 2010
Time
(e) France
.
6
.
8
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
Pr
od
uc
tio
n/
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
30
00
1980 1990 2000 2010
Time
(f) United Kingdom
.
04
.
05
.
06
.
07
.
08
.
09
Pr
od
uc
tio
n/
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
1980 1990 2000 2010
Time
(g) Germany
.
01
.
01
5
.
02
.
02
5
.
03
.
03
5
Pr
od
uc
tio
n/
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
1980 1990 2000 2010
Time
(h) Japan
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
Pr
od
uc
tio
n/
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
0
50
0
10
00
1980 1990 2000 2010
Time
(i) Netherlands
0
5
10
15
Pr
od
uc
tio
n/
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
1980 1990 2000 2010
Time
(j) Norway
−
.
02
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
Pr
od
uc
tio
n/
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
1980 1990 2000 2010
Time
(k) Sweden
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
Pr
od
uc
tio
n/
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
1980 1990 2000 2010
Time
(l) United States
Data for oil production and oil consumption from IEA (2018).
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Table 2.B.1: Unit root test
cons&trend constant trend cons&trend constant trend
GDP ∆ GDP
AUS -1.038 4.768*** 14.748*** -13.839*** -13.879*** -8.909***
BEL -0.888 1.277 11.239*** -8.794*** -8.559*** -6.500***
CAN -1.021 -0.975 4.411*** -9.225*** -8.883*** -6.216***
FIN -1.021 -0.975 4.411*** -14.466*** -14.022*** -12.007***
FRA -0.579 -1.392 10.780*** -8.669*** -7.964*** -5.424***
GBR -1.583 1.024 8.530*** -11.050*** -11.040*** -8.721***
GER -2.160 -0.672 6.000*** -12.274*** -12.007*** -9.852***
JPN -0.262 -2.504 4.713*** -11.977*** -10.673*** -8.827***
NLD -1.362 -0.036 6.625*** -15.809*** -15.608*** -12.611***
NOR -2.414 -0.183 6.186*** -17.291*** -16.364*** -11.980***
SWE -1.443 1.330 6.156*** -14.731*** -14.759*** -12.198***
USA -1.870 1.399 11.203*** -9.460*** -9.341*** -6.633***
CPI ∆ CPI
AUS -1.768 -1.792 -0.416 -11.749*** -11.775*** -11.808085
BEL -1.826 -1.737 -0.088 -9.883*** -9.907*** -9.933
CAN -1.598 -1.585 -1.054 -10.143*** -10.169*** -10.172
FIN -1.824 -0.928 -0.559 -9.827*** -9.824*** -9.841
FRA -3.171* -2.055 -0.694 -10.697*** -10.712*** -10.724
GBR -2.204 -2.221 -0.263 -10.583*** -10.597*** -10.618
GER -2.727 -1.846 -0.385 -10.800*** -10.780*** -10.808
JPN -1.279 -2.036 -0.059 -10.504*** -10.301*** -10.285
NLD -3.030 -2.878* 0.231 -10.919*** -10.878*** -10.899
NOR -2.417 -2.367 -0.367 -11.611*** -11.612*** -11.645
SWE -2.905 -1.439 -1.532 -10.653*** -10.681*** -10.611
USA -2.056 -2.391 -0.783 -9.961*** -9.926*** -9.954
interest ∆ interest
AUS -2.772 -1.757 -1.073 -10.484*** -10.422*** -10.411***
BEL -2.602 -1.099 -1.048 -6.631*** -6.306*** -6.203***
CAN -2.868 -1.279 -0.971 -8.865*** -8.821*** -8.824***
FIN -3.161* -0.295 -1.068 -4.842*** -4.578*** -4.378***
FRA -2.845 -0.936 -0.959 -6.565*** -6.210*** -6.097***
GBR -2.886 -1.175 -1.005 -8.461*** -8.319*** -8.265***
GER -2.390 -1.401 -1.356 -6.448*** -6.212*** -6.101***
JPN -2.136 -1.171 -1.469 -9.188*** -9.166*** -9.046***
NLD -3.669** -2.277 -1.493 -10.561*** -10.338*** -10.260***
NOR -3.632** -1.990 -1.170 -13.923*** -13.823*** -13.824***
SWE -2.061 -0.848 -1.067 -4.406*** -4.293*** -4.184***
USA -3.039 -1.482 -1.086 -8.946*** -8.943*** -8.958***
oil price ∆ oil price
-1.133 -1.651 -1.067 -10.831*** -10.791*** -10.710***
-1.183 -1.671 -1.070 -10.350*** -10.359*** -10.336***
-1.290 -1.742 -1.104 -10.405*** -10.378*** -10.312***
-1.143 -1.629 -1.083 -10.492*** -10.482*** -10.427***
-1.165 -1.665 -1.075 -10.252*** -10.247*** -10.206***
-1.024 -1.540 -1.064 -10.199*** -10.184*** -10.103***
-1.212 -1.676 -1.063 -10.349*** -10.370*** -10.363***
-1.741 -2.010 -1.191 -10.217*** -10.237*** -10.249***
-1.204 -1.678 -1.063 -10.368*** -10.385*** -10.373***
-1.134 -1.634 -1.072 -10.622*** -10.625*** -10.567***
-1.080 -1.576 -1.076 -10.606*** -10.596*** -10.517***
-2.012 -1.757 -0.912 -10.226*** -10.213*** -10.178***
cons&trend constant trend cons&trend constant trend
unemployment ∆ unemployment
-2.089 -2.244 0.194 -8.196*** -8.006*** -7.971***
-2.489 -2.933** 0.662 -11.622*** -11.170*** -11.077***
-1.656 -1.525 -0.151 -7.765*** -7.748*** -7.769***
-0.695 -1.358 0.176 -6.986*** -6.972*** -6.962***
-1.627 -1.936 1.247 -7.286*** -6.973*** -6.764***
-1.332 -1.505 0.028 -5.341*** -5.304*** -5.332***
-1.458 -2.193 -0.345 -15.400*** -15.059*** -15.061***
-0.040 -1.680 0.553 -11.402*** -11.055*** -10.942***
-2.224 -2.230 0.610 -8.152*** -8.009*** -7.969***
-1.391 -1.380 0.218 -14.365*** -14.387*** -14.375***
-1.114 -0.725 0.792 -9.951*** -10.006*** -10.009***
-1.437 -1.379 -0.516 -6.152*** -6.152*** -6.1645***
IPI ∆ IPI
-1.321 -1.541 2.886* -6.383*** -6.321*** -6.059***
-1.321 -1.541 2.886* -6.383*** -6.321*** -6.059***
-1.321 -1.541 2.886* -6.383*** -6.321*** -6.059***
-1.321 -1.541 2.886* -6.383*** -6.321*** -6.059***
-1.321 -1.541 2.886* -6.383*** -6.321*** -6.059***
-1.321 -1.541 2.886* -6.383*** -6.321*** -6.059***
-1.321 -1.541 2.886* -6.383*** -6.321*** -6.059***
-1.321 -1.541 2.886* -6.383*** -6.321*** -6.059***
-1.321 -1.541 2.886* -6.383*** -6.321*** -6.059***
-1.321 -1.541 2.886* -6.383*** -6.321*** -6.059***
-1.321 -1.541 2.886* -6.383*** -6.321*** -6.059***
-1.321 -1.541 2.886* -6.383*** -6.321*** -6.059***
Oil / GDP ∆ Oil / GDP
-2.064 -2.311 -1.736* -13.159*** -13.144*** -13.179***
-2.467 -2.237 -2.695*** -13.725*** -13.762*** -13.496***
-2.499 -1.005 0.238 -5.716*** -5.831*** -5.812***
-2.466 -1.574 -2.453** -13.776*** -13.813*** -13.526***
-1.745 -1.507 -2.786*** -14.175*** -14.213*** -13.493***
-1.841 -3.107** -3.297*** -9.223*** -8.994*** -8.944***
-1.897 -1.325 -3.206*** -14.190*** -14.221*** -13.494***
-1.595 -1.083 -3.267*** -14.120*** -14.082*** -13.520***
-2.085 -1.735 -2.185** -13.813*** -13.852*** -13.617***
0.432 -1.631 -0.273 -5.057*** -5.210*** -4.635***
-1.986 -1.884 -3.393*** -13.938*** -13.938*** -13.513***
-1.994 -0.500 -0.773 -14.039*** -13.699*** -13.644***
oil-to-energy share ∆ oil-to-energy share
-1.476 -1.597 -1.804* -13.641*** -13.624*** -13.494***
-2.197 -3.053** -2.265** -13.980*** -13.774*** -13.609***
-0.821 -2.016 -2.223** -13.830*** -13.666*** -13.495***
-0.933 -1.687 -2.890*** -13.859*** -13.828*** -13.510***
-0.662 -1.671 -3.622*** -14.623*** -14.575*** -13.685***
-2.421 -2.014 -1.311 -13.570*** -13.529*** -13.491***
-1.612 -1.675 -1.847* -13.751*** -13.753*** -13.599***
-1.457 -1.057 -2.923*** -14.137*** -14.174*** -13.667***
-2.652 -3.501*** -1.786* -14.445*** -14.143*** -14.074***
-2.130 -1.852 -1.657* -13.544*** -13.571*** -13.498***
-1.147 -2.782* -4.302*** -14.424*** -14.264*** -13.541***
-1.736 -0.936 -1.571 -13.633*** -13.670*** -13.531***
Dickey-Fuller test to check whether a variable of interest follows a unit-root process. The null-hypothesis is that the variable contains a unit-root.
Table shows Dickey-Fuller test statistics. Asterisks ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Chapter 3
Durable Goods and Energy in
RBC: An Endogenous
Multisectoral Model
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, we describe a real business cycle (RBC) model, into which we add
the endogenous generation of energy from different resources. We integrate energy
into both the production process, in the form of a further input factor, and into the
household’s utility function, in the form of an additional consumption good. This
allows us to examine transmission channels of how energy, and also its underlying
resources, affect the economy.
A stable supply of energy is essential to ensure a durable and substantial eco-
nomic development, and to guarantee long-run welfare. Real-life examples where
energy supply has been unstable, due to a weak energy infrastructure and energy
sector, are known from developing countries, where economies struggle to flourish.
Such production sectors of struggling economies are often unable to produce suf-
ficient final goods, either to be consumed or exported, and consequently they are
unable to participate in global growth. At the same time, events such as the oil
crises in the 1970s and 1980s show that developed countries are not immune to
similar problems. Due to the negative consequences that accompanied these crises,
many countries started moving towards alternative ways of organizing their energy
sector and energy usage, in order to minimize the dependence on singular energy
resources, and thus to minimize the risk. A more efficient usage of energy, at the
same time beneficial for productivity in general, is just one way to achieve this.
Another way is to substitute finite energy resources by alternative and locally pro-
duced resources. Macroeconomic models, in particular those investigating business
cycles in the short term, have either focused on one single energy resource or have
not taken energy into account at all. Those models that do consider energy in the
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production process propose that shocks in the supply or price formation of energy
resources are exogenous.
Apart from this, as will be covered later there is a strong consensus in existing
literature, that despite considering energy inputs, total factor productivity is still
the major driver of output volatility. However, the former can definitely have ef-
fects on the economy through various transmission channels such as the reallocation
of resources or disruptive spending on consumption goods (Bernanke et al., 1997;
Hamilton, 2008; Herrera, 2018; Kilian, 2008).
The aim of this paper is to deepen existing research by allowing for distinguishing
between finite and renewable energy resources in the energy sector. On the one
hand, this paper investigates the effects of a stochastic technological progress on the
production side, in particular in the energy sector, as the price formation of energy
and intermediate energy resources are determined endogenously. On the other hand,
this paper considers additional transmission channels, through which macroeconomic
variables other than output are affected. In doing so, we assume a complementary
link within the bundle of durable goods and energy in the household utility function,
as well as within the bundle of capital and energy in the final goods production
function. Studying the dynamics within a model calibrated and estimated to match
the German economy, we investigate whether this complementary relationship can
be confirmed by Bayesian estimation.
To this end, we construct an RBC model of a closed economy with three main
sectors: households, final (non-durable) good production, and energy producers.
Energy, as a further input good, is consumed by households and used in the pro-
duction process of final goods. Furthermore, we distinguish between two types of
consumable goods: durable goods and non-durable goods, where the former can
only be used in combination with energy (the same holds for capital in the produc-
tion function of final goods). By doing so, we can examine additional transmission
channels of energy shocks affecting households’ expenditures for different consump-
tion goods. This is motivated by Dhawan and Jeske (2008) who analyze the role of
durable consumption goods in a business cycle of the US economy. They model en-
ergy as an exogenous variable with a price that is stochastically affected by shocks,
and that explicitly enters the model in the utility as well as the production function.
In contrast, in the present paper energy is not only endogenized but also gener-
ated from a combination of different resources, namely an infinite one and a finite
one. Our model extension allows for a transition from non-renewable resources to
backstopping resources, caused by a change in relative marginal costs.
In a further extension of the model we allow for a constrained replenishment
of the finite resource stock. As shown by Gross et al. (2013), investments in R&D
transform resources, which are not accessible with previously available technology, to
reserves, which are available as an input factor to produce intermediate energy. But
other than done by Gross et al., in our model the capital and R&D are completely
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supplied by domestic households and the price of intermediate energy is generated
by the non-renewable energy sector and determined endogenously. This way, we
investigate how dynamics of TFP shocks deviate from the benchmark model in the
case of depletion and exploration.
The results of this study show that in our RBC model, Bayesian estimation
confirms the complementary relationship between durable goods and energy con-
sumption in the household sector, as well as between physical capital and energy
consumption in the final good sector. Furthermore, a TFP shock in the (final and
intermediate) energy sectors has a larger effect on durable good purchases than on
capital investments in the final good production, which is in line with results from
Dhawan and Jeske (2008). Nevertheless, even in the model at hand, with endoge-
nous price determination of energy, TFP in final good production is still the major
contributor to the business cycle formation of the national account, which confirms
evidence from previous literature (e.g. Kim and Loungani, 1992). Furthermore, this
paper provides an essential improvement to explaining theoretical moments by dis-
tinguishing between durable and non-durable goods, taking energy consumption into
account. Moreover, we regard an extension of our baseline model where we allow
for replenishing the constrained fossil stock, but do not find the dynamic responses
of the variables to significantly deviate from those observed in our baseline model.
Only for goods consumption do we find a slight increase in volatility, resulting from
costly R&D, which raises household income.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview of existing
research dealing with energy and energy-related resources in business cycle models.
In Section 3, we present the model and derive the equilibrium in Section 4. In
Section 5, we discuss the calibration of parameters, the estimation methods which
will be applied, as well as the results of the estimated parameters. In Section 6, we
discuss the numerical results, and the accuracy with which they match the data.
Section 7 analyzes the dynamic results of the model caused by TFP shocks in the
production functions and shocks in the finite reserve/resource stock. In Section 8,
we look at the weighting of all individual shocks by performing a variance decompo-
sition. Subsequently, we carry out robustness checks to verify our results. Section
10 concludes.
3.2 Energy and Resources in Macroeconomic Models
The amount of literature dealing with the role of energy and similar resources in a
theoretical framework is quite extensive. Moreover, the term ”energy” is taken quite
vaguely by often specifically describing oil as a finite resource. In general, economists
analyze the effects of energy in macroeconomic models through various transmission
channels that present the reciprocal relations of energy and other macroeconomic
components supported by evidence from literature (Bernanke et al., 1997; Herrera,
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2018; Kilian, 2008). In earlier studies, energy has been mainly present on the supply
side. However, its degree of importance is differently valued. In the course of time,
two strings of theories have been established with contradictory views about the
effect and use of energy in the macroeconomic environment.
On the one side, supporters of the ”conservation hypothesis” take the view that
energy can simply be substituted for alternative input factors. Moreover, technolog-
ical progress can ease this process and leaves energy as a non-essential component.
Hence, energy scarcity would not have negative effects on the economy. This allows
economic growth even in the presence of a scarce energy resource where non-finite
alternatives act as possible substitutes (Solow, 1974; Stiglitz, 1974; Tobin et al.,
1980).
On the other side, the ”growth hypothesis” promotes scarce resources as the lim-
iting factor for economic growth due to its binding supply constraint. Considering
finite energy as the primary resource in production, this theory is particularly sup-
ported by ecological economists (Stern, 2011). Possible substitutes such as capital
and labor cannot fully take effect in the production process without energy. Conse-
quently, the latter constitutes a complementary product. In the present paper, when
considering the short term, we follow this theory as a possibility of substitution by
other components which is constrained by time. To be more precise, investments
are needed to enforce these strategy changes. The conservation hypothesis is not
completely neglected. The reason is that we allow for different types of energy re-
sources, finite and renewable, and consequently some degree of substitution between
them.
Frequent literature that analyzes the theoretical relationship of energy with other
macroeconomic variables often include RBC models. In principle, these models in-
vestigate the external influence through shocks on the modeled economy and de-
compose the effects on its variables. But despite the popularity of RBC models
that stems from its close to real-life predictions, the role of aggregate technology
shocks is controversial. Several researchers such as Plosser (1989) and McCallum
(1988) have agreed that some of the facts that characterize economic variations are
successfully explained by RBC models. However, it remains a constraint that a
number of important issues, such as shocks, that should explain variations in the
business cycle have stayed unsolved, or that evidence for them is too fragile to be
credible. One criticism is the role of the Solow residual which is often identified as
the main source of aggregate fluctuations in the model. On the one side, the nature
of technological shocks often remains open. On the other side, the Solow residual
includes unexplained behaviors such as energy price shocks that are not necessarily
linked to productivity, which leads to overestimation of the productivity factor.
In this context, McCallum (1988) has identified energy as an essential factor on
the supply side which contributes to fluctuation to which less attention is paid. In
one of the subsequent papers, Kim and Loungani (1992) analyze an RBC model
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with respect to exogenous energy price changes. By implementing energy in the
production function as a further independent input factor, next to the usual inputs
such as capital and labor, this allows to extend the source of possible fluctuations
affecting total output. In their model, the relative price of energy is modeled as
an exogenous stochastic process. All structural parameters are based on the US
economy and are chosen in line with microeconomic evidence and certain historical
averages. However, the results are in line with those of macro-economists who neglect
the impact of shocks by energy factors on an economy. TFP is still the main driver
of output volatility while objections such as those by Tobin et al. (1980) who noted
that the share of energy in the GNP is too small to generate strong aggregate impacts
are confirmed. On the one side, this leads Kim and Loungani to assume prices and
wages to be perfectly flexible, which is contrary to empirical studies that derive
strong impacts of energy on real variables due to the implementation of some degree
of rigidity in prices and wages (Black, 1985; Mork and Hall, 1980). On the other
side, energy prices are completely exogenously determined and moreover exclusively
affecting the production side. In the present paper, the latter assumption is changed
by allowing for energy production determined from within the model and used by
the production and consumer side.
To meet the critics, researchers have considered different approaches to imple-
ment energy in RBC models. These can be segmented into RBC models following the
classical approach and New-Keynesian models with classical market failures. Along
with the former, Finn (1995) allowed energy price shocks to affect capital utilization,
a method which has been taken over by several subsequent studies (i.e. Leduc and
Sill, 2004; Sa´nchez, 2011). The idea is that, because energy is dependent on capital
utilization and necessary for the usage of physical capital, it enters the production
function indirectly. Just as Kim and Loungani (1992), Finn’s model assumes perfect
competition in the production sector. Along with some other modifications, this
results in a model which explains 76% to 89% of US output volatility. Both, Kim
and Loungani, and Finn conclude that shocks in energy prices account for up to
20% of the aggregate fluctuations in the business cycle.
A further remark made by several economists concerns a possible reallocative
effect of energy shocks (Hamilton, 1983; Loungani, 1986; Mork, 1989). Assuming
a multi-sector economy, changes in energy prices can induce individual producers
to reallocate other input factors across sectors in a costly manner. Consequently,
energy price shocks may have an indirect effect on the macroeconomy through other
factors, e.g. labor supply. Shocks in energy prices impact substitution of energy with
other input components affecting the marginal cost of production. In particular,
substitution by capital can influence investment behavior which eventually leads to
long-run consequences (Amin and Ferdaus, 2015). In our paper, we consider different
sources of energy. Hence, reallocation can even take place within the same input
factor that is substituted by an alternative.
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Specifically talking about oil, Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) have developed
a model that is similar to that analyzed by Kim and Loungani (1992), which uses
this resource as an independent input factor. However, in contrast to the present
paper, the price determination process is still exogenously determined. In their anal-
ysis, Rotemberg and Woodford find that the predicted aggregate effects of a change
in oil prices improves significantly by allowing for a modest degree of imperfect
competition. Consequently, in Rotemberg and Woodfords’ model, they consider an
environment with imperfectly competitive elements rather than a perfectly compet-
itive market. These modifications make it possible to introduce mark-ups in prices.
Furthermore, the authors argue that an oil price shock could amplify macroeconomic
effects by affecting the costs of production. Since the producer faces changes in costs
he is likely to adjust his prices by changing the mark-up of what he is selling. Al-
though considering a model with perfect competition only and ignoring mark-ups,
we also find some pass-through effects of costs in the energy sector as higher costs
are added up to the selling price in the present model.
Researchers following the New-Keynesian approach within dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models generally assume that shocks are independent
of each other. However, several economists have questioned the direct influence of
energy shocks to the aggregate output. Leduc and Sill (2004) investigate whether
recessionary consequences of an oil-price shock are caused by the shock itself or
rather by monetary policy responses to the shock, as it has been argued by Bernanke
et al. (1997). They find about 40% of the output drop which stems from monetary
policy intervention. However, these interventions could not be offset by the negative
consequences of an oil shock to the aggregate outcome. Sa´nchez (2011) is one of
the first economists who has introduced oil in a model that was based on the Euro
area countries. In doing so he implemented oil into an European economic model
following the idea by Finn (1995) of linking the required value of oil to the capital
utilization rate. By using a standard DSGE model, he demonstrated that gains in oil
usage efficiency lead to an alleviation of inflationary and contractionary consequences
when an oil shock affects the economy. In addition, he concluded that a higher degree
of flexibility in wages can help ease the impact on output, even though this comes at
the expense of larger inflationary pressure. These results are confirmed by Jacquinot
et al. (2009) within a open country model.
In the present paper, we take over the approach according to the neoclassical
approach looking at real variables rather than distinguishing between nominal and
real values as it is done in New-Keynesian model. The aim is to concentrate on
the origin of business cycles by allowing for several energy sectors rather than re-
stricting different channels though rigidities or imperfect competition. Hereafter, we
concentrate on the classical approach to point out the occurrence of business cycles
through the interaction of several input factors and their relationships rather than
market failures.
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All the models described so far are dealing with energy in a very general context.
As either the variable itself or the price determining process are exogenously shaped,
next to having only one variable with no more other variables, further detailed
properties could be neglected by dealing with the remaining dynamics of the model.
However, this goes along with less precise description of what causes these exogenous
effects. An input factor such as oil is constrained by being a finite resource and hence,
behaving differently to labor, capital, or even a renewable resource. Literature that
investigates optimal depletion of finite resources includes Bohn and Deacon (2000)
and Gross et al. (2013). By integrating a separate fossil sector within the models, it
allows to analyze its influence on the economy. Bohn and Deacon and Gross et al.
even go further by endogenizing the stock of the natural resource rather than holding
it constant. Firms are allowed to augment existing reserves through exploration
which has been previously ignored. However, the price determination process of this
resource is still exogenously determined. They find that endogenous reserves have a
quite significant effect on the magnitude and persistence of the remaining variables’
response to price shocks. In the present paper, we compare both types of stocks but
fully endogenize the price-setting.
RBC literature that covers resources with different properties, namely finite ones
and renewable ones, is limited. Argentiero et al. (2018) analyze the effects of envi-
ronmental taxation policy in a model with both resources for China, Europe, and the
USA. However, opposite to the present paper, the household sector is much simpli-
fied without consumption of energy. Furthermore, the model considers substitution
between energy and capital/labor within the production function while we allow for
a complementary relationship between energy and capital. While the response of a
shock in final good sector’s TFP does not distinguish from ours, the results for the
dynamics of the remaining shocks do.
Although considering energy as a general and exogenous given variable, Dhawan
and Jeske (2008) analyze its role in the household and production sectors. Fur-
thermore, they distinguish between durable and non-durable consumption goods.
Assuming a complementary relationship with capital in the production function
and durable goods in the household sector they find significant improvements in
explaining business cycles. In contrast to Kim and Loungani (1992), disruption in
fixed capital investments comes closer to the one observed in the data as the house-
holds have an additional channel of adjustments in investments through durable
goods. As pointed out by Bernanke et al. (2004), changes in the energy price can
induce households to postpone irreversible purchases of durable goods. However,
they also find that major impacts causing output fluctuations are still due to pro-
ductivity shocks. The present paper is based on the work by Dhawan and Jeske
by considering multiple margins of investment but endogenizing energy. In doing
so, we distinguish between several energy sectors and consequently allow for differ-
ent properties in energy resources. As a byproduct, this also allows to implement
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sectoral productivity to consider disaggregated TFP coming from product and pro-
cess innovation or further fundamental productivity changes (Caliendo et al., 2017).
Like Argentiero et al. (2018), Huynh (2016) analyzes a multisectoral model by en-
dogenizing the production process of durable goods and energy, which brings energy
volatility closer to its empirical target values. But in contrast to the present paper,
Huynh neither allows for energy consumption by households, nor does he distinguish
between various resources to generate energy from.
3.3 Model
The model consists of three main sectors: Households, final goods-producing firms
and energy producing firms. In addition, the latter is divided into three sub-sectors:
a general energy sector, a fossil resource sector, and a renewable resource sector.
We do not include labor in the production function of the resource sectors as our
focus lies on the dynamic change of the capital and reserve stock. In the following,
we will describe each sector in more detail. Figure 3.A.1 in the Appendix depicts a
graphical description of the model.
3.3.1 Households
Households maximize their utility by choosing the optimized demand of non-durable
CN and durable consumption goods CD , demand of energy EH, supply of labor L,
and capital which they accumulate through investments KY,KF,KN.
1 The util-
ity function is assumed to have constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between
durable goods and energy which are nested within a Cobb-Douglas function with
non-durable goods. Additive-separable disutility is gained from labor supply. The
utility aggregation of households follows:
Ut = ϑ ln
[
CN γt
(
θCDζt−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t
) 1−γ
ζ
]
+ (1− ϑ) ln [1− Lt] (3.1)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) indicates the share of durable consumption good and ϑ ∈ (0, 1)
indicates the share of consumption. As γ ∈ (0, 1), non-durable goods and a common
basket of durable goods and energy are substitutes while ζ < 0 implies a complemen-
tary relationship between durable goods and energy consumed by households.2 Em-
pirical observations show that the elasticity of substitution between non-durable and
durable goods are close to unity (Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2011; Green-
wood et al., 1995; Ogaki and Reinhart, 1998). Hence, we assume of Cobb-Douglas
function between non-durables and the complementary composite basket, similar
to Dhawan and Jeske (2008). Moreover, by analyzing business cycle fluctuations,
1Hereafter, we omit the time index when describing variables.
2Note that 1
1−ζ
is the elasticity of substitution between capital and energy which determines the
degree of substitutability of both.
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Bilbiie and Straub (2013) emphasize to check whether overall concavity is fulfilled
when using an utility function with non-separable preferences.
Lemma 1. Strict concavity of utility
The partial derivatives for the utility function Ut are:
U ′CN > 0, U
′
CD > 0, U
′
EH
> 0, U ′L < 0
U ′′CNCN < 0, U
′′
CDCD < 0, U
′′
EHEH
< 0
U ′′LL < 0, U
′′
CNCD = U
′′
CDCN > 0, U
′′
CDEH
= U ′′EHCD > 0, U
′′
CNEH
= U ′′EHCN > 0.
Utility function Ut is overall strictly concave in CN ,CD , EH, L > 0 iff all the fol-
lowing conditions hold:
0 < ϑ, γ < 1
ζ, θ < 1.
Proof: See Appendix 3.H.1.
According to Lemma 1, utility increases with consumption of non-durable and
durable goods as well as energy, but at a decreasing rate. Energy can be considered
to be consumed to enhance the consumption of durable goods in a non-perfect
substitutable manner. Alternatively, the presence of energy is required to consume
durable goods. On the contrary, the supply of labor diminishes households’ utility.
Furthermore, overall concavity of utility function U is guaranteed if Lemma 1 holds.
Households are restricted by a budget constraint given by:
CN t + (pH)t(EH)t+(ICD )t + (IY)t + (IF)t + (IN)t
= wtLt + (rY)t(KY)t−1 + (rF)t(KF)t−1 + (rN)t(KN)t−1
+Xt + (πY)t + (πE)t + (πN)t + (πF)t
(3.2)
Income is gained by the supply of labor L in return for wages w and by undertaking
investments ICD ,IY,IF,IN. Households lend capital to the goods production sector
KY and each resource sector KF,KN, which they receive back in the next period with
a mark-up in the form of interests rY,rF,rN. We assume that physical investment
can only be made to sectors specifically. Hence, once it is invested, it is restricted
to the specific sectors’ capital stock and distinct from other stocks. Furthermore,
households can undertake investments ICD in durable goods CD according to
(ICD)t = CD t −
(
1− δCD
)
CD t−1 (3.3)
which affects their own utility. δCD denotes the depreciation rate of the durable
goods stock. Because households own all companies, their income increases by the
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flow of all profits πY,πE,πF,πN from these.
3 Expenditures further exist by consuming
non-durable goods from final goods production and using energy EH from the energy
sector with the price pH. In an extension, we also allow for R&D in the fossil
intermediate energy sector which is provided by households and does not diminish
their labor supply. The corresponding profits are equal to Xt. The corresponding
function is further discussed in Section 3.3.4.
3.3.2 Final good production
Non-durable goods CN which are consumed within the household sector are pro-
duced by the final good sector, hence Y = CN . Here, firms act under perfect
competition. Production follows a CES function which is defined by:
Yt = (AY)t
[
η(KY)
ν
t−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν L1−αt (3.4)
AY defines Hicks-neutral technological progress which will be later affected by stochas-
tic shocks. η ∈ (0, 1) measures the share of capital with respect to energy and ν the
substitution parameter between capital and energy. We assume that ν < 0 which
leads to a complementary relationship between both input factors. According to
that, the efficient usage of capital KY within the production process requires some
amount of energy EY. Moreover, the firm employs labor supplied by households L.
α ∈ (0, 1) indicates the output elasticity of the capital-energy basket. As the elastic-
ity of substitution between labor and the composite of physical capital and energy
is one, final goods are produced with constant returns to scale. This is similar to
the aggregated production function used by Kim and Loungani (1992) and Dhawan
and Jeske (2008) who also assume a complementary relationship between physical
capital and energy. The installation of physical capital takes place with a lag, hence
in the period before, which is analogous to having fixed investments.
Lemma 2. Concavity of final production
The partial derivatives for the final production function are:
Y ′KY > 0, Y
′
EY
> 0, Y ′L > 0,
Y ′′KYKY < 0, Y
′′
EYEY
< 0, Y ′′LL < 0,
Y ′′KYEY = Y
′′
EYKY
> 0, Y ′′KYL = Y
′′
LKY
> 0, Y ′′EYL = Y
′′
LEY
> 0.
The production function Yt is overall concave in A
Y ,KY, EY, L > 0 iff all the fol-
lowing conditions hold:
ν, η ≤ 1 or ν > 1, η ≥ 1 or ν = 1, η > 1
α < 1.
3Because all firms act in a perfect competitive market, their profits are equal to zero.
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Proof: See Appendix 3.H.2.
As Lemma 2 shows, final output increases with installed physical capital, energy
and labor but at a decreasing rate. Moreover, overall concavity of the production
function is satisfied. The capital stock (KY)t is accumulated according to the house-
holds investment function:
(IY)t = (KY)t −
(
1− δY
)
(KY)t−1 (3.5)
Final good producing firms face the following profit function:
(πY)t = Yt − (rY)t(KY)t−1 + wtLt + (pE)t(EY)t (3.6)
By normalizing the price of non-durable goods to one, revenues of firms are equal to
Y . On the expenditure side, the input factors capital, labor, and energy are payed
off with their respective marginal products w, rY, and pE.
3.3.3 Energy sector
The energy sector combines both intermediate energy sources (non-renewable and
renewable energy) to provide a general energy product to the household sector and
the final good sector. As we assume substitution between the input factors, we
model the production function as a Cobb-Douglas function.
Et = (AE)tF
φ
t N
1−φ
t (3.7)
where E is the general energy output, AE is the Hicks-neutral technological progress,
F is the non-renewable energy input, and N is the renewable energy input. φ
determines the elasticity of output. The energy sector optimizes its production
function with respect to the profit function:
πEt = (pE)tEt − (pF)tFt − (pN)tNt. (3.8)
As the energy sector acts under perfect competition, the input factors are payed off
with their marginal production, defined by pF and pN. pE is the price for the energy
output which is the same for both consumers, households and final good firms.
3.3.4 Fossil resource sector
In the fossil resource sector, the resources are extracted from a finite resource stock
and, when combined with physical capital, transformed to the intermediate energy
good. Here, we follow the idea of Gross et al. (2013) with some minor adjustments.
In the present model, the economy is completely closed and, consequently, capital is
merely supplied by domestic households. Furthermore, the resource stock is owned
by the fossil resource sector. Hence, the sector does not face additional occupational
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costs that have to be paid to another owner. The general production function is
defined by:
Ft = (AF)t(KF)
ϕ
t−1S
1−ϕ
t−1 (3.9)
where F is the intermediate energy good, AF is the Hicks-neutral technological
progress, KF is the physical capital stock, and S is the resource stock. ϕ ∈ (0, 1)
measures the output elasticity of capital. As we assume constant returns to scale
this Cobb-Douglas function, 1−ϕ displays the output elasticity of the reserve stock.
Capital is supplied by the household sector. The accumulation of the physical capital
stock KF in the production function is standard, following the investment function:
(IF)t = (KF)t −
(
1− δF
)
(KF)t−1 (3.10)
where the capital stock depreciates with the rate δF .
The fossil resource sector is further constrained by a stock of finite reserves
S, that decreases by the amount of intermediate energy, extracted each period F .
Moreover, εS
iid
∼ N
(
0, σ2S
)
defines a direct shock to the quantity of available reserves:
St = St−1 − Ft + ωDt − e
εS,t . (3.11)
In an extension of the model, the fossil energy sector is able to increase the reserve
stock by investing in R&D which is paid off to the households. By assumption, we
distinguish between reserves and resources. Reserves have been already discovered
and can be technically extracted at the current point of time with the available
technology. However, resources denote the amount of crude resources that are not
feasible to be extracted either due to high costs or due to missing technology. Invest-
ment into R&D allows the transformation of certain share of resources into reserves.
After this definition, St is always the amount of reserves available at that moment.
D is the amount of reserves which is replenished through R&D whereas ω ∈ (0, 1) is
an efficiency parameter. If ω = 0, there is no R&D in the model and consequently no
possibility to replenish the resource stock (marking the baseline model). Expenses
in R&D are determined by a non-linear cost function:
C (Dt, Vt) =
(
Dt
Vt
)υ
= Xt (3.12)
where Dt is the replenished amount of reserves or amount of transformation from
resources to reserves (amount of exploration). Vt is the stock of resources. Although
this expenditure function is different, its properties resemble the model by Gross
et al. (2013) as we abstract from the assumption of a finite bound in the level of
resources as is done by Bohn and Deacon (2000). This is fulfilled by assuming
that additional reserves can be discovered but at increasing costs. Therefore, R&D
underlies a convex cost function when the second derivative is positive, which is
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satisfied iff υ > 1. To transform the last resource unit to a reserve unit comes with
infinite costs. Hence, it will not be mined by the sector. Similar to the reserve stock,
the resource stock is finite and bounded by the constraint:
Vt = Vt−1 −Dt − e
εV,t (3.13)
where εV
iid
∼ N
(
0, σ2V
)
defines a direct shock to the quantity of available resources.
As the fossil resource sector performs under the assumption of perfect competition,
its corresponding profit function is given by:
(πF)t = (pF)tFt − (rF)t(KF)t−1 − C (Dt, Vt) . (3.14)
3.3.5 Renewable resource sector
The renewable resource sector generates an intermediate energy good that is com-
pletely generated from a capital stock. This follows the assumption that access to
renewable natural resources require prior investments in capital. In their paper,
Mason and Chasse´ (2018) describe this approach to expand capacities of renewable
resources. Households, who own this physical capital, invest into and hence, ac-
cumulate this stock for capital returns. The harvesting function of this non-finite
product follows:
Nt = (AN)t(KN)
ψ
t−1 (3.15)
where N indicates the intermediate energy product, AN the technological progress
which is exogenously determined, andKN the capital stock of the renewable resource
sector. ψ measures the output elasticity of the physical capital input. As ψ < 1, the
harvesting function has decreasing returns to scale. The capital stock is accumulated
according to the following function:
(IN)t = (KN)t −
(
1− δN
)
(KN)t−1. (3.16)
The corresponding profit function
(πN)t = (pN)tNt − (rN)t(KN)t−1 (3.17)
satisfies the assumption of perfect competition by paying of input factor capital with
the sector’s revenue.
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3.3.6 Market clearing
To complete the model, the markets have to be cleared. According to that, the two
remaining equations are:
GDPt = Yt − (pE)t(EY)t + (rN)t(KN)t−1 + (rF)t(KF)t−1 +Xt
= CN t + (pH)t(EH)t + (ICD)t + (IY)t + (IF)t + (IN)t
(3.18)
Et = (EH)t + (EY)t (3.19)
where (3.18) determines the general market clearing and (3.19) describes the clearing
of energy. For simplicity, we assume that prices per unit of energy is the same for
households and firms. The market value is calculated by using the expenditure
approach.
We distinguish between three sorts of shocks that affect the economy of this
model exogenously. We assume that innovation A, which can lead to an increase
in productivity, is sector-specific and non-transferable. All sectors with production
functions can face impacts by shocks in TFP which are each independent and identi-
cally distributed. Their laws of motion are described by the following log-functions:
ln(AY)t = ρY ln(AY)t−1 + εY,t (3.20)
ln(AE)t = ρE ln(AE)t−1 + εE,t (3.21)
ln(AF)t = ρF ln(AF)t−1 + εF,t (3.22)
ln(AN)t = ρN ln(AN)t−1 + εN,t (3.23)
They follow an AR(1) process (autoregressive of order one) where εi
iid
∼ N
(
0, σ2i
)
, i ∈
(Y,E, F,N), hence with a zero mean and uncorrelated variance. The parameter
ρi, i ∈ (Y,E, F,N) measures the persistence of TFP.
Furthermore, a quantity shock can affect the size of the stock of finite resource
σi. This is comparable with adjustments of the estimation of probable reserves or
forced abandonment of reserves by politics and the society. However, contrary to
shocks in TFP, it has only an one-time direct effect to the stock constraints. In the
model with replenishment of the reserves, we add a similar shock to the resource
constraint σi reflecting the same properties as a reserve shock.
Moreover, we introduce two taste shifters similar to (Bencivenga, 1992) and
(Stockman and Tesar, 1995), each for non-durable good consumption TCN and
durable good consumption TCD. Both shocks, which follow an AR(1) process, con-
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sider shifts in demand for consumption that are not captured by the dynamics in our
model. This is particularly necessary to avoid incorrect identification by estimating
some of the remaining parameters taking empirical consumption data into account.4
The log laws of motion for the taste shifters are:
ln(TCN)t = ρT,CN ln(TCN)t−1 + εT,CN,t (3.24)
ln(TCD)t = ρT,CD ln(TCD)t−1 + εT,CD,t (3.25)
where εT,i
iid
∼ N
(
0, σ2T,i
)
, i ∈ (CN ,CD).
3.4 Competitive Equilibrium
After setting up the model, each actor maximizes its functions to optimize its de-
cision making. In the following, we solve the model for each sector successively.
The equations are derived in detail in Appendix 3.H. The representative household
decides about its demand for consumption of non-durable goods, durable goods,
and energy as well as its supply of labor to maximize expected lifetime utility. The
household faces the following optimization problem:
maxU0 =
CNt,CDt,(EH)t,Lt,
(KY)t,(KF)t,(KN)t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ϑ ln
[
CN γt
(
θCD ζt−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t
) 1−γ
ζ
]
+ (1− ϑ) ln [1− Lt]
+λHt {CN t + (pH)t(EH)t + (ICD )t + (IY)t + (IF)t + (IN)t − wtLt − (rY)t(KY)t−1
−(rF)t(KF)t−1 − (rN)t(KN)t−1 −Xt − (πY)t − (πN)t − (πF)t}}
(3.1)
where β serves as a time preference parameter to discount future utility streams.
The associated FOCs with respect to CN , CD , EH, L, KY, KF, and KN are sum-
marized below:
1 = βE
{
1− γ
γ
θ
CDζ−1t CN t
θCDζt + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
}
+ βE
{
CN t
CN t+1
(
1− δCD
)}
(3.2)
(pE)t =
(1− γ) (1− θ)
γ
CN t(EH)
ζ−1
t(
θCDζt−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t
) (3.3)
wt =
CN t
1− Lt
1− γ
γϑ
(3.4)
4In fact, it holds that CN = TCNCN net and CD = TCDCDnet. According to the law of large
numbers, TCN and TCD are constant and equal to one so CN = CN net and CD = CDnet.
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1 = βE
{
CN t
CN t+1
(
1 + (ri)t+1 − δ
i
)}
for: i = Y, F,N. (3.5)
The trade-off between non-durable consumption goods and the composite basket
including durables and energy is described in (3.2) while (3.3) determines the de-
mand for energy, given its price. Equation (3.4) shows the intratemporal optimality
condition of labor supply in relation with consumption of non-durables, given the
wage. Disutility from labor due to an increase in working hours is compensated by a
decrease of consumption at constant wages. Equation (3.5) describes the Euler equa-
tions which imply that the current marginal utility of consumption on non-durable
goods is equal to the discounted utility of future consumption.
The final good sector maximizes current profits with respect to its input factors
which are paid off according to their respective marginal productivities:
(rY)t = αη(AY)t
[
η(KY)
ν
t−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν
−1
L1−αt (KY)
ν−1
t−1 (3.6)
(pE)t = αη(AY)t
[
η(KY)
ν
t−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν
−1
L1−αt (EY)
ν−1
t (3.7)
wt = (1− α) (AY)t
[
η(KY)
ν
t−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν L−αt (3.8)
The associated demand functions of the input factors of the energy sector, based
on the profit function under perfect competition, given pF and pN are:
(pF)t = φ(pE)t(AE)tF
φ−1
t N
1−φ
t (3.9)
(pN)t = (1− φ) (pE)t(AE)tF
φ
t N
−φ
t (3.10)
The fossil resource sector faces a finite resource stock constraint and at given
conditions also with a finite reserve stock. Thus, the firm’s decision problem depends
on choosing the optimal demand for raw resources, physical capital, and optimal
setting of R&D strategy. The subsequent dynamic problem is given by:
max
(KF)t,St,Dt,Vt
πF0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt {(pF)tFt − (rF)t(KF)t−1 − C(Dt, Vt)
+λFSt {St−1 − Ft + ωDt − St}+ λ
FV
t {Vt−1 −Dt − Vt}
} (3.11)
The corresponding demand functions read as follows:
(pF)t =
(rF)t(KF)t−1
ϕFt
+ βE {(pF)t+1}+ βE
{
(rF)t+1(KF)t
ϕFt+1
[
(1− ϕ)
Ft+1
St
− 1
]}
(3.12)
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(pF)t =
(rF)t(KF)t−1
ϕFt
+ υ
Dυt
DtV υt
− βυE
{
Dυt+1
Dt+1V υt+1
}
+ βE {(pF)t+1} − βE
{
(rF)t+1(KF)t
ϕFt+1
}
+ υ
Dυt
V
(1+υ)
t
(3.13)
As β ∈ (0, 1), (3.12) shows that the inflation rate of the price for intermediate fossil
energy is positive. Note, that this function is similar to the Hotelling rule (Hotelling,
1931) saying that the rate of price increase equals, among others, the social discount
rate. Equation (3.13) denotes that the sector equation its marginal costs of R&D
for exploration to the marginal revenue it earns from selling the intermediate fossil
energy product.
The renewable energy sector maximizes current-period profit under perfect com-
petition. Consequently, the first order condition for the only input factor physical
capital is as follows:
(rN)t = ψ(pN)t(AN)t(KN)
ψ−1
t−1 (3.14)
describing the price of physical capital, invested in the renewable energy sector. It
increases with a higher scarcity of capital stock and a higher profit of the renewable
sector though higher productivity or selling prices.
3.5 Calibration and Estimation of Parameters
In a next step, parameters have to be determined to be able to proceed with the
numerical as well as the dynamic analysis of the model. We estimate these values
in the course of this paper on the basis of calibrated values which have to be deter-
mined in the first instance using real long-term data. Subsequently, we define the
distributions, hence the kernel and the variance, on which the posterior parameters
are estimated. The estimation is based on Bayesian techniques and is carried out
with data about the German economy which is discussed more detailed below.
3.5.1 Data and estimation methodology
In order to estimate the parameters to apply the model to Germany, we use data
for the period of 1991 to 2014 (1991 being the earliest year in which sufficient
detailed data about energy market is available). Two macroeconomic variables and
three variables describing the development in the energy sectors are considered. In
particular, we look at: (i) economic output, (ii) consumption of durable goods, (iii)
total energy consumption, (iv) fossil energy consumption, and (v) renewable energy
consumption.
For aggregated economic output, we take the output approach of the gross do-
mestic product (GDP) from OECD (2012) at constant prices based on the reference
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year 2010 (Code: B1 GA). Durable goods consumption is also taken from OECD at
constant prices (Code: P311B). The remaining three energy time series are taken
from Eurostat (2017, 2018). Total energy consumption is defined as the gross inland
consumption of all energy products (Code: nrg 110a 1). Fossil energy includes the
consumption of gas, nuclear energy, solid fuels, and total petrol (Code: nrg 100a 1).
All remaining consumption of energy is referred to as renewable energy products.
All energy products are measures in terajoule to have a common unit, which allows a
better comparison and relation. As records for energy consumption and production
as well as the consumption of durable goods are not sufficiently recorded in short
term units of time, the data is used on annual frequency. To avoid stochastic sin-
gularity, the number of time series also determines the amount of exogenous shocks
that have to be at least applied to the model. To make the data applicable to our
model, the following measurement equation holds:
∆ lnGDP t
∆ lnCN t
∆ lnCDt
∆ lnEt
∆ lnFt
∆ lnNt
 =

GDP
CN
CD
E
F
N
+

GDP t −GDP t−1
CN t − CN t−1
CDt − CDt−1
Et − Et−1
Ft − Ft−1
Nt −Nt−1

The first vector includes the log difference from the trend path while the second
vector describes the trend growth rate for each variable respectively. The trends are
identified by applying the HodrickPrescott (HP) filter of each time series respectively
(see Appendix 3.D).5 In the third vector, the variables are included as the first
difference from the previous period. Overall, this equation mirrors the relationship
between empirical values from the data on the left-hand side and theoretical values
from the model on the right-hand side. As the model includes stationary data only,
we pursue to calibrate and estimate the model as well as to fit the theoretical values
close to their empirical counterparts.
3.5.2 Calibration
Independently of whether or not the model should be analyzed with calibrated pa-
rameters or estimated values from priors, we have to critically identify both of them
on the basis of the given model. Here, the parameters can be split up into two groups.
Structural parameters which determine the dynamics of the model and steady state
values, such as average ratios, which describe the general state of the economy. We
follow three approaches to match an annual time horizon reflecting most of the fea-
tures of the German economy. Some parameters are (i) calibrated using empirical
data to fit the model with real data, some parameters are (ii) taken from existing lit-
erature, mainly in the field of RBC models dealing with energy in general or specific
sources of energy production while some other parameters are (iii) calculated from
5For yearly data we use an HP parameter of λ = 100.
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the steady state of the model. Altogether, there are 24 structural parameters which
can be distinguished by 16 structural parameters and 8 shock related parameters.
Structural parameters are categorized as numerical factors defining the system of
sectors such as the utility function or production function. As prices, in particular
those of resources, are completely endogenously determined, shocks affect the tech-
nological progress of each production sector only. They define how TFPs behave
over time. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 give an overview of the definition of parameters as
well as their prior values, sorted according to their respective category.
A number of parameters are initially taken as fixed. We set α = 0.365, leading to
a labor income share in goods production output of 63.5%. This is close to the value
of 0.36 used by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Hansen (1985) in general literature.
Compared to lower values used in other German RBC models such as Schmidt and
Zimmermann (2005) and Flor (2014), the reduction of labor income shares considers
a more capital-intensive production as discussed by Schmalwasser and Schidlowski
(2006). Here, the authors argue that capital stock grows faster than production be-
cause labor is increasingly replaced with capital in recent time. The time discount
rate β = 0.99 and the substitution parameter of the durable good/energy consump-
tion bundle and non-durable goods in the utility function amounts for ζ = −2.8748
according to Dhawan and Jeske (2008). To adapt the elasticity of substitution
between physical capital and energy in the final good production function to its cor-
responding value of the German economy, we set ν = −0.15 following Kemfert and
Welsch (2000). This is different to Dhawan and Jeske (2008) and Kim and Loungani
(1992) who choose ν = −0.7, whereby the former also perform a sensitivity analysis
for alternative values. Usually, all parameters have to be carefully chosen as they
cannot be altered by remaining variables later on. But opposite to just calibrat-
ing the model, these values are solely used as initial priors to later pick the best
kind and structure of the model according to our metrics using several estimation
methods. Nevertheless, we will perform robustness tests in Section 3.9 to verify the
relationship between capital and energy in the production function as we differ from
established theoretical literature. By selecting different priors for ν, this allows us
to check the strengths of this parameter.
Moreover, the parameters ζ and θ in the utility function and ν and η in the final
good production function cannot be simultaneously calibrated, because of having
an equation system with one degree of freedom. Hence, either of those must be
predetermined – in our case the elasticities in these functions. Subsequently, the
particular share parameters are calculated to match empirical data. The weight
of overall consumption within the utility function is set to ϑ = 0.341 which is
determined by the steady state of the wage equation and labor supply equation.
The depreciation rate of durable goods is taken from Dhawan and Jeske (2008)
with the assumption that the behavior of US households does not distinguish from
German consumers significantly. Accordingly, δCD is set to 0.0683. Regarding the
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motion of the capital stock, used in the final good sector, its depreciation rate is
calculated from the time preference rate and the steady state interest rate while
the latter is calculated from the long-run first-order condition of the production
function.
The depreciation rate of fossil capital is determined by the long-run capital/output
ratio and investments into the former. Under consideration of its different weights,
the combined rates resemble the general depreciation rate of the German econ-
omy. The output elasticity of intermediate fossil energy is set to φ = 0.88 following
Argentiero et al. (2018). It approximately reflects the average relation between non-
renewable energy with respect to renewable energy. This comes close the average
proportion in Germany for the observed time period. The output elasticities of
physical capital in the intermediate fossil energy generation function and the in-
termediate renewable energy generation function are set to ϕ = 0.62 according to
Gross et al. (2013) and ψ = 0.3 according to Argentiero et al. (2018) respectively.
The remaining structural parameters are determined from the given parameters and
empirical findings. A more detailed derivation of the calibrated parameters can be
found in Appendix 3.H.6.
Table 3.1: Structural parameter values
Parameter Value Description
β 0.990 discount factor
ϑ 0.341 share of consumption in utility
γ 0.793 elas. of substitution of consumption
ζ -2.875 elas. of substitution between CD and EH
θ 0.999 share of durable consumption good
α 0.365 final output elas. of VA
η 0.949 share of capital
ν -0.150 elas. of substitution between KY and EY
φ 0.800 output elasticity of fossil resources
ϕ 0.490 fossil resource share
ω 1.000 exploration parameter
υ 2.000 parameter of exploration cost function
ψ 0.310 renewable asset share
δCD 0.068 depreciation rate of CD
δY 0.017 depreciation rate of KY
δF 0.045 depreciation rate of KF
δN 0.045 depreciation rate of KN
Note that θ and η depend on ζ and ν but also δCD and α (see (3.H.60) and
(3.H.63) in Appendix 3.H.5).
The shock related parameters, in particular the coefficients describing the au-
toregressive process of total factor productivity in each production function, are
assumed to be uniformly equal to 0.85. This reflects a modest reduction of the
direct impulse of stochastic shocks and follows business cycle literature Smets and
Wouters (2003).
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Table 3.2: Shock related parameter values
Parameter Value Description
ρAY 0.850 persistence technology shock of AY
ρAE 0.850 persistence technology shock of AE
ρAF 0.850 persistence technology shock of AF
ρAN 0.850 persistence technology shock of AN
ρT,CN 0.850 persistence consumer taste shock of CN
ρT,CD 0.850 persistence consumer taste shock of CD
σAY 0.010 volatility shock in AY
σAE 0.010 volatility shock in AE
σAF 0.010 volatility shock in AF
σAN 0.010 volatility shock in AN
σT,CN 0.010 volatility shock in non-durable taste
σT,CD 0.010 volatility shock in durable taste
σS 0.010 volatility shock in S
σV 0.010 volatility shock in V
a
a The constraint for resources and hence, the shock in its quantity only
hold for the model allowing for replenishment of the reserves.
For steady state values, we calibrate parameters that are consistent with long-run
historical averages from data. Only for labor supply do we set its long-run steady
state value to L = 0.3 as is also standard in the literature. Although this goes
along with Dhawan and Jeske (2008), it holds very close to its German equivalent
(see Hristov, 2016). However, as there are not good measures available for some
data, modification of certain values is requested. As such, the depreciation rate
of the stock of physical capital in the renewable energy sector, belonging to the
group of structural parameters, is taken over from its appropriate value in the fossil
resource sector. The model does not distinguish between different forms of finite
resources, and thus we have to combine its various expressions in one term. These
are calculated considering their respective heating values (see Appendix 3.H.6 for a
detailed discussion). The ratio between extraction of fossil resources and its stock
is calculated from data retrieved from the German Federal Institute for Geosciences
and Natural Resources (BGR, 2016). For the German economy, the F¯ /S¯ ratio is set
to 0.12875.
3.5.3 Estimation methodology
To determine the model by specifying the parameters, we use the concept of Bayesian
estimation which gives us a few advantages. It incorporates the derivation of the
modes by combining log-likelihood maximization with confronting the model with
data through priors. These priors work as weights in the maximization process to
avoid strange peak of the log-likelihood function. Otherwise, as pointed out by
Griffoli (2007), this can lead to a frequent property of DSGE models that likeli-
hood maximization can lead to illogical or foolish outcomes that contradict with
observations in data which is caused by their stylized and misspecified nature. Fur-
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thermore, opposed to GMM, Bayesian estimation fits the complete model and not
only particular equilibria. However, this also goes along with an adequate definition
of the model to avoid misspecification of all estimation results. Moreover, Bayesian
techniques can cope with a lack of identification of parameters and is therefore also
more robust to outliers in the data. Assuming a peak of likelihood function using
false insufficient priors, it will lead to a low probability of the posterior results. A
more detailed explanation about the solution technique of the Bayesian methodol-
ogy can be found in Appendix 3.B. Subsequent to identifying the likelihood function
to estimate the modes of the parameters, we perform a Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) method applying the Metropolis Hansting algorithm to obtain the full
posterior distribution of the values. In addition, this also acts as a diagnostic tool
to check the robustness of the results to build up confidence in our estimations. The
comparison of the prior and posterior distributions is shown in Appendix 3.C.
3.5.4 Prior parameters
Subsequently, we determine the probability distributions of all parameters that will
be estimated. These densities reflect beliefs about the parameter values and should
be carefully chosen. The previously determined calibration results are taken as
means to avoid diffuse results as they mainly are based on data. Standard deviations
and prior distributions are listed up in the third and forth column of Tables 3.3 and
3.4.
For the capital-energy bundle substitution parameter in the final good produc-
tion function as well as the major output elasticities in the remaining production
functions {α, φ, ϕ, ψ}, we assume a variance of {0.05, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1} and a beta distri-
bution to constrained the parameter between zero and one. The elasticity param-
eters within the durable good-energy bundle and capital-energy bundle {ζ, ν} are
distributed according to a normal probability distributed function with a variance
of 0.5 and 0.2 respectively as they do not only contain natural numbers but also
all real numbers. The share parameters in both CES functions, the utility function
and final good production function {θ, η}, are determined by ζ and ν (see Appendix
3.H.6). The depreciation rates {δCD , δY , δF , δN} follow a beta distribution with a
standard deviation of 0.05 final good productive capital, fossil and renewable capital
deposits and 0.1 for durable good stock.
For shock related parameters, determining the development of technological
progress in the production functions, we have beta distributions limiting the range
to positive values only. Furthermore, this guarantees a stable development to avoid
unit roots. The standard deviations of white noise in these autoregressive functions,
which acts as the shock components at the same time, follow an inverse-gamma
distribution with a mean of 0.01 and an infinite standard deviation.
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3.5.5 Posterior parameters
All parameters seem to be well identified which is confirmed by identification tests
within Dynare.6 The resulting values from Bayesian estimation performance are
summarized in the last four columns of Tables 3.3–3.4, distinguishing between the
posterior mode, the posterior standard deviation, and the 90% confidence interval
for the model parameters. In addition, a graphical representation of the prior and
posterior densities is included in Appendix 3.C.
The substitution parameter within the durable goods–energy bundle is -2.885
which comes close to its prior value. The posterior of the substitution parameter of
capital–energy amounts to -0.288 which slightly deviates from its prior. To avoid
misspecification of the latter due to a bad fit of prior settings, we perform a robust-
ness test later. The present outcomes verify the assumption of a complementary
relationship between energy and durable goods or physical capital in the utility or
production function. Although the 90% confidence interval also includes positive
values for ν, its posterior mean deviates from the prior values by becoming even
more negative.
The posteriors of the remaining structural parameters lie in the range of the
prior values which have been originally calibrated from the data. Furthermore,
they roughly correspond to the findings of the literature. The output elasticity
of the capital-energy bundle α is slightly lower than its prior which corresponds
to its equivalent in German RBC models (e.g. Flor, 2014). Argentiero et al. (2018)
estimate a mean of 0.395 but assume a substitutable relationship between energy and
capital while Dhawan and Jeske (2008) set an output elasticity of 0.36, assuming the
same structure as in the present paper. Posterior estimation values of depreciation
of physical capital in all sectors including durable goods are almost identical to their
prior estimation values. This can be explained as they are not well identified by the
data,7 in particular through the assumption of equal values for fossil and renewable
physical capital. Overall, this is negligible due to a lower share in the production
function. Alternatively, a close posterior distribution with respect to its prior can
also indicate a very accurate reflection of the given information (Pfeifer, 2014). As
we set the prior means equal to their steady state values in consideration of the
empirical data, this can justify the posterior results for ϕ, ψ, and φ.
The posterior values of the means of the shock related parameters describing
the autoregressive processes are close to the priors for the energy sector and the
fossil resource sector. The same holds for the renewable sector as well as consumer
taste of non-durable goods. Looking at the means of the shock related parameters
6In fact, we perform two independent tests based on the prior parameters. One checks for
identification according to Ratto and Iskrev (2011), the other one is a sensitivity test that looks at
unique solutions, indeterminacy, and explosive solutions.
7We limit the estimation process to the most relevant sector output series only. Hence, we do
not include capital data series which might assess the evolution of depreciation more precisely in
comparison to sector output.
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describing the autoregressive processes, their posterior values are close to the priors
for the energy sector, the fossil resource sector, the renewable resource sector and
the consumer taste of non-durable goods.
Stochastic technological change in the final output sector and consumer taste
of durable goods vanish at a higher speed. The variance describing the stochastic
component are close to the prior. Only for the technological process in the finite
and renewable resource sector as well as for the consumer taste of durables are they
significantly more volatile with a standard deviation of 1.9%, 4.0%, and 3.2% re-
spectively. This can come along with the fact that we do not consider any additional
costs in doing investment adjustments. Hence, households overreact to optimally re-
spond to changes in the economy. By construction, fluctuation in the finite resource
stock is not subject to an autoregressive process. According the estimation results,
its one time effect is slightly lower than the prior mean. In sum, it has the lowest
volatility of all exogenous shocks to the model.
In the model allowing for replenishment of the reserve stock, the posterior struc-
tural parameters are in accordance with the results from the baseline model (see
Appendix 3.E). In particular, the complementary relationship through ζ and ν are
again confirmed. The estimated value of the additional parameter υ, measuring
the exponent of the exploration cost function, is negligibly higher than the priory
estimated value which slightly increases the cost of R&D. Volatility in the finite re-
source stock as well as the reserve stock increases only slightly in comparison to the
baseline model without extraction. Again, both shocks have only one-time direct
effects their respective stock constraints.
3.6 Numerical Results
In the following, we compare the percentage standard deviation (2nd moment) of
selected variables from the model with the respective values from German economy
data, using an HP-filter. Doing so allows us to test how accurately the models
with endogenous energy producing sectors fit the actual German business cycle. We
simulate both models, without and with extraction, over 1000 periods, taking the
estimated posterior parameters to receive the moments of simulated variables. In
addition, we present the results of the simulations, in which we allow for only one
shock respectively for the baseline model without extraction. The moments are
summarized in Table 3.1.
In the baseline model, which considers an economy without resource-extraction that
is affected by all shocks (column 1), output volatility comprises 92% of the fluctua-
tion in the data. Comparing that result with those from the models being affected by
a single shock only (columns 2–6), we can identify TFP as the main source of gener-
ating fluctuation in the national account. TFP in each of the remaining sub-sectors
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Table 3.3: Results from Metropolis-Hastings (parameters)
Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev. HPD inf HPD sup
ρAY beta 0.850 0.1000 0.655 0.1340 0.4416 0.8832
ρAE beta 0.850 0.1000 0.772 0.0994 0.6189 0.9391
ρAF beta 0.850 0.1000 0.840 0.1027 0.6926 0.9909
ρAN beta 0.850 0.1000 0.791 0.0937 0.6469 0.9485
ρT,CN beta 0.850 0.1000 0.804 0.0985 0.6595 0.9699
ρT,CD beta 0.850 0.1000 0.602 0.1170 0.4107 0.7952
ζ norm -2.875 0.5000 -2.885 0.4941 -3.6868 -2.0612
ν norm -0.150 0.3000 -0.288 0.2632 -0.7185 0.1476
α beta 0.365 0.0500 0.347 0.0491 0.2663 0.4279
ϕ beta 0.490 0.1000 0.487 0.0969 0.3323 0.6500
ψ beta 0.310 0.1000 0.305 0.0991 0.1473 0.4681
φ beta 0.800 0.0100 0.813 0.0100 0.7969 0.8297
δCD beta 0.068 0.0100 0.067 0.0099 0.0508 0.0829
δF beta 0.045 0.0100 0.045 0.0098 0.0292 0.0608
δY beta 0.017 0.0100 0.016 0.0092 0.0024 0.0297
δN beta 0.045 0.0100 0.045 0.0102 0.0287 0.0612
HPD inf (HPD sup) correspond to the lowest (highest) points of the highest posterior
density with a 95% confidence interval.
Table 3.4: Results from Metropolis-Hastings (standard deviation
of structural shocks)
Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev. HPD inf HPD sup
σAY invg 0.010 Inf 0.009 0.0014 0.0062 0.0107
σAE invg 0.010 Inf 0.009 0.0013 0.0067 0.0109
σAF invg 0.010 Inf 0.019 0.0027 0.0151 0.0237
σAN invg 0.010 Inf 0.040 0.0058 0.0315 0.0491
σT,CN invg 0.010 Inf 0.008 0.0013 0.0056 0.0097
σT,CD invg 0.010 Inf 0.032 0.0046 0.0245 0.0392
σS invg 0.010 Inf 0.007 0.0031 0.0025 0.0109
HPD inf (HPD sup) correspond to the lowest (highest) points of the highest pos-
terior density with a 95% confidence interval.
can only contribute 5% to aggregate output volatility. With respect to consump-
tion, the model can account for about 76% of consumption volatility of non-durable
goods while it is only slightly below the empirical target for durable goods. Although
Dhawan and Jeske (2008) have calibrated their model for the US economy, whose
data partially deviate from the German data, the present endogenized model is able
to map business cycles more accurately. Volatility of total energy is well-matched by
the model. Most of the fluctuations are generated by TFP in fossil energy produc-
tion, accounting for more than 82%. Models with shocks solely in the total energy
sector or renewable energy sector can explain 45% and 38% respectively, while TFP
shocks in the final good sector only generate 17%. The lower share of renewable
energy resources in the total energy mix compared to the finite resource is the main
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Table 3.1: Percentage standard deviation
baseline extraction
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Data all shocks w/ Ay w/ Ae w/ Af w/ An w/ S all shocks
GDP 1.50 1.38 1.47 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.00 1.53
Non-durable goods 0.83 0.63 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.65
Durable goods 2.87 2.86 0.23 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.01 2.96
Total energy 1.74 1.82 0.29 0.78 1.44 0.66 0.03 1.78
Energy households 1.07 0.34 0.46 0.81 0.39 0.02 1.05
Energy firms 2.58 0.66 1.14 2.18 0.98 0.05 2.71
Finite resources 1.85 1.90 0.35 0.25 1.78 0.22 0.04 1.90
Renewable resources 5.58 3.90 0.05 0.09 0.00 3.85 0.01 3.69
Labor 0.98 0.91 0.95 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.00 1.00
Total energy prices 4.98 3.27 0.95 1.35 2.54 1.15 0.05 3.20
Values denote the simulated results of percentage standard deviation (2nd moment) over 1000
periods using a HP-filter.
reason for its lower share of the explained variation. Moreover, according to the
moments, fluctuation in total energy is mainly caused by the supply side as final
good production has the opportunity to partly substitute volatility in energy by an
alternative input factor. Unsurprisingly, volatility in outputs of finite and renewable
resources are primarily caused by TFP shocks in their respective sectors, because
these have an immediate impact on the quantity of production. While the model
can replicate fluctuation in finite resources quite accurately, it can only explain 70%
of volatility in renewable resources. However, its generation process is simplified
in this model by including only capital and investments and hence no other input
factors such as labor input and innovation (besides TFP). This simplification may
be what is behind the unexplained effects. The same also applies for total energy
prices where the model can explain 66% of volatility in the data.
In sum, total output fluctuation is mainly driven by TFP shocks in the final good
sector in spite of energy being endogenously generated. However, the presence of
energy seems to improve the explanation of fluctuation in durable goods. Volatility
of this good is by far closer to its empirical target in German data in comparison
to Dhawan and Jeske (2008), even without considering additional costs in adjusting
its investments. TFP in final production can only explain 14% of volatility in non-
durable goods and 8% of volatility in durable goods. In a model with an exogenous
energy price process calibrated for Germany, Schmidt and Zimmermann (2005) can
only account for 8% of output volatility for the time period 1987-2002. In the present
model, volatility is only slightly below the target value by 8%.
Extending the baseline model by allowing to replenish the available stock of fossil
resources, we introduce a further source of fluctuation to the model which directly
affects the size of reserve stock of the finite resource. The respective simulated
percentage standard deviations in column 7 confirm that most fluctuations generated
by the model come closer to the target values in the data. The extended model
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slightly overestimates volatility in GDP, but at the same time it can account for
78% of the target value of fluctuation in non-durable goods. Durable goods and
total energy output volatility are well generated. Only regarding the renewable
energy output, the standard deviation declines and moves away from the empirical
target in the data.
3.7 Dynamic Results
In this section, we examine the effects of changes in the productivity processes AY,
AE, AF, and AN within the production functions, as well as a shock in the stock
of fossil reserves S by describing the impulse response functions. We neglect the
effects of a shock in consumer taste in durable and non-durable goods as they are
of minor interest when discussing the effects of endogenous energy generation.8 The
dynamic results are based on the calibrated and estimated values, where the size
of a positive shocks corresponds to their individual standard deviations σY, σE, σF,
σN, and σS as shown in Table 3.4. The IRFs, depicted in Figures 3.1–3.5, aim at
explaining two questions: Firstly, how do the endogenous variables respond to shocks
in TFP and the stock of reserves. Secondly, to what extent do the responses differ
when allowing for replenishment of the fossil reserve stock (red curve). For better
visibility, we include the dynamics of both models in the same graph. Furthermore,
we add the dynamics of the baseline model without durable goods (blue curve) to
show the dynamic consequences when distinguishing between consumption goods
with different properties.
3.7.1 Shock to TFP in the final good sector
Figure 3.1 shows the IRFs after a positive shock in total factor productivity in the
final good sector. As expected, there is a positive effect on the sector’s output
because the same unit of all input factors becomes more productive, other things
equal. At the same time, this leads to an increase in GDP because it is part of
the national account. On the consumption side, there are more final goods to be
consumed by households. On the expenditure side, as productivity of each input
factor increases, the marginal products, and hence returns to capital and labor
increase (consequently, households’ incomes from this sector increase). As a result,
households not only increase their expenditures for consumption goods to gain higer
utility, but also increase the supply of capital due to the higher interest rates. Here,
capital demand by the final good sector is growing over the initial 10 periods because
optimization of investments is always lagging behind the adjustment of remaining
variables due to the restrictions in the capital constraint. In contrast, the peak of
supply and demand of labor occurs without a lag, because the input factor ‘labor’ is
8The IRFs of shocks in consumer taste in durable and non-durable goods can be found in
Appendix 3.G.
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initially used as a substitute for the capital-energy bundle. Similarly, energy demand
in final production increases due to the higher demand for non-durable goods by
households but also due to its complementary link with capital. The complementary
relationship also leads to a boost in the demand for energy by households, because
consumption of durable goods increases due to higher income. In sum, the price for
energy increases, which has direct impacts the energy and resources sectors.
The energy sector benefits from higher energy prices but also from the increase
in demand for energy. In order to fulfill this demand, the sector has to generate
more energy. There are two reasons why it is mainly the fossil energy sector that
meets this higher demand: First, even though demand for physical capital increases
in both intermediate energy sectors (in order to raise production along with higher
capital returns), the renewable energy sector can only change its resource generation
by adjusting capital investments, which always happens with a lag (just as phys-
ical capital in final production). On the contrary, the fossil energy sector is able
to respond to these changes almost immediately, by higher depletion of reserves.
Second, renewable intermediate energy has a lower output elasticity with constant
returns to scale in overall energy production. Hence, higher demand of overall en-
ergy leads to an increase of intermediate energy by the same proportional change.
But the absolute change of renewable intermediate energy is lower with respect to
fossil intermediate energy. Over time, following the AR(1) process, TFP in the final
good sector converges to its long-run steady state. Therefore, the amplitudes of the
remaining variables diminish as well.
In the model with no durable goods (dotted curves in Figure 3.1), the qualitative
effects slightly change in comparison to the baseline model. Households can consume
only non-durable goods, with demands for these goods being higher in comparison
to the baseline model. Consequently, final good production has a higher demand
for labor, capital, and energy. But because households do not consume any energy
products, the magnitudes of positive responses within the energy sectors are smaller.
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Figure 3.1: Bayesian IRF: orthogonalized shock to εY .
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.005
0.01
0 10 20 30 40
0.5
1
1.5
2 10
-3
0 10 20 30 40
0
10
20 10
-4
0 10 20 30 40
1
2
3 10
-3
0 10 20 30 40
0
2
4
6
10-3
0 10 20 30 40
1
2
3 10
-3
0 10 20 30 40
0
5
10 10
-4
0 10 20 30 40
-5
0
5 10
-3
0 20 40
0
2
4 10
-3
0 20 40
-1
0
1
2 10
-3
0 20 40
0
5
10 10
-3
0 10 20 30 40
0
5
10 10
-3
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
1.5 10
-3
GDP CN
CD
N
KY
KF KN
pE
E EH EY
rY rF
F S
All subfigures depict the deviations for each respective variable from the deterministic steady state in per-
centage. The solid lines display the baseline model, the dashed lines display the model with replenishment
of the reserve stock while the dotted lines display the model without durable goods and energy consumption
by the final good sector only. In figure (F S), the black lines displays the response of variable F, the red
lines display the response of variable S. In figure (rY rF ), the black lines displays the response of variable
rY , the red lines display the response of variable rF .
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The dashed curves in Figure 3.1 describe the dynamics of the variables in the
model, with the possibility to replenish the fossil resource stock. In comparison with
the baseline model, the results show a shift towards non-renewable intermediate
resources in the final energy sector. The finite intermediate energy sector has the
possibility to immediately respond to changes in the demand for intermediate energy
by raising the stock of finite resources through an intensification of R&D activity.
As a direct consequence of the shock in TFP in the final good sector and the boost in
demand for energy, the energy sector substitutes even more renewable intermediate
energy with finite intermediate energy in comparison to the baseline model. This is
because the usage of the latter is more efficient (less costs and no adjustment lag
in all input factors). Positive capital investments are kept lower in comparison to
the baseline model, as the reserve stock can be expanded. Although R&D certainly
brings along additional costs for the finite intermediate energy sector, total costs can
be kept down because less capital has to be used than without R&D. These savings
are passed through to a lower price of energy paid by households and final good
producers. Furthermore, output by the finite intermediate energy sector is higher,
which leads to more energy generation by the energy sector. Hence, as a side effect,
both energy consumers slightly increase their demand for energy. In sum, allowing
for replenishment of the finite resource stock has no significant impacts on GDP
but rather on the energy sectors. In particular the finite intermediate energy sector
benefits.
3.7.2 Shock to TFP in the energy sector
The dynamics of a positive shock in the energy sector are shown in Figure 3.2.
As productivity and output in this sector increase, marginal productivities of input
factors increase, creating an oversupply of total energy and finally resulting in a drop
in energy prices. Consequently, because marginal costs of energy input decrease,
the final good sector and households increase their demand of energy, which leads
to higher investments in durable goods and increases the demand of the remaining
input factors in the production function. Capital utilization increases due to the
complementary link with energy. Labor increases, but at a significantly lower extent,
to satisfy the demand of non-durable goods through higher production, which cannot
be fulfilled by the capital-energy bundle alone. Overall, this has a positive effect on
final output and GDP. Despite the increased energy output, the energy sector reduces
its demand for intermediate energy due to higher TFP, which puts negative pressure
on the price. The intermediate energy sectors are concerned with two impacts. On
the one hand, less demand for their outputs leads to a reduction of input factors. On
the other hand, the increase in demand for physical capital by the final good sector
puts positive pressure on the price. Hence, it becomes more attractive for households
to provide capital for final production, which leads to a withdrawal of capital from
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intermediate energy sectors. As a consequence, capital returns for assets employed
in these sectors increase.
The renewable energy sector suffers significantly more than the fossil energy sec-
tor and looses shares to the latter. The ability to quickly adjust production by
changing the degree of depletion of reserves provides the fossil energy sector with
a flexible instrument and comparative advantage over the renewable energy sector.
However, these effects diminish over the periods, as the economy converges back to
its long-run steady state. The quantity of energy peaks instantaneously, because
the shocked variable is present in the energy production sector, whose production
function is not constrained by any time lag, opposite to a TFP shock in final pro-
duction.
In the presence of no durable goods, the dynamics do not essentially change.
Notably, the negative effects on the energy sector are higher in absence of a further
energy purchaser such as households, in comparison to the baseline model. Conse-
quently, only final production can take advantage of lower energy prices. As house-
holds consume one sort of goods only, non-durable consumption is higher, which
leads to a more important role of final production. As a result, the reallocation of
assets towards the more productive ones, namely physical capital in final produc-
tion, is intensified. This is done at the expense of the intermediate renewable and
finite energy sectors, whose capital stocks decrease significantly.
Allowing for replenishment of the fossil reserve stock does not significantly change
the dynamics when comparing them to the baseline model. Solely variables related to
the finite intermediate energy sector are affected. The resource stock can be enlarged
through an intensification of R&D. As a result, the lack of physical capital due to
the redistribution of assets by households can simply be substituted by extending
the usage of the resource stock. Renewable energy responses are hardly affected,
neither positively nor negatively, which shows that replenishment is directly passed
through to the energy production and its purchasers.
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Figure 3.2: Bayesian IRF: orthogonalized shock to εE .
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All subfigures depict the deviations for each respective variable from the deterministic steady state in per-
centage. The solid lines display the baseline model, the dashed lines display the model with replenishment
of the reserve stock while the dotted lines display the model without durable goods and energy consumption
by the final good sector only. In figure (F S), the black lines displays the response of variable F, the red
lines display the response of variable S. In figure (rY rF ), the black lines displays the response of variable
rY , the red lines display the response of variable rF .
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3.7.3 Shock to TFP in the fossil energy sector
The effects of a positive TFP shock in the fossil energy sector are summarized in
Figure 3.3. Initially, the increase in productivity boosts finite intermediate energy
output. The response of demand by the energy sector is sedated, so market prices
of finite intermediate energy drop to make up for imbalances between demand and
supply. As a direct consequence, the depletion rate of reserves drops immediately
because a higher TFP leads to an increase in output per unit of input. Since the
stock reserves are limited with respect to time, a higher productivity allows the
sector to save this valuable input factor. For the same reason, the physical capital
is significantly reduced.
Due to lower costs, the final energy sector substitutes renewable energy with fossil
energy, which puts downward pressure on the price of renewable intermediate energy
and demand for physical capital in this sector. Overall, the final energy sector can
pass through the cost saving to energy prices paid by final producers and households,
because it acts under perfect competition. This leads to an increased demand in
energy as well as consumption. Furthermore, the final good sector substitutes labor
by both capital and energy because of cost and efficiency reasons. Households are
additionally motivated to reallocate their assets towards the good producing sector,
due to the lower demand for capital in the intermediate energy sectors. GDP is
positively affected by the TFP shock in the finite intermediate energy sector. This
is because of lower energy prices and the resulting higher demand by households
for non-durable goods, and in particular for durables, whereas the latter acts as a
complementary good with respect to energy.
As we have already seen in the previous cases of TFP shocks (in the final good
sector and final energy sector), the consequences of a TFP shock in the finite in-
termediate energy sector in an economy without durable goods are not significantly
different from those in the baseline model. Only for the direct competitor of finite
intermediate energy, namely the sector generating renewable intermediate energy,
are the negative responses intensified. Due to the missing demand for energy by
households, the magnitude of total energy is slightly diminished.
Comparing the baseline model and the model to replenishment of the reserve
stock, the dynamic responses do not deviate significantly. However, it is apparent
that given the ability to rely on additional reserves, the finite energy sector can
reduce the magnitude of negative response in capital and consequently the fluctua-
tion in finite intermediate energy output. As a result, all the effects are smoothed
over the observed periods. The initially strong fluctuations diminish and persist for
longer time. Furthermore, we notice a light increase in GDP, which can be traced
back to R&D activity and its positive contribution to the national account.
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Figure 3.3: Bayesian IRF: orthogonalized shock to εF .
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All subfigures depict the deviations for each respective variable from the deterministic steady state in per-
centage. The solid lines display the baseline model, the dashed lines display the model with replenishment
of the reserve stock while the dotted lines display the model without durable goods and energy consumption
by the final good sector only. In figure (F S), the black lines displays the response of variable F, the red
lines display the response of variable S. In figure (rY rF ), the black lines displays the response of variable
rY , the red lines display the response of variable rF .
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3.7.4 Shock to TFP in the renewable energy sector
The responses of a positive TFP shock in the renewable energy sector are similar to
those in the previous case, where the finite energy sector was affected by productivity
changes. Here, the boost in productivity increases output of the renewable energy
sector (see Figure 3.4). Because demand by the energy sector does not respond
immediately, the renewable intermediate energy price drops. Even though a single
unit of capital becomes more productive, fewer physical capital units have to be
demanded to produce the same output, leading to a reduction of capital investments.
But other than the TFP shock in the fossil energy sector, the renewable energy
sector cannot substitute the usage of capital. Due to this dependency, the marginal
product of capital increases, and with it the capital unit costs, but to a lower extent
in comparison to the returns to capital in the final good sector.
Again, low factor prices in the final energy sector are passed through to the
lower price and higher demand of total energy. Households increase their consump-
tion while final good producers increase production. Due to the demand for capital
and its attractive interest returns, households reallocate their assets to final produc-
tion, putting downward pressure on the interest rate. After around 10 periods, the
marginal product of capital in the final good sector falls below that of the renewable
and that of the finite energy sector. Consequently, households re-optimize their asset
allocation by deducting capital from the final production sector, leading to a hump-
shaped capital response curve. In an economy without durable goods, the effects
are only intensified. However, there are no qualitative differences in comparison to
the baseline model.
Increasing the stock of finite resources through R&D does not affect the output
of the renewable energy sector at all. The same holds for the remaining variables,
with the exception of assets employed in the finite intermediate energy sector. As
the size of the available resource stock can be optimized by lowering the efforts in
R&D, transforming resources to usable reserves, the sector can substitute capital
losses much better in comparison to in the baseline model. At the same time, this
means less capital returns for households which affects consumption expenditures in
subsequent periods. However, this happens to such a low extent that GDP is not
influenced significantly.
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Figure 3.4: Bayesian IRF: orthogonalized shock to εN .
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All subfigures depict the deviations for each respective variable from the deterministic steady state in per-
centage. The solid lines display the baseline model, the dashed lines display the model with replenishment
of the reserve stock while the dotted lines display the model without durable goods and energy consumption
by the final good sector only. In figure (F S), the black lines displays the response of variable F, the red
lines display the response of variable S. In figure (rY rF ), the black lines displays the response of variable
rY , the red lines display the response of variable rF .
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3.7.5 Shock to finite reserve stocks
Figure 3.5 shows the IRFs of a shock in the finite reserve constraint. A negative
impact leads to a one-time unexpected reduction of reserve stock. The direct con-
sequence is a drop in fossil intermediate energy and an increase in its price. More-
over, the finite energy sector increases its demand for capital as a substitute for the
resource stock. At the same time, the energy sector substitutes fossil intermedi-
ate energy with its alternative input factor, namely renewable intermediate energy,
whereby the renewable energy sector increases its energy generation by employing
more capital. However, its output does not offset the loss in fossil energy as the
degree of substitution is limited. Consequently, it is not avoidable that the supply
of total energy drops, and hence the price of energy increases. Final good producers
and households have to reduce their expenditures, leading to less consumption of
non-durable and durable goods and a reduction of GDP. In contrast to the preced-
ing shocks, an unexpected change in the reserve constraint has significantly longer
persisting impacts on all macroeconomic variables. This can be attributed to the
high weight of the fossil sector which is significantly dependent on the reserve stock,
and whose reduction has persistent impact on finite intermediate energy generation.
In the model with replenishment of the finite resource stock, an intensification of
R&D allows compensation of the loss in the fossil resource stock that comes along
with the shock. As a result, the economy can return to its optimal path after some
initial periods of adjustments. Moreover, as the high effort in R&D leads to a higher
income for households, GDP can even benefit during the first periods.
Overall, the dynamic responses confirm the findings on the behavior of the dis-
ruption of fixed capital by Dhawan and Jeske (2008) due to the enlargement of the
flexibility to re-balance the household’s portfolio. This also explains the low weight
of TFP shocks in the energy sectors, which are further discussed below. As there
are more channels available to households, they are more flexible in their investment
decision. Facing a shock in TFP (in AE, AF, AN) leads to adjustments of capital
investments in final good production which, in turn, are dominated by adjustments
of investments in durable goods by the households. To be more precise, the neg-
ative response of capital investments in the final good sector following a reduction
in the non-renewable reserve stock are less strong than the reduction of durable
goods purchases. Overall, the present paper allows for four channels to re-balance
investments, while Dhawan and Jeske consider only two.
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Figure 3.5: Bayesian IRF: orthogonalized shock to εS .
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All subfigures depict the deviations for each respective variable from the deterministic steady state in per-
centage. The solid lines display the baseline model, the dashed lines display the model with replenishment
of the reserve stock while the dotted lines display the model without durable goods and energy consumption
by the final good sector only. In figure (F S), the black lines displays the response of variable F, the red
lines display the response of variable S. In figure (rY rF ), the black lines displays the response of variable
rY , the red lines display the response of variable rF .
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3.8 Shock Decomposition
3.8.1 Variance decomposition
Table 3.1 displays the importance of the effects of all seven shocks on the main
endogenous variables in the model relative to each other. In other words, Table
3.1 shows the relative contribution of each shock to the variance in the observed
variables. In contrast to other papers that determine energy prices exogenously
(e.g. Dhawan and Jeske, 2008; Finn, 1995; Kim and Loungani, 1992; Schmidt and
Zimmermann, 2005), we distinguish between several productivity shocks, which are
allocated to the respective sectors’ production or generation functions. As a re-
sult, energy and resource prices are endogenously determined as in Jacquinot et al.
(2009) and Argentiero et al. (2018). Further sources of fluctuation are taste shocks
in consumption goods and quantity shocks in reserved or resources stocks. To be
able to observe the degree of influence of each shock over time, we compute the con-
ditional variance decomposition for three different periods. The short-term horizon
is defined by the decomposition after four periods, and the mid-term horizon after
twelve periods respectively. Additionally, the long-term horizon is computed by an
unconditional variance decomposition.
Unsurprisingly, shocks in total factor productivity (εY ,εE ,εF ,εN ) have the most
influential pressure on output in their respective sectors except for the final energy
sector. On the one side, bounded fossil intermediate energy and its high share
relative to renewable intermediate energy seems to impact final energy production
significantly. We notice a significantly high share of fluctuation in TFP of finite
intermediate energy contributing to fluctuations in total energy. On the other side,
both the autoregressive coefficient and variance in the total factor productivity shock
process of final energy are small and consequently do not boost output notably.
Apparently, productivity in final good production has the most important influ-
ence on overall GDP. It remains above 90%, although the share slightly decreases
over the different time horizons as the influence of the remaining sectors can evolve
with time. This is in line with previous literature such as Kim and Loungani (1992)
and Dhawan and Jeske (2008), who detect TFP to be the main driving force be-
hind output fluctuations. It even shows to have a high impact on consumption of
non-durable goods, next to the shock in consumer taste (εT,CN ). Its role is obvious,
as it has a direct influence on consumption for two reasons. Firstly, the final good
sector is the producer of this consumption good, and hence it has a direct impact
on its quantity. Secondly, TFP of final production affects the marginal product of
input factors, such as capital and labor, which are provided by households. Conse-
quently, it alters households’ available income and thus their spending capabilities.
The remaining shock processes are negligible with respect to GDP.
Considering durable goods, the influence of each shock depends on the time
periods. In the short-term, more than one-third of its variance is explained by
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the energy sectors. Durable goods respond to changes in quantity and prices of
total energy due to its complementary link with energy. Over time, the degree of
influence of these changes is reduced, as TFP of final good production becomes more
important, because households substitute durable goods with non-durable goods.
Table 3.1: Conditional variance decommposition: baseline model
εE εN εY εF εT,CN εS εT,CD
short-term horizon
GDP 0.25 0.19 96.67 0.13 1.19 0.00 1.57
Non-durable goods 0.25 0.19 60.45 0.14 29.58 0.00 9.38
Durable goods 20.09 16.23 21.33 0.63 26.74 0.35 14.62
Total energy 25.27 19.09 4.96 49.69 0.07 0.14 0.78
Finite resources 2.89 2.23 8.32 85.15 0.08 0.27 1.07
Renewable resources 0.05 99.88 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04
mid-term horizon
GDP 0.29 0.22 95.76 0.13 1.97 0.00 1.63
Non-durable goods 0.40 0.32 66.24 0.12 26.06 0.01 6.86
Durable goods 10.83 9.05 46.27 0.41 24.10 0.39 8.95
Total energy 25.99 20.54 8.58 43.23 0.31 0.42 0.92
Finite resources 3.59 2.92 13.58 77.39 0.40 0.83 1.30
Renewable resources 0.06 99.68 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05
long-term horizon
GDP 0.38 0.26 94.55 0.18 2.25 0.07 2.31
Non-durable goods 0.76 0.61 62.33 0.18 28.22 0.48 7.41
Durable goods 8.03 6.28 47.86 0.57 24.80 4.33 8.13
Total energy 23.64 16.53 7.26 46.04 0.66 4.92 0.95
Finite resources 2.86 2.08 10.07 74.64 0.78 8.37 1.19
Renewable resources 0.07 99.36 0.39 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.07
The short-term horizon is defined by the decomposition after four periods, the mid-term
horizon after twelve periods. The long-term horizon is computed by an unconditional
variance decomposition.
The remaining variables describing the outputs of the energy sectors develops simi-
larly. Only renewable intermediate energy seems to be robust to alternative shocks
besides its own TFP. Although TFP in the final energy and finite intermediate en-
ergy sectors contributes most to volatility in output in the production processes,
TFP in final good production gains importance when comparing the short- and
mid-term horizon. Final good producers respond to changes in the supply of energy
by modifying their allocation of input factors, which in turn also affects the demand
of energy. The impact of volatility in the stock of finite resources (εS) is negligibly
small in the short- and mid-term. However, with respect to long-term development,
it has a certain stake in total and finite intermediate energy output as it influences
optimization of energy generation in the long-term.
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3.8.2 Historical decomposition
Figure 3.1: Historical shock decomposition: national account GDP .
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The black line depicts the business cycle of the corresponding variables (Figure 3.D.1), given the specified
parameter set. The colored bars correspond to the contribution of the respective smoothed shocks. Grey
colored initial values are part of the business cycles which are not explained by the smooth shocks, but
rather by unknown initial values of the state variables.
To investigate how shocks affect deviation from the steady state of the German econ-
omy over the sample periods, Figure 3.1 presents the shock decomposition of his-
torical business cycles of Germany between 1991-2016. Overall, a shock in the TFP
of final good production (εY) still includes the most influential variance explaining
the cycles of the economy. This confirms the variance decomposition analysis from
Section 3.8.1. The shock shifting consumer taste (εT,CD) is clearly less important
for final goods than TFP, followed by shocks in the energy sectors. Finite energy
productivity does not play an important role in GDP fluctuation, despite contribut-
ing the predominant share to final energy production, which is an input factor in
final good production and consumption. On the one side, the final energy sector
can substitute either of the forms of intermediate energy for the other, and hence it
is flexible in responding to volatility in their supply. On the other side, energy con-
sumers smooth the effects though shifting to substitutes. As a consequence, GDP
is relatively robust to fluctuation in energy. The respective historical decomposition
of GDP considering the model with resource exploration is equivalent.
In contrast, historically the decomposition of consumption goods is more het-
erogeneous (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Next to exogenous impacts through variation
in consumer taste for non-durable and durable goods (εT,CN ,εT,CD), volatility in
the TFP of the energy sectors definitely plays a role in explaining historical fluc-
tuations in consumption of durable goods. In particular, productivity shocks in
the total energy (εE) and renewable intermediate energy sectors (εN ) have a high
weight, though their effects are offsetting each other. We argue that inconsistency
in renewable energy generation is balanced by changing the overall productivity in
90 Durable Goods and Energy in RBC
total energy production. Decomposing historical non-durable goods data shows that
energy price shocks or respectively shocks from energy related sectors are negligibly
small.
Figure 3.2: Historical shock decomposition: non-durable goods CN .
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Figure 3.3: Historical shock decomposition: durable goods CD .
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In addition to the previous decomposition of output variables, we examine what
affects the price setting of total energy. Figure 3.4 shows that all energy related
sectors have similar impacts on the price. Again, as detected in the decomposition
of durable goods, TFP in total energy and renewable intermediate energy are almost
neutralizing each other. With the exception of 2007, TFP in the finite intermediate
energy sector is decisive for the direction of price development, which can be traced
back to its dominant role in the energy mix.
Altogether, the variance decomposition shows that the share of fluctuations re-
sulting from changes in productivity within the energy sectors is negligibly small
when considering fluctuation in GDP. The overall share explaining business cycles
comes from TFP in the final good sector. However, volatility originating from en-
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ergy and its underlying sectors affects the behavior of households when optimizing
their utility.
Figure 3.4: Historical shock decomposition: energy price pE.
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3.9 Robustness
When calibrating the distribution and substitution parameters for the energy bun-
dles in the utility function of households and final good production function, there
is one degree of freedom each. Consequently, there is an initial value problem shown
by:
θ =
1−β(1−δCD)
1−β(1−δCD )+β CD
EH
ζ−1 and η =
α
(
EY
GDP
)
−1
−1
α
(
EY
GDP
)
−1
−1+
(
KY
EY
)ν .
Thus, we examine robustness by checking whether the volatility results are sen-
sitive to alternative parameters. To do so, we choose alternative parameters at the
higher and lower range around the benchmark value. We set the elasticity of substi-
tution in the energy-capital bundle of firms {ν} to unity, 0.59, and 0.25 apart from
the benchmark of 0.87, or respectively ζ ∈ (0,−0.15,−0.7,−3). These values are
similar to those of Kim and Loungani (1992) and Dhawan and Jeske (2008) whose
benchmark value of 0.59 corresponds to real values of the US economy. For the
elasticity of substitution of energy demand and durable goods, we consider values
of unity, 0.59, and 0.25, respectively ζ ∈ (0,−0.7,−0.2875).
Table 3.1 summarizes the percentage standard deviation of all 12 combinations
of substitution parameters for both the baseline and the replenishment model, when
all shocks are present. Apart from total energy prices, the moments seem to be
robust to variation in both substitution parameters. It is worth to mention that
we fully re-estimate all parameters that are not fixed according to the estimation
process described in Section 3.5. Hence, also the posterior values of the remaining
parameters can deviate from those of the baseline model, to capture the salient
features of the data.
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Table 3.1: Robustness test: volatility shares
baseline model replenishment model
ν = 0 ν = −0.15 ν = −0.7 ν = −3 ν = 0 ν = −0.15 ν = −0.7 ν = −3
ζ = 0
GDP 1.48 1.44 1.47 1.58 1.48 1.49 1.50 1.50
Non-durable goods 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.65
Durable goods 2.93 2.78 2.79 2.82 2.96 2.92 2.89 2.95
Total energy 1.90 1.89 1.84 1.83 1.87 1.86 1.84 1.77
Finite resources 1.89 1.92 1.88 1.85 1.90 1.89 1.87 1.80
Renewable resources 3.88 3.85 3.90 3.69 3.89 3.90 3.74 3.84
Labor 0.97 0.95 0.96 1.02 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.96
Total energy prices 2.10 2.16 2.36 2.90 2.09 2.17 2.34 2.80
ζ = −0.7
GDP 1.47 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.44 1.50 1.48 1.49
Non-durable goods 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.63 0.66
Durable goods 2.99 2.98 2.95 2.90 2.87 2.91 2.99 2.81
Total energy 1.85 1.84 1.78 1.73 1.80 1.89 1.80 1.67
Finite resources 1.85 1.84 1.80 1.83 1.84 1.93 1.86 1.76
Renewable resources 3.96 3.95 3.88 3.63 3.80 3.84 3.75 3.75
Labor 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.99 0.96 0.96
Total energy prices 2.43 2.51 2.80 3.61 2.38 2.59 2.86 3.53
ζ = −2.875
GDP 1.46 1.38 1.55 1.45 1.44 1.53 1.49 1.52
Non-durable goods 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.67
Durable goods 2.96 2.86 2.71 2.83 2.85 2.96 3.08 2.87
Total energy 1.79 1.82 1.86 1.75 1.77 1.78 1.81 1.81
Finite resources 1.81 1.90 1.88 1.88 1.83 1.90 1.88 1.94
Renewable resources 3.97 3.90 3.54 3.81 3.74 3.69 3.75 3.72
Labor 0.95 0.91 1.01 0.93 0.95 1.00 0.96 0.98
Total energy prices 3.06 3.27 4.05 5.83 2.99 3.20 3.94 6.01
Values denote the simulated results of percentage standard deviation (2nd moment) over 1000 periods
using an HP-filter.
Nevertheless, the moments are close to their empirical targets, which contermi-
nously means that the responses of the main variables are robust. For non-durable
goods, we can only explain a maximum of 78% (82% with replenishment) of the
desired volatility. Hence, households are still very strong with smoothing their con-
sumption expenditures, which is line with Dhawan and Jeske (2008). But contrasting
their findings, we cannot find an excess of volatility in (total) energy use. The expla-
nation for this is that in our model, the quantity of energy is endogenously regulated
by a set of additional sectors that are, through substitution, more flexible in respond-
ing to volatility in factor prices or quantities. In the model by Dhawan and Jeske,
the demand of energy responds to energy prices, which follows an autoregressive
process with exogenous shocks.
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Table 3.1 also shows that increasing the degree of complementarity, volatility in
total energy prices increases and approaches its empirical target. This particularly
applies to the increase in the substitution parameter of capital and energy. According
to this, the more complementary the link between physical capital and energy in final
good production, the more volatile total energy prices. A firm’s energy use is too
volatile as it supplements demand for capital, for instance after a TFP shock in final
production. This fluctuation is passed through to create excess volatility in total
energy prices. A reduction of the complementary link between energy and capital
leads to less volatility in energy prices, while the amplitudes of business cycles in
GDP or consumption do not change significantly.
Inspecting the sensitivity analysis of the model with replenishment, we cannot
notice any discrepancy to the findings of the respective baseline model. Only for
goods consumption do we observe a slight increase in volatility. This is closely linked
to additional research costs, which go along with R&D activity when transforming
resources into reserves in the finite intermediate energy sector. Households receive
an additional source of passive income, which is primarily used for consumption
expenditures.
Furthermore, when indicating unity in the elasticity of substitution within the
energy bundle as priors, Bayesian estimation leads to the parameter becoming more
negative. This indicates support for our initial assumption that there is a comple-
mentary relationship between energy and the directly linked input factor, namely
capital and durable goods.9
3.10 Conclusion
We have constructed an RBC model with endogenous energy generation from var-
ious different resources. The aim of this paper has been to examine the influence
of several shocks and their transmission channels impacting an economy with an
extended energy sector. Usable energy is generated from fossil intermediate energy
and renewable energy which are each endogenously mined or generated in separate
sectors. To avoid exaggerated disruptive investment dynamics, households can in-
vest in a durable good stock next to the usual physical assets for each production
sector.
In our estimated RBC model, Bayesian estimation confirms a complementary
relationship between durable goods and energy consumption in the household sector
as well as between physical capital and energy consumption in the final good sector.
We find that a TFP shock in the (final and intermediate) energy sectors has a
larger effect on durable good purchases than on capital investments in the final
good production. Nevertheless, even in the model at hand with endogenous price
determination of energy, TFP in final good production is still the major contributor
9The posterior results from the Metropolis-Hasting estimation are available upon request.
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to business cycle formation of the national account, confirming existing literature.
However, the explanation of theoretical moments can be essentially improved by
distinguishing between durable and non-durable goods, taking energy consumption
into account. Moreover, despite allowing the replenishment of constrained fossil
stock in an extension, the dynamic response of the variables do not deviate from
the baseline model. Solely for goods consumption do we notice a slight increase in
volatility resulting from costly R&D, which raises the income of households.
The framework in the present paper can be extended towards several directions.
By investigating policy strategies to regulate the usage of different sources of inter-
mediate energy, instruments such as taxes or subsidies can be applied to perform
artificial market imperfections. Under this aspect, it is interesting to analyze the
inequality of welfare with heterogeneous households which may change on the basis
of the corresponding policy instrument. Furthermore, as this model has ignored
environmental consequences resulting from different types of energy generation, a
consideration of negative externalities and its impact on decision making is left for
further research.
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Appendix
3.A Model Overview
Figure 3.A.1: Model overview.
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3.B Bayesian Estimation
To derive the posterior distribution of the parameters, we proceed in two steps.
Firstly, we derive the mode of the posterior distribution of the model’s parameters
using the Bayesian estimation method. Secondly, we apply Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) simulation methods to obtain the posterior distribution. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss the full procedure:
Employing Bayesian methods allows us to link two approaches to determine the
parameters of the model. First, the specification of prior information is obtained
from calibration, e.g. though earlier studies of less complex models at the micro and
macro level. Next, by using the maximum likelihood approach, the model is con-
fronted with data to estimate the parameters. By combining both approaches, the
priors affect the likelihood function in order to weight certain areas of the parameter
subspace. This procedure is also known as the Bayes theorem.
The log-linearized model is linked to the data through the following measurement
equation:
Yt = Cyt + µt
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where Yt describes the variables from observable data, yt describes the model vari-
ables, C is a matrix mapping the models endogenous variables, and µt characterizes
the iid measurement errors. We assume that the log-likelihood function of Yt is con-
ditional on the vector parameters θ ∈ Θ and thus, the corresponding log-likelihood,
using the Kalman-Filter, is expressed by
L (θ|YT ) = −
Tn
2
ln 2π −
1
2
T∑
t=1
ln |
∑
Yt,t|t−1
| −
1
2
T∑
t=1
e′t|t−1
∑−1
Yt,t|t−1
et|t−1 (3.B.1)
where YT = {Y1, Y2, ..., YT } expresses the set of observable variables Yt from the
measurement equation, n is the number of observable variables,
∑
Yt,t|t−1
is a pre-
dictor of the variance-covariance matrix of the one-step-ahead forecast, and et|t−1
is a vector of the one-step-ahead forecast errors from using parameters θ to predict
sample variables Yt.
Now, we can combine the likelihood function (3.B.1) with the prior density p (θ)
(defined according to prior kernel and values in Section 3.5.4) using the Bayesian
theorem in order to obtain the posterior density, given by:
p (θ|YT ) =
L (θ|YT ) p (θ)∫
Θ L (θ|YT ) p (θ)dΘ
(3.B.2)
where the denominator denotes the marginal density of the data, conditional on the
model. The log posterior kernel can be expressed as:
lnK (θ|YT ) = lnL (θ|YT ) + ln p (θ)
By maximizing this kernel with respect to θ, we obtain the mode of the posterior
distribution. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain the closed-form solution for the
posterior distribution (3.B.2). Therefore, the distribution is approximated numer-
ically, using the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) sampling method (a heuristic rejection
sampling algorithm). The MH is a MCMC method, which generates draws from a
distribution that is unknown at the outset, eventually exploring the target poste-
rior distribution (black lines in Figures 3.C.1–3.C.3). The posterior mode, obtained
through the maximum likelihood method, is used as a starting value to generate
the draws. In the following, the implementation of the MCMC-HC procedure is
briefly described. An alternative, detailed description of the solution strategy is also
reported by An and Schorfheide (2007), Griffoli (2007), Adjemian et al. (2011), and
Marto (2014).
Step 1: Starting from an arbitrary point (this is usually the posterior mode), steps
2–4 are run in a loop large enough to build a histogram of retained draws.
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Step 2: Draw a proposal from a jumping distribution
J (θ∗|θt−1) = N (θt−1, c
∑
m) ,
where c is a scale factor and
∑
m = H (θm|YT )
−1 is the inverse of the Hessian
computed at the posterior mode θm.
Step 3: Compute the acceptance ratio
Ω =
p (θ∗|YT )
p (θt−1|YT )
=
K (θ∗|YT )
K (θt−1|YT )
Step 4: Dependent on Ω, accept or discard θ∗ according to:
θt =
θ∗ with probabilitymin(Ω, 1)θt−1 otherwise.
Step 5: After the loop, compute the mean of the histogram of retained draws,
reflecting the posterior distribution of θ.
We implement the procedure on four chains with 100,000 iterations each (re-
moving the first 50,000 observations from each chain to avoid any dependency from
the initial conditions). The scale factor c has been chosen in such a way that the
acceptance rate Ω of each chain is around 25%, which comes close to the desired
acceptance rate of 23% (Roberts et al., 1997).
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3.C Priors and Posteriors Distributions
Figure 3.C.1: Priors and posteriors 1.
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Figure 3.C.2: Priors and posteriors 2.
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Figure 3.C.3: Priors and posteriors 3.
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The gray line shows the prior density defined in section 3.5.4 while the black line shows the density of the
posterior distribution. The dashed green line marks the posterior mode.
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3.D Derivation of Business Cycles
Figure 3.D.1: Development of GDP , E, F , N , and CN data.
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Business cycles are derived by using an HP-filter with λ = 100 applied to the annual data of GDP, total
energy (E), fossil energy (F), renewable energy (N), non-durable consumption (C), and durable consumption
(CD).
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Figure 3.D.2: Smoothed shocks.
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The smoothed shocks plots show the best guess for the structural shocks given the observed data which is
derived from the Kalman smoother at the posterior mean.
3.E Estimation Results of Model with Replenishment
Table 3.E.1: Results from Metropolis-Hastings (parameters).
Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev. HPD inf HPD sup
ρAY beta 0.850 0.1000 0.645 0.1348 0.4387 0.8825
ρAE beta 0.850 0.1000 0.774 0.1009 0.6148 0.9414
ρAF beta 0.850 0.1000 0.841 0.1041 0.6908 0.9936
ρAN beta 0.850 0.1000 0.795 0.0931 0.6509 0.9492
ρT,CN beta 0.850 0.1000 0.798 0.1016 0.6388 0.9599
ρT,CD beta 0.850 0.1000 0.603 0.1196 0.4049 0.7979
ζ norm -2.875 0.5000 -2.886 0.5012 -3.6811 -2.0324
ν norm -0.150 0.3000 -0.274 0.2671 -0.7133 0.1638
α beta 0.365 0.0500 0.346 0.0484 0.2703 0.4282
ϕ beta 0.490 0.1000 0.475 0.0980 0.3149 0.6362
ψ beta 0.310 0.1000 0.309 0.1013 0.1422 0.4704
φ beta 0.800 0.0100 0.813 0.0098 0.7976 0.8296
υ invg 2.000 0.2000 2.005 0.1980 1.6909 2.3309
δCD beta 0.068 0.0100 0.067 0.0097 0.0507 0.0824
δF beta 0.045 0.0100 0.045 0.0098 0.0286 0.0602
δY beta 0.017 0.0100 0.016 0.0089 0.0025 0.0289
δN beta 0.045 0.0100 0.045 0.0100 0.0286 0.0610
HPD inf (HPD sup) correspond to the lowest (highest) points of the highest posterior
density with a 95% confidence interval.
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Table 3.E.2: Results from Metropolis-Hastings (standard devia-
tion of structural shocks).
Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev. HPD inf HPD sup
σAY invg 0.010 Inf 0.008 0.0014 0.0062 0.0107
σAE invg 0.010 Inf 0.009 0.0013 0.0067 0.0108
σAF invg 0.010 Inf 0.019 0.0027 0.0151 0.0236
σAN invg 0.010 Inf 0.040 0.0057 0.0314 0.0490
σT,CN invg 0.010 Inf 0.008 0.0013 0.0055 0.0096
σT,CD invg 0.010 Inf 0.032 0.0046 0.0245 0.0393
σS invg 0.010 Inf 0.009 0.0075 0.0023 0.0186
σV invg 0.010 Inf 0.008 0.0048 0.0024 0.0141
HPD inf (HPD sup) correspond to the lowest (highest) points of the highest pos-
terior density with a 95% confidence interval.
3.F Variance Decomposition
3.F.1 Baseline model
Figure 3.F.1: Historical shock decomposition.
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(a) Historical shock decomposition: E.
The black line depicts the business cycle of the corresponding variables (Figure 3.D.1), given the specified
parameter set. The colored bars correspond to the contribution of the respective smoothed shocks. Grey
colored initial values are part of the business cycles which are not explained by the smooth shocks, but
rather by unknown initial values of the state variables.
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3.F.2 Model with replenishment
Table 3.F.1: Conditional variance decomposition: model with replenish-
ment.
εE εN εY εF εT,CN εS εV εT,CD
short-term horizon
GDP 0.26 0.2 96.72 0.13 1.06 0 0 1.64
Non-durable goods 0.26 0.19 60.8 0.14 28.27 0 0 10.34
Durable goods 20.07 16.37 21.81 0.36 25.28 0 0 16.11
Total energy 25.02 19.18 5.5 49.34 0.09 0 0 0.87
Finite resources 3.18 2.57 9.13 83.81 0.11 0 0 1.19
Renewable resources 0.06 99.88 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0.04
mid-term horizon
GDP 0.3 0.23 95.91 0.12 1.71 0 0 1.72
Non-durable goods 0.43 0.33 66.42 0.12 25.04 0 0 7.67
Durable goods 10.85 8.83 47.64 0.23 22.61 0 0 9.84
Total energy 25.87 20.22 9.74 42.69 0.41 0 0 1.08
Finite resources 4.16 3.44 15.09 75.25 0.54 0 0 1.51
Renewable resources 0.07 99.7 0.15 0 0.03 0 0 0.06
long-term horizon
GDP 0.2 0.21 97.15 0.09 0.91 0 0 1.45
Non-durable goods 0.55 0.57 76.2 0.11 16.36 0 0.01 6.2
Durable goods 5.81 6.2 65.24 0.2 15.02 0.03 0.11 7.39
Total energy 20.1 20.96 14.21 42.73 0.66 0.04 0.14 1.16
Finite resources 2.97 3.31 19.79 71.28 0.83 0.07 0.24 1.5
Renewable resources 0.05 99.45 0.4 0 0.04 0 0 0.06
The short-term horizon is defined by the decomposition after four periods, the mid-term hori-
zon after twelve periods. The long-term horizon is computed by an unconditional variance
decomposition.
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3.G Additional IRFs of Shocks in Consumer Taste
Figure 3.G.1: Bayesian IRF: orthogonalized shock to εT,CN .
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All subfigures depict the deviations for each respective variable from the deterministic steady state in per-
centage. The solid lines display the baseline model, the dashed lines display the model with replenishment
of the reserve stock while the dotted lines display the model without durable goods and energy consumption
by the final good sector only. In figure (F S), the black lines displays the response of variable F, the red
lines display the response of variable S. In figure (rY rF ), the black lines displays the response of variable
rY , the red lines display the response of variable rF .
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Figure 3.G.2: Bayesian IRF: orthogonalized shock to εT,CD.
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2 10
-3
0 10 20 30 40
0
2
4
6 10
-4
0 10 20 30 40
-20
-10
0
10-3
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
3 10
-3
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
3 10
-3
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2 10
-3
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1 10
-3
0 10 20 30 40
-1
0
1
2 10
-3
0 20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5 10
-3
0 20 40
0
0.5
1 10
-3
0 20 40
0
1
2
10-3
0 10 20 30 40
-2
-1
0 10
-3
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
3 10
-4
GDP CN
CD
N
KY
KF KN
pE
E EH EY
rY rF
F S
All subfigures depict the deviations for each respective variable from the deterministic steady state in per-
centage. The solid lines display the baseline model, the dashed lines display the model with replenishment
of the reserve stock while the dotted lines display the model without durable goods and energy consumption
by the final good sector only. In figure (F S), the black lines displays the response of variable F, the red
lines display the response of variable S. In figure (rY rF ), the black lines displays the response of variable
rY , the red lines display the response of variable rF .
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3.H Mathematical Appendix
3.H.1 Overall concavity
Definition. Overall concavity
A twice continuously differentiable function of several variables is concave on a con-
cave set iff its Hessian matrix of second partial derivatives is negative (semi)definite
on the interior of the concave set. According to the Sylvester’s criterion, a Hermi-
tian matrix M is negative-(semi)definite if the leading principle minors of the LxL
matrix are of an alternating sign starting with a minus sign, hence,
for strict concavity if (−1)r rHr(x) > 0 with r = 1, ..., L
(for concavity if (−1)r rHr(x) ≤ 0 with r = 1, ..., L)
where rHr(x) is the leading principle minor of order r.
3.H.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For the utility function (3.1) and the corresponding Hessian H(x) (a 4x4
matrix), there are four leading principle minors given by the determinant:
1H1 =
[
−1+ϑ
(−1+L)2
]
2H2 =
[
−1+ϑ
(−1+L)2
0
0 − ϑγ
CN2
]
3H3 =


−1+ϑ
(−1+L)2
0 0
0 − ϑγ
CN2
0
0 0 ϑ(γ−1)θCD
ζ(θCDζ+(1−θ)(EH)
ζ
−ζ(1−θ)Eζ)
CD2(θCDζ+(1−θ)(EH)
ζ)
0 0 − ϑ(γ−1)θCD
ζ(θ−1)ζ(EH)
ζ
CD(θCDζ+(1−θ)(EH)
ζ)2EH


4H4 =


−1+ϑ
(−1+L)2
0 0 0
0 − ϑγ
CN2
0 0
0 0 ϑ(γ−1)θCD
ζ(θCDζ+(1−θ)(EH)
ζ
−ζ(1−θ)Eζ )
CD2(θCDζ+(1−θ)(EH)
ζ)
− ϑ(γ−1)θCD
ζ(θ−1)ζ(EH)
ζ
CD(θCDζ+(1−θ)(EH)
ζ)2EH
0 0 −
ϑ(γ−1)θCDζ(θ−1)ζ(EH)
ζ
CD(θCDζ+(1−θ)(EH)
ζ)2EH
ϑ(γ−1)(θ−1)(EH)
ζ(θ(ζ−1)CDζ+(θ−1)(EH)
ζ)
−(EH)
2(θCDζ+(1−ζ)(EH)
ζ)2


Overall strict concavity is satisfied when
1H1 < 0
2H2 > 0 if ϑ < 1, γ > 0
3H3 < 0 if ϑ > 0, θ, γ < 1, ζ < 1
4H4 > 0 if γ > 0, either θ, ζ < 1.
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3.H.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For the final good production function (3.4) and the corresponding Hessian
H(x) (a 3x3 matrix), there are three leading principle minors given by the determi-
nant:
1H1 =
[
aK,K
]
2H2 =
[
aK,K aK,E
aE,K aE,E
]
3H3 =
aK,K aK,E aK,LaE,K aE,E aE,L
aL,K aL,E aL,L

where
aL,L =
L1−α(α − 1)α(η(KY )
ν + (1 − η)(EY)
ν)
α
ν
L2
aL,K = aK,L = −
L1−α(α− 1)αη(η(KY )
ν + (1 − η)(EY)
ν)
α
ν (KY)
ν
LKY(η(KY)ν + (1− η)(EY)ν)
aL,E = aE,L = −
L1−α(α− 1)α(η − 1)(η(KY )
ν + (1− η)(EY)
ν)
α
ν (EY)
ν
LEY(η(KY)ν + (1− η)(EY)ν)
aK,K =
L1−α(η(KY)
ν + (1− η)(EY)
ν)
α
ν αη(KY)
ν(η(α − 1)(KY)
ν − ην(EY)
ν + η(EY)
ν + (ν − 1)(EY)
ν)
(KY)2(η(KY)ν + (1− η)(EY)ν)2
aK,E = aE,K = −
L1−α(η(KY)
ν + (1 − η)(EY)
ν)
α
ν α(η − 1)(EY)
νη(KY)
ν(α− ν)
EY((η − 1)(EY)ν − η(KY)ν)2KY
aE,E =
L1−α(η(KY)
ν + (1− η)(EY)
ν)
α
ν α(η − 1)(EY)
ν(αη(EY)
ν − η(KY)
νν − α(EY)
ν − η(EY)
ν + η(KY)
ν + (EY)
ν)
(EY)2(−η(KY)ν − (1 − η)(EY)ν)2
Overall concavity is satisfied when
1H1 < 0 if α < 1
2H2 > 0 if {ν ≤ 1, η ≤ 1} , {ν > 1, η ≥ 1} , {ν = 1, η > 1}
3H3 = 0 for all ν, η.
3.H.2 Optimization
Under the assumption that prices for final energy are equal for households and final
goods-producing firms pE = pH = pY, the household’s problem, the decision making
of the remaining sectors, and the corresponding first order conditions with respect
to the decision variables are:
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Household sector
LHt = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ϑ ln
[
CN γt
(
θCDζt−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t
) 1−γ
ζ
]
+ (1− ϑ) ln [1− Lt]
+ λHt [wtLt + (rY)t(KY)t−1 + (rF)t(KF)t−1 + (rN)t(KN)t−1 +Xt + (πY)t + (πN)t
+(πF)t − CN t − (pE)t(EH)t − CD t + (1− δ
CD)CD t−1 − (KY)t + (1− δ
Y )(KY)t−1
−(KF)t + (1− δ
F )(KF)t−1 − (KN)t + (1− δ
N )(KN)t−1
]}
(3.H.1)
• Non-durable goods:
∂LHt
∂CN t
= βtϑγ
CN γ−1t
(
θCDζt−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t
) 1−γ
ζ
CN γt
(
θCDζt−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t
) 1−γ
ζ
− βtϑγ
1
CN t
− βtλHt
= βtϑγ
1
CN t
− βtλHt
!
= 0
⇔ ϑγ
1
CN t
− λHt
!
= 0 ⇔ λHt = ϑγ
1
CN t
(3.H.2)
• Durable goods:
∂LHt
∂CD t
= βt+1
ϑ (1− γ) ζθ
ζ
E

CN γt+1
(
θCDζt + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
) 1−γ
ζ
CDζ−1t
CN γt+1
(
θCDζt + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
) 1−γ
ζ

− βtλHt + β
t+1E
{
λHt+1
(
1− δCD
)}
= βt+1ϑ (1− γ) θE
{
CD ζ−1t
θCDζt + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
}
+ βt+1E
{
λHt+1
(
1− δCD
)}
− βtλHt
!
= 0
⇔ λHt = ϑ (1− γ) θβE
{
CD ζ−1t
θCDζt + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
}
+ βE
{
λHt+1
(
1− δCD
)}
(3.H.3)
• Energy consumption of households:
∂LHt
∂(EH)t
= ϑ (1− γ)
CN γt
(
θCDζt−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t
) 1−γ
ζ
CN γt
(
θCDζt−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t
) 1−γ
ζ
(1− θ)EH
ζ−1
t−1 − λ
H
t (pE)t
= ϑ (1− γ) (1− θ)
(1− θ) (EH)
ζ−1
t
θCDζt−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t
− λHt (pE)t
!
= 0
⇔ λHt (pE)t = ϑ (1− γ) (1− θ)
(1− θ) (EH)
ζ−1
t
θCDζt−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t
(3.H.4)
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• Labor supply:
∂LHt
∂Lt
=
1− ϑ
1− Lt
− λHt wt
!
= 0 (3.H.5)
• Euler equations for capital stocks:
∂LHt
∂(KY)t
= βt+1E
{
λHt+1
(
1 + (rY)t+1 − δ
Y
)}
− βλHt
!
= 0 (3.H.6)
∂LHt
∂(KF)t
= βt+1E
{
λHt+1
(
1 + (rF)t+1 − δ
F
)}
− βλHt
!
= 0 (3.H.7)
∂LHt
∂(KN)t
= βt+1E
{
λHt+1
(
1 + (rN)t+1 − δ
N
)}
− βλHt
!
= 0 (3.H.8)
Final goods production sector
(πY)0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
(AY)t
[
η(KY)
ν
t−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν L1−αt
−(rY)t(KY)t−1 − wtLt − (pE)t(EY)t}
(3.H.9)
• Capital demand of final goods production:
∂(πY)0
∂(KY)t−1
= (AY)tαη
[
η(KY)
ν
t−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν
−1
L1−α(KY)
ν−1
t−1 − (rY)t
!
= 0
(3.H.10)
• Energy consumption of final goods production:
∂(πY)0
∂(EY)t
= (AY)tαη
[
η(KY)
ν
t−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν
−1
L1−α(EY)
ν−1
t − (pE)t
!
= 0
(3.H.11)
• Labor demand of final goods production:
∂(πY)0
∂Lt
= (AY)t (1− α)
[
η(KY)
ν
t−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν L−α − wt
!
= 0 (3.H.12)
Final energy sector
(πE)0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
(pE)t(AE)tF
φ
t N
1−φ
t − (pF)tFt − (pN)tNt
}
(3.H.13)
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• Demand for finite intermediate energy:
∂(πE)0
∂Ft
= φ(pE)t(AE)tF
φ−1
t N
1−φ − (pF)t
!
= 0 (3.H.14)
• Demand for renewable intermediate energy:
∂(πE)0
∂Nt
= (1− φ) (pE)t(AE)tF
φ
t N
−φ
t − (pR)t
!
= 0 (3.H.15)
Finite intermediate energy sector
LF =E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
(pF)t(AF)t(KF)
ϕ
t−1S
1−ϕ
t−1 − (rF)t(KF)t−1 −
(
Dt
Vt
)υ
+ λSt
St−1 − (AF)t(KF)ϕt−1S1−ϕt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ft
+ ωDt − St

+λVt [Vt −Dt − Vt+1]
}
(3.H.16)
• Capital demand of finite intermediate energy generation:
∂LF
∂(KF)t−1
= ϕ(pF)t(AF)t(KF)
ϕ−1
t−1 S
1−ϕ
t−1 − (rF)t − λ
S
t ϕ(AF)t(KF)
ϕ−1
t−1 S
1−ϕ
t−1
!
= 0
⇔ (rF)t = ϕ
Ft
(KF)t−1
(
(pF)t − λ
S
t
)
⇔ λSt = (pF)t −
(rF)t(KF)t−1
ϕFt
(3.H.17)
• Optimal reserve stock:
∂LF
∂St
= βt+1E
{(
(pF)t+1 − λ
S
t+1
) [
(1− ϕ) (AF)t+1(KF)
ϕ
t S
−ϕ
t
]
+ λSt+1
}
− βtλSt
!
= 0
⇔ λSt = βE
{(
(pF)t+1 − λ
S
t+1
) [
(1− ϕ) (AF)t+1(KF)
ϕ
t S
−ϕ
t
]
+ λSt+1
}
(3.H.18)
• Exploration rate (only in model allowing for exploration):
∂LF
∂Dt
= −υDυ−1t V
−υ
t + λ
S
t − λ
V
t
!
= 0
⇔ λVt = λ
S
t − υD
υ−1
t V
−υ
t
(3.H.19)
• Optimal resource stock (only in model allowing for exploration):
∂LF
∂Vt
= υDυt V
−υ−1
t + β
tλVt − λ
V
t
!
= 0
⇔ λVt = υD
υ
t V
−υ−1
t + β
tλVt
(3.H.20)
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Renewable intermediate energy sector
(πN)0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
(pN)t(AN)t(KN)
ψ
t−1 − (rN)t(KN)t−1
}
(3.H.21)
• Capital demand of renewable intermediate energy generation:
∂(πN)0
∂(KN)t
= ψ(pN)t(AN)t(KN)
ψ−1
t−1 − (rN)t
!
= 0 (3.H.22)
By rearranging the conditions above, the optimized decisions as well as the market
clearing equations are calculated which define the complete model (34 equations).
Household sector
• Durable Euler equation: combining (3.H.2) and (3.H.3)
ϑγ
1
CN t
= βϑ (1− γ) θE
{
CDζ−1t
θCDζt + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
}
+ βE
{
ϑγ
1
CN t+1
(
1− δCD
)}
⇔ 1 = β
(1− γ)
γ
θE
{
CDζ−1t CN t
θCDζt + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
}
+ βE
{
CN t
CN t+1
(
1− δCD
)}
(3.H.23)
• Non-durables vs. energy: combining (3.H.3) and (3.H.4)
ϑγ
(pE)t
CN t
= ϑ (1− γ) (1− θ)
(EH)
ζ−1
t
θCDζt−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t
⇔ (pE)t =
(1− γ) (1− θ)
γ
CN t(EH)
ζ−1
t(
θCDζt−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t
) (3.H.24)
• Labor supply: combining (3.H.2) and (3.H.5)
wt =
CN t
1− Lt
1− γ
γϑ
(3.H.25)
• Euler equation for capital of final goods production: combining (3.H.2) and (3.H.6)
ϑγ
1
CN t
= βE
{
ϑγ
1
CN t+1
(
1 + (rY)t+1 − δ
Y
)}
⇔ 1 = βE
{
CN t
CN t+1
(
1 + (rY)t+1 − δ
Y
)} (3.H.26)
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• Euler equation for capital of finite intermediate energy generation: combining
(3.H.2) and (3.H.7)
ϑγ
1
CN t
= βE
{
ϑγ
1
CN t+1
(
1 + (rF)t+1 − δ
F
)}
⇔ 1 = βE
{
CN t
CN t+1
(
1 + (rF)t+1 − δ
F
)} (3.H.27)
• Euler equation for capital of renewable intermediate energy generation: combining
(3.H.2) and (3.H.8)
ϑγ
1
CN t
= βE
{
ϑγ
1
CN t+1
(
1 + (rN)t+1 − δ
N
)}
⇔ 1 = βE
{
CN t
CN t+1
(
1 + (rN)t+1 − δ
N
)} (3.H.28)
• Investments in durable goods:
(ICD )t = CD t −
(
1− δCD
)
CD t−1 (3.H.29)
• Investments in capital of final production:
(IY)t = (KY)t −
(
1− δY
)
(KY)t−1 (3.H.30)
• Investments in capital of finite intermediate energy generation:
(IF)t = (KF)t −
(
1− δF
)
(KF)t−1 (3.H.31)
• Investments in capital of renewable intermediate energy generation:
(IN)t = (KN)t −
(
1− δN
)
(KN)t−1 (3.H.32)
Final goods production sector
• Final goods production output (= non-durable goods)
Yt = (AY)t
[
η(KY)
ν
t−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν L1−αt (3.H.33)
• Capital demand of final goods production: rearranging (3.H.10)
(rY)t = (AY)tαη
[
η(KY)
ν
t−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν
−1
L1−αt (KY)
ν−1
t−1 (3.H.34)
• Energy demand of final goods production: rearranging (3.H.11)
(pE)t = (AY)tαη
[
η(KY)
ν
t−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν
−1
L1−αt (EY)
ν−1
t (3.H.35)
Durable Goods and Energy in RBC 113
• Labor demand of final goods production: rearranging (3.H.12)
wt = (AY)t (1− α)
[
η(KY)
ν
t−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν L−αt (3.H.36)
Final energy sector
• Amount of final energy generation:
Et = (AE)tF
φ
t N
1−φ
t (3.H.37)
• Price for finite intermediate energy: rearranging (3.H.14)
(pF)t = φ(pE)t(AE)tF
φ−1
t N
1−φ
t (3.H.38)
• Price for renewable intermediate energy: rearranging (3.H.15)
(pR)t = (1− φ) (pE)t(AE)tF
φ
t N
−φ
t (3.H.39)
Finite intermediate energy sector
• Amount of finite intermediate energy:
Ft = (AF)t(KF)
ϕ
t−1S
1−ϕ
t−1 (3.H.40)
• Finite reserve constraint:
St = St−1 − Ft + ωDt − e
εS,t (3.H.41)
• Cost-function of exploration:
C (Dt, Vt) =
(
Dt
Vt
)υ
= Xt (3.H.42)
• Finite resource constraint:
Vt = Vt−1 −Dt − e
εV,t (3.H.43)
• Capital demand of finite intermediate energy generation: combining equations
(3.H.17) and (3.H.18)
(pF)t =
(rF)t(KF)t−1
ϕFt
+ βE {(pF)t+1}+ βE
{
(rF)t+1(KF)t
ϕFt+1
[
(1− ϕ)
Ft+1
St
− 1
]}
(3.H.44)
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• Amount of exploration in finite intermediate energy generation: combining equa-
tions (3.H.19),(3.H.20), and (3.H.18)
(pF)t =
(rF)t(KF)t−1
ϕFt
+ υ
Dυt
DtV
υ
t
− βυE
{
Dυt+1
Dt+1V
υ
t+1
}
+ βE {(pF)t+1} − βE
{
(rF)t+1(KF)t
ϕFt+1
}
+ υ
Dυt
V
(1+υ)
t
(3.H.45)
Renewable intermediate energy sector
• Amount of renewable intermediate energy:
Nt = (AN)t(KN)
ψ
t−1 (3.H.46)
• Capital demand of renewable intermediate energy generation: rearranging (3.H.22)
(rN)t = ψ(pN)t(AN)t(KN)
ψ−1
t−1 (3.H.47)
Market Clearing
• Aggregate market constraint:
GDP t = Yt − (pE)t(EY)t + (rN)t(KN)t−1 + (rF)t(KF)t−1 +Xt
= CN t + (pH)t(EH)t + (ICD)t + (IY)t + (IF)t + (IN)t
(3.H.48)
• Energy market constraint:
Et = (EH)t + (EY)t (3.H.49)
Formation of shocks
• Productivity shock in final goods production:
ln(AY)t = ρY ln(AY)t−1 + εY,t (3.H.50)
• Productivity shock in final energy generation:
ln(AE)t = ρE ln(AE)t−1 + εE,t (3.H.51)
• Productivity shock in finite intermediate energy generation:
ln(AF)t = ρF ln(AF)t−1 + εF,t (3.H.52)
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• Productivity shock in renewable intermediate energy generation:
ln(AN)t = ρN ln(AN)t−1 + εN,t (3.H.53)
• Consumer taste shock in non-durable goods:
ln(TCN)t = ρT,CN ln(TCN)t−1 + εT,CN,t (3.H.54)
• Consumer taste shock in durable goods:
ln(TCD)t = ρT,CD ln(TCD)t−1 + εT,CD,t (3.H.55)
3.H.3 Steady states
Table 3.H.1: Parameter values and targeted moments
Parameter Value Source Parameter Value Source
α 0.3650 see Section 3.5.2 IF
GDP
0.0006 OECD (2012)
β 0.9900 see Section 3.5.2 IN
GDP
0.0030 UNEP (2017)
δCD 0.0682 see Section 3.5.2 ICD
GDP
0.1071 OECD (2012)
ν -0.1500 see Section 3.5.2 LL 0.3 see Section 3.5.2
ζ -2.8748 see Section 3.5.2 GDP 3043.65 OECD (2012)
φ 0.8000 see Section 3.5.2 F 10593 IEA (2012)
ϕ 0.4900 see Section 3.5.2 N 1679 IEA (2012)
ψ 0.3100 see Section 3.5.2 F
S
0.076238 see Section 3.H.6
CD
GDP
1.5853 OECD (2012) D
V
0.012594 see Section 3.H.6
EH
GDP
0.0449 IEA (2012) D
S
0.034757 see Section 3.H.6
EY
GDP
0.0406 Schmidt and Zimmermann (2005) D
F
0.455904 see Section 3.H.6
KF
GDP
0.0133 OECD (2012)
In the following, we construct the steady state conditions of the model in combi-
nation with the calibrated parameters in Section 3.H.5 and the targeted moments
from Germany in Table 3.H.1.
Household sector
• Durable Euler equation (3.H.23)
1 = βθ
(1− γ)
γ
CNCDζ−1
θCDζ + (1− θ) (EH)ζ
+ β
(
1− δCD
)
(3.H.23.SS)
• Non-durables vs. energy (3.H.24)
pE =
(1− γ) (1− θ)
γ
CN (EH)
ζ−1(
θCDζ + (1− θ) (EH)ζ
) (3.H.24.SS)
• Labor supply (3.H.25)
w =
CN
1− L
1− γ
γϑ
(3.H.25.SS)
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• Euler equation for capital of final good production (3.H.26)
1 = β
(
1 + (rY)t+1 − δ
Y
)
consequently
rY =
1
β
+ δY − 1 (3.H.26.SS)
• Euler equation for capital of finite intermediate energy generation (3.H.27)
rF =
1
β
+ δF − 1 (3.H.27.SS)
• Euler equation for capital of renewable intermediate energy generation (3.H.28)
rN =
1
β
+ δN − 1 (3.H.28.SS)
• Investments in durable goods (3.H.29)
ICD = δ
CDCD (3.H.29.SS)
• Investments in capital of final goods production (3.H.30)
IY = δ
YKY (3.H.30.SS)
• Investments in capital of finite intermediate energy generation (3.H.31)
IF = δ
FKF (3.H.31.SS)
• Investments in capital of renewable intermediate energy generation (3.H.32)
IN = δ
NKN (3.H.32.SS)
Final goods production sector
• Final goods production output (= non-durable goods) (3.H.33)
Y = (AY) [η(KY)
ν + (1− η) (EY)
ν ]
α
ν L1−α (3.H.33.SS)
• Capital demand of final goods production (3.H.34)
rY = (AY)αη [η(KY)
ν + (1− η) (EY)
ν ]
α
ν
−1 L1−α(KY)
ν−1 (3.H.34.SS)
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• Energy demand of final goods production (3.H.35)
pE = (AY)αη [η(KY)
ν + (1− η) (EY)
ν ]
α
ν
−1 L1−α(EY)
ν−1 (3.H.35.SS)
• Labor demand of final goods production (3.H.36)
w = (1− α)
Y
L
(3.H.36.SS)
Final energy sector
• Amount of final energy generation (3.H.37)
E = (AE)F
φN1−φ (3.H.37.SS)
• Price for finite intermediate energy (3.H.38)
pF = φ(pE)(AE)F
φ−1N1−φ (3.H.38.SS)
• Price for renewable intermediate energy (3.H.39)
pR = (1− φ) (pE)(AE)F
φ
t N
−φ (3.H.39.SS)
Finite intermediate energy sector
• Amount of finite intermediate energy (3.H.40)
F = (AF)(KF)
ϕS1−ϕ (3.H.40.SS)
• Finite reserve constraint (3.H.41)
Ft = ωDt (3.H.41.SS)
• Cost-function of exploration (3.H.42)
C (D,V ) =
(
D
V
)υ
= X (3.H.42.SS)
• Capital demand of finite intermediate energy generation (3.H.44)
(1− β) pF =
rFKF
ϕF
+ β
rFKF
ϕF
[
(1− ϕ)
F
S
− 1
]
(3.H.44.SS)
• Amount of exploration in finite intermediate energy generation (3.H.45)
pF =
(
rFKF
ϕF
+ υ
Dυ
DV υ
)
+
1
(1− β)
υ
Dυ
V (1+υ)
(3.H.45.SS)
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Renewable intermediate energy sector
• Amount of renewable intermediate energy (3.H.46)
N = (AN)(KN)
ψ (3.H.46.SS)
• Capital demand of renewable intermediate energy generation (3.H.47)
rN = ψ(pN)(AN)(KN)
ψ−1 (3.H.47.SS)
Market Clearing & additional equations
• Aggregate market constraint (3.H.48)
GDP = Y − pEEY + rNKN + rFKF +X
= CN + pEEH + ICD + IY + IF + IN
(3.H.48.SS)
• Energy market constraint (3.H.49)
E = EH + EY (3.H.49.SS)
• Steady state price for final energy
pE =
1− β + βδCD
βθ (1− θ)
(
EH
CD
)ζ−1 (3.H.56)
• Steady state price for finite intermediate energy
pF =
pE
(
EH
GDP
+ EY
GDP
)
− pN
N
GDP
F
GDP
(3.H.57)
• Steady state price for renewable intermediate energy: rearranging (3.H.21)
pN = rN
KN
N
(3.H.21.SS)
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3.H.4 Log-linearized equations
We have log-linearized the necessary equations characterizing the equilibrium of
the system as derived before. In doing so, we have used the first order Taylor
approximation around the steady state. For more details about the procedure, we
refer to Uhlig (1995). Steady state values are marked with an upper bar. Log-
linearized values are marked with a hat.
Household sector
with: CDLL =
(
1 +
(1− θ)
θ
(
EH
CD
)ζ)−1
and (EH)
LL =
(
1 +
θ
(1− θ)
(
CD
EH
)ζ)−1
• Durable Euler equation (3.H.23)
(
1− δCD
) (
ĈN t+1 − ĈN t
)
=
1− γ
γ
CN
CD
CDLL
[
ĈN t −
(
CDLLζĈD t + (EH)
LLζ(ÊH)t+1
)
+ (ζ − 1) ĈD t
]
(3.H.23.LL)
• Non-durables vs. energy (3.H.24)
(p̂E)t = ĈN t + (ζ − 1) (ÊH)t − CD
LLζĈDt − (EH)
LLζ(ÊH)t (3.H.24.LL)
• Labor supply (3.H.25)
ĈN t = ŵt −
(
L¯
1− L¯
)
L̂t (3.H.25.LL)
• Euler equation for capital of final production (3.H.26)
ĈN t+1 = ĈN t + (βrY) (r̂Y)t+1 (3.H.26.LL)
• Euler equation for capital of finite intermediate energy generation (3.H.27)
ĈN t+1 = ĈN t + (βrF) (r̂F)t+1 (3.H.27.LL)
• Euler equation for capital of renewable intermediate energy generation (3.H.28)
ĈN t+1 = ĈN t + (βrN) (r̂N)t+1 (3.H.28.LL)
• Investments in durable goods (3.H.29)
(ÎCD )t =
CD
ICD
ĈD t −
(
1− δCD
) CD
ICD
ĈD t−1 (3.H.29.LL)
120 Durable Goods and Energy in RBC
• Investments in capital of final production (3.H.30)
(ÎY)t =
KY
IY
(K̂Y)t −
(
1− δY
) KY
IY
(K̂Y)t−1 (3.H.30.LL)
• Investments in capital of finite intermediate energy generation (3.H.31)
(ÎF)t =
KF
IF
(K̂F)t −
(
1− δF
) KF
IF
(K̂F)t−1 (3.H.31.LL)
• Investments in capital of renewable intermediate energy generation (3.H.32)
(ÎN)t =
KN
IN
(K̂N)t −
(
1− δN
) KN
IN
(K̂N)t−1 (3.H.32.LL)
Final goods production sector
with: (KY)
LL =
(
1 +
(1− η)
η
(
EY
KY
)ν)−1
and (EY)
LL =
(
1 +
η
(1− η)
(
KY
EY
)ν)−1
• Final goods production output (= non-durable goods) (3.H.33)
Ŷt = (ÂY)t + α
[
(KY)
LL(K̂Y)t−1 + (EY)
LL(ÊY)t
]
+ (1− α) L̂t (3.H.33.LL)
• Capital demand of final goods production (3.H.34)
(r̂Y)t = Ŷt −
[
(KY)
LLν(K̂Y)t−1 + (EY)
LLν(ÊY)t
]
+ (ν − 1) (K̂Y)t−1 (3.H.34.LL)
• Energy demand of final goods production (3.H.35)
(p̂E)t = Ŷt −
[
(KY)
LLν(K̂Y)t−1 + (EY)
LLν(ÊY)t
]
+ (ν − 1) (ÊY)t (3.H.35.LL)
• Labor demand of final goods production (3.H.36)
ŵt = Ŷt − L̂t (3.H.36.LL)
Final energy sector
• Amount of final energy generation (3.H.37)
Êt = (ÂE)t + φF̂t + (1− φ) N̂t (3.H.37.LL)
• Price for finite intermediate energy (3.H.38)
(p̂F)t = (p̂E)t + Êt − F̂t (3.H.38.LL)
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• Price for renewable intermediate energy (3.H.39)
(p̂N)t = (p̂E)t + Êt − N̂t (3.H.39.LL)
Finite intermediate energy sector
• Amount of finite intermediate energy (3.H.40)
F̂t = (ÂF)t + ϕ(K̂F)t−1 + (1− ϕ) Ŝt (3.H.40.LL)
• Finite reserve constraint (3.H.41)
Ŝt = Ŝt−1 −
F
S
F̂t +
D
S
D̂t − εS,t (3.H.41.LL)
• Cost-function of exploration (3.H.42)
ĈO t = υ
(
D̂t − V̂t
)
(3.H.42.LL)
• Finite resource constraint (3.H.43)
V̂t = V̂t−1 −
D
V
D̂t − εV,t (3.H.43.LL)
• Capital demand of finite intermediate energy generation (3.H.44)
(p̂F)t =
rFKF
F
1
ϕpF
(
(r̂F)t + (K̂F)t−1 − F̂t
)
+ (1− ϕ)
F
S
(
(p̂F)t + F̂t − Ŝt
)
+ β(p̂F)t+1
−β
rFKF
F
1
ϕpF
(
(r̂F)t+1 + (K̂F)t − F̂t+1
)
− β (1− ϕ)
F
S
(
(p̂F)t+1 + F̂t − Ŝt
)
+β
rFKF
F
1
ϕpF
F
S
(1− ϕ)
(
(r̂F)t+1 + (K̂F)t − F̂t+1 + F̂t − Ŝt
)
(3.H.44.LL)
• Amount of exploration in finite intermediate energy generation (3.H.45)
(p̂F)t =
rFKF
F
1
ϕpF
(
(r̂F)t + (K̂F)t−1 − F̂t
)
+
υDυ
DV υ
1
pF
(
(υ − 1)D̂t − υV̂t
)
− β
υDυ
DV υ
1
pF
(
(υ − 1)D̂t+1 − υV̂t+1
)
+ β(p̂F)t+1 +
rFKF
F
1
ϕpF
(
(r̂F)t+1 + (K̂F)t − F̂t+1
)
+
υDυ
V 1+υ
1
pF
(
(υ)D̂t − (1 + υ)V̂t
)
(3.H.45.LL)
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Renewable intermediate energy sector
• Amount of renewable intermediate energy (3.H.46)
N̂t = (ÂN)t + ψ(K̂N)t−1 (3.H.46.LL)
• Capital demand of renewable intermediate energy generation (3.H.47)
(r̂N)t = (p̂N)t + N̂t − (K̂N)t−1 (3.H.47.LL)
Market Clearing
• Aggregate market constraint (3.H.48)
ĜDP =
(
1−
rFKF
GDP
−
rNKN
GDP
+
pEEY
GDP
−
C
GDP
)
Ŷt −
pEEY
GDP
(
(p̂E)t + (ÊY)t
)
+
rFKF
GDP
(
(r̂F)t + (K̂F)t−1
)
+
rNKN
GDP
(
(r̂N)t + (K̂N)t−1
)
+
C
Y
Ĉt
(3.H.48a.LL)
ĜDP =
(
1−
ICD
GDP
−
IY
GDP
−
IF
GDP
−
IN
GDP
−
pEEH
GDP
)
ĈN t +
pEEH
GDP
(
(p̂E)t(ÊH)t
)
+
ICD
GDP
(ÎCD )t +
IY
GDP
(ÎY)t +
IF
GDP
(ÎF)t +
IN
GDP
(ÎN)t
(3.H.48b.LL)
• Energy market constraint (3.H.49)
Êt =
EH
E
(ÊH)t +
EY
E
(ÊY)t (3.H.49.LL)
Formation of shocks
• Productivity shock in final goods production (3.H.50)
(ÂY)t = ρY(ÂY)t−1 + εY (3.H.50.LL)
• Productivity shock in final energy generation (3.H.51)
(ÂE)t = ρE(ÂE)t−1 + εE (3.H.51.LL)
• Productivity shock in finite intermediate energy generation (3.H.52)
(ÂF)t = ρF(ÂF)t−1 + εF (3.H.52.LL)
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• Productivity shock in renewable intermediate energy generation (3.H.53)
(ÂN)t = ρN(ÂN)t−1 + εN (3.H.53.LL)
• Consumer taste shock in non-durable goods (3.H.54)
(T̂CN)t = ρT,CN(T̂CN)t−1 + εT,CN (3.H.54.LL)
• Consumer taste shock in durable goods (3.H.55)
(T̂CD)t = ρT,CD(T̂CD)t−1 + εT,CD (3.H.55.LL)
3.H.5 Calibration
Some parameters can be directly derived from their target moments. The remain-
ing parameters are calculated from the steady state conditions of the model. All
endogenous variables correspond to their steady-state values.
Rearranging (3.H.29.SS), we get:
δCD =
ICD/GDP
CD/GDP
(3.H.58)
Similarly, rearranging (3.H.31.SS), we get:
δF = δN =
IF /GDP
KF/GDP
(3.H.59)
Plugging (3.H.24.SS) into (3.H.23.SS):
(
θCDζ + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
)−1
= pE
γ
(1− γ) (1− θ)
(EH)
1−ζ
CN
1 = βθ
(1− γ)
γ
(EH)
1−ζ
CN
CNCDζ−1pE
γ
(1− γ) (1− θ)
+ β
(
1− δCD
)
= β
θ
(1− θ)
pE
(
EH
CD
)1−ζ
+ β
(
1− δCD
)
solving for θ
θ =
1− β
(
1− δCD
)
1− β (1− δCD ) + βCD
EH
ζ−1
(3.H.60)
Rearranging (3.H.32.SS), we get:
KN
GDP
=
IN
GDP
1
δN
(3.H.61)
124 Durable Goods and Energy in RBC
Similar to Dhawan and Jeske (2008), we target the aggregate capital stock relative
to GDP to 12:
KY
GDP
= 12−
KF
GDP
−
KN
GDP
(3.H.62)
From (3.H.35.SS), we can solve for η:
η =
α
(
EY
GDP
)−1
− 1
α
(
EY
GDP
)−1
− 1 +
(
KY
EY
)ν (3.H.63)
From (3.H.34.SS), we can derive the steady state value for rY:
rY =
KY
GDP
−1(
η + (1− η)
KY
EY
−ν)−1
αη (3.H.64)
Rearranging (3.H.27.SS), we get:
rF = δ
F +
1
β
− 1 (3.H.65)
Similarly, rearranging (3.H.28.SS), we get:
rN = δ
N +
1
β
− 1 (3.H.66)
From (3.H.23.SS), we can solve for γ:
γ =
1− θ
1− θ + EH
CN
(
θ
(
CD
EH
)ζ
+ 1− θ
) (3.H.67)
Rearranging (3.H.26.SS), we get:
δY = rY −
1
β
+ 1 (3.H.68)
Rearranging (3.H.30.SS), we get:
IY
GDP
= δY
KY
GDP
(3.H.69)
Rearranging the expenditures approach of (3.H.48.SS), we get:
CN
GDP
= 1−
EH
GDP
−
EY
GDP
−
IY
GDP
−
IF
GDP
−
IN
GDP
−
ICD
GDP
(3.H.70)
Equalizing (3.H.25.SS) and (3.H.36.SS), we can solve for ϑ:
ϑ =
1
1 +
(
CN
GDP
)−1
γ (1− α) (1−LSS)
LSS
(3.H.71)
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3.H.6 Calibration of steady states in primary energy mining
Steady state values concerning the mining of finite primary energy, their reserves and
resources are based on panel data from BGR (2016). These observations are sub-
ject to considerable fluctuations, in particular the estimations of resources, mainly
because of different estimation techniques but also economics reasons or political
interventions to abandon reserves or resources. Hence, we calculated the steady
states as averages of the whole observation time period comprising 1992–2014. We
covered oil, gas, hard coal, and lignite coal as finite primary energy resources. Table
3.H.2 depicts the steady states for each resource and the weighted-average. Since
primary energy resources differ by the amount of total energy they can release, we
standardized the values using heating values (MJ/kg). This is why the share of oil
and gas is considerable larger than expected because both energy substance have
significantly larger heating values in comparison to coal.
Table 3.H.2: Steady states of finite primary energy
oil gas hard coal lignite coal standard weighted-average
F/S 0.06655 0.07021 0.21544 0.00435 0.07624
D/V 0.07063 0.02971 0.00002 0.00382 0.01259
D/F 0.57679 0.32557 -0.01191 0.77500 0.45590
Heating valuesa 42.8 46 32.7 8
Shareb 4.54% 25.81% 24.67% 44.99% ∼100%
a Heating values are in MJ/kg.
b Shares are calculated based on mining in 2007 and adjusted according to the respective heating values.
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Chapter 4
Heterogeneity in an RBC Model
with Durable Goods and Energy
4.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the effects of total factor productivity and energy price
shocks in a real business cycle (RBC) model with heterogeneous agents. It extends
the model by Dhawan and Jeske (2008), including the distinction between durable
goods and non-durable goods, by an incomplete market similar to Preston and Roca
(2007). Furthermore, in our model a fixed proportion of agents has limited asset
market participation as in Gali et al. (2003). As a result, this model can predict
the evolution of inequality in income and wealth, unlike traditional homogeneous
macroeconomic models with a representative agent.
Basic dynamic general equilibrium models with a single consumption good pro-
duced by a production sector predict a consumption volatility that is significantly
lower than the one in observational data. Dhawan and Jeske (2008) have extended
the RBC model by Kim and Loungani (1992) which includes energy, with the oppor-
tunity to gain utility from the consumption of accumulated durable goods. Although
energy has smaller effects on output fluctuations compared to Kim and Loungani,
enlarging the flexibility to re-balance an agent’s portfolio improves the prediction of
consumption volatility. By impacting consumption of durable goods and improving
the prediction of consumption volatility significantly, the factor energy shows that it
is not negligible in analyzing economic activities. Huynh (2016) goes beyond this by
endogenizing the production process of durable goods and energy, bringing energy
volatility closer to its empirical target values. Representative for other, but similar,
homogeneous frameworks, both models ignore the existence of heterogeneity in hu-
man beings and their decision making. As a result, they are neither able to describe
how inequality arises nor how it affects economic activity. However, such expla-
nations become important, in particular when considering the role of government
intervention to effectively correct market imperfections.
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In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to demonstrate the conse-
quences of agents’ heterogeneous labor supply and limited market participation.
The framework explicitly models the consumption of durable and non-durable goods.
Just as in Dhawan and Jeske (2008), we assume complementarity between energy
and the usage of durable goods (in the utility function) and capital (in the goods
production function). We use explicit aggregation as done by Den Haan and Ren-
dahl (2010) in order to solve the cross-section capital distribution among Ricardian
households and, consequently, the policy function for capital on the macro level of
the model.
The aim of this work is to investigate the transmission mechanisms and char-
acteristics of total-factor productivity (TFP) and energy price shocks, but also of
external shocks of heterogeneity though labor supply. Moreover, we study to what
degree the empirically observed inequality in income and wealth can be explained
by the provided framework. Therefore, we calibrate the model to match the Ger-
man economy. Furthermore, we consider not only how policy intervention through
redistribution affects individuals’ income and wealth, but also the inequality on the
macro level of the economy.
We show that the distinction between non-durable and durable goods leads to
a significant improvement in predicting most of the moments close to the one in
observational data from Germany. Here, energy price shocks have a contractionary
effect on economic activity, as they cause disruptions in particular in durable goods,
as is similarly shown in Dhawan and Jeske (2008). Nevertheless, TFP is still the
driving force of output volatility. The provided framework is able to match income
inequality indices quite well, whereas inequality of wealth remains underestimated.
This is justified given that we assume homogeneity in individuals’ productivity as
well as the exogenous process of labor supply. Furthermore, we find that energy price
shocks lead to decreasing inequalities, with respect to both income and wealth. This
happens due to the complementary relationship between durable goods and energy
and sunk costs, which arise along with adjustments in the durable goods stock. We
conclude that it is not the low-income agent who benefits from volatility in energy
prices, but the high-income agent who looses in income and wealth due to higher
absolute sunk costs.
Policy intervention in the form of redistribution of income decreases income in-
equality on the macro level, between both classes of agents, and within the class of
rule-of-thumb agents, but leads to a slight increase among Ricardian agents. For
wealth inequality, we notice a slight increase in overall inequality. This is due to
decreasing saving rates, which widen the gap between savers. Accordingly, we con-
clude that policy instruments have to be evaluated carefully in order to successfully
combat inequality.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: After a brief discussion of
several sources of heterogeneity in Section 2, Section 3 describes the model economy.
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Section 4 specifies the market equilibrium and examines theoretical literature in
order to solve the aggregate capital stock. Section 5 presents the calibrated and
estimated parameters. Section 6 presents the results of the model. In Sections
7, we conduct a sensitivity analysis. Section 8 discusses the policy implication of
redistribution through income taxation. Section 9 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical Literature on Inequality
Many traditional neoclassical economic models often assume an economy populated
by a representative consumer who operates in a perfectly competitive good, factor,
and asset market. Aggregated shocks, e.g. in TFP, can cause uncertainty in the
market, which affects the behavior of consumers in maximizing their utility. Even
in models in which heterogeneous agents face idiosyncratic shocks, such as in labor
supply or income, the assumption of a representative household can hold through
aggregation of heterogeneous agents, when complete markets are present (e.g. in
standard Arrow-Debreu economies). The reason is that idiosyncratic risk can fully
be diversified away (e.g. by borrowing and saving) and hence become irrelevant
for equilibrium outcomes. The market is self-regulating and volatility in aggregate
economic activity in an efficient response to shocks (Christiano et al., 2018), while
government interference is inefficient and worsen the state of the economy. However,
when agents cannot fully insure against idiosyncratic risk, e.g. due to incomplete
capital markets, inequality in the evolution of wealth occurs. Incomplete capital
markets may for example exist when there is a borrowing constraint, preventing
agents from holding debt, so that they cannot borrow against their future earnings.
When markets fail, government intervention can be efficient for correcting market
failures.
To understand how inequality occurs and evolves in macroeconomic models, we
briefly focus on several sources of heterogeneity and how they are mapped in eco-
nomic models. For an extended discussion of approaches on modeling heterogeneity,
we refer to Heathcote et al. (2009) and Guvenen (2011). It is common to distinguish
between fundamental inequality or inequality of opportunity and inequality of out-
come, when analyzing inequality in general. The latter is usually the result of the
former, economically often resulting in inequality in income, wealth, consumption,
utility, or leisure time. While individual utility is the ultimate object of interest, this
is difficult to measure and quantify. Therefore, attraction is mostly turned to the
remaining variables that play an intermediate role, particularly income and wealth.
Fundamental inequality describes the heterogeneous nature of individuals such as
health, education, social status, gender, preference or age. When considering these
types of inequality from the economic modeling perspective, fundamental inequality
influences the model selection, the formation of assumption about the model, and
its ingredients such as variables or functions. The model just acts as an intermediate
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transmission system. Consequently, a model without fundamental inequality cannot
explain inequality on the output side. There are several sources of heterogeneity that
cause fundamental inequality within a society. In the following, we look at three of
them: namely, capabilities, external shocks, and preferences.
The assumption of different capabilities among human beings has a significant
impact on inequality. In traditional models including homogeneous agents, individ-
uals do not differ in their decision making. However, in real life this homogeneity
is not very likely, because human beings differ in their behavior or their individual
skills and abilities. This has an influence on their levels of productivity, and hence
also on earnings, which in turn impacts income and wealth. In models that include
education, agents can increase their productivity by choosing different amounts of
schooling. However, that decision depends on several factors, such as the ability
to learn, the starting level of human capital, access to educational institutions, or
simply the choice of studying or entering the labor market (e.g. Huggett et al., 2011).
A further variation in capability comes from the restricted access to further
key institutions, such as financial markets. Under ”limited asset market participa-
tion”, there is a distinction between two classes of agents: Ricardian agents who
have free access to the capital market, and rule-of-thumb agents who are excluded
from this market. Economically, this means that the latter cannot insure against
income disruption to smooth their consumption. Other models describe heterogene-
ity in capability by including choice of occupation, in which an individual decides
about becoming an entrepreneur or a worker because of its individual risk aversion
(e.g. Clemens, 2006; Kanbur, 1979; Lucas Jr, 1978).
Considering heterogeneity in external shocks has become popular with standard
incomplete market models (SIM), also called Bewley models (Bewley, 1976). In the
SIM approach, individuals are identical ex-ante but differ ex-post due to idiosyn-
cratic shocks which are uninsurable. These shocks are unexpected or unpredictable
events and follow a stochastic process. In contrast to aggregate shocks in traditional
RBC models, which generally affect the entire economy including several sectors,
these idiosyncratic shocks affect households individually. Initial models incorporate
uninsurable idiosyncratic earning shocks (e.g. Aiyagari, 1994; Huggett, 1993; Imro-
horog˘lu, 1989) which translate into inequality of income and wealth through different
saving decisions. Storesletten et al. (2004) and Shimer (2010) model heterogeneity
in the labor market by including idiosyncratic shocks in labor supply to replicate job
fluctuation. Next to a job loss, further idiosyncratic shocks can affect health and
family (e.g. Greenwood and Guner, 2008; Hubbard et al., 1995). An individual’s
health status can become dramatically worse through a sudden disease. The family
composition can change through marriage, divorce, the birth of a child, or death.
Although these types of heterogeneity can involve some decision making and can be
modeled endogenously, they also incorporate an exogenous component (risk).
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Heterogeneity in preferences is closely connected to heterogeneity in capabilities,
as various abilities, such as learning abilities and human capital, might subsequently
influence individual behavior. Many models assume that once set, preferences re-
main constant throughout the entire lifetime. Alternatively, in models that feature
discrete groups of agents, such as overlapping generation models, different prefer-
ences can be assigned to different stages of life (e.g. Benabou, 2000; Persson and
Tabellini, 1994). Furthermore, preferences may vary at the individual level after
introducing a statistical distribution over parameters such as time preference, risk
aversion, or elasticity of substitution.
In this paper, we combine two sources of heterogeneity. We first introduce het-
erogeneity by using idiosyncratic shocks in labor supply that allow for income fluc-
tuation among all agents and result in an incomplete market model. However, this
type of model would not allow for dichotomy in the access to selected institutions.
Consequently, households at the extreme ends of income and wealth distribution
would not yet be different in any relevant way. Moreover, taxation policy would
become complicated, as there would be no groups that can individually be taxed
progressively, as is evident from real-life observations. Therefore, we also introduce
limited asset market participation, by excluding a fixed proportion of agents from
the capital market. We acknowledge that this may violate the permanent income
hypothesis by Friedman (2018), stating that agents save in anticipation of possible
future declines. However, the violation would only be partial, thanks to the presence
of a further (durable) consumption goods that can be accumulated over time.
4.3 Model
The model consists of two sectors: a household sector and a sector with goods-
producing firms. Moreover, the model is characterized by incomplete markets, ag-
gregate uncertainty, as well as an infinite number of agents. The specific structure
of heterogeneity comes from the household sector which faces a partly uninsurable
idiosyncratic labor supply and hence labor shocks similar to Aiyagari (1994). Since
employers cannot discriminate between agents by assumption, a shock on the de-
mand side would not affect agents individually, but aggregately. As a result, the
introduction of idiosyncratic shocks on the supply side allows introducing hetero-
geneity among agents.
In addition, we distinguish between two types of households which differ by their
access to the capital market. Ricardian households can intertemporally allocate
capital while rule-of-thumb households are excluded from this activity.1 Besides
that, both classes do not differ; hence, they face the same elasticities of substitution
1In fact, rule-of-thumb households can use durable goods to slightly intertemporally smooth con-
sumption. However, using the durable goods stock is not as efficient as using the capital stock, due
to additional adjustment costs, and hence it can be described as partly-illiquid wealth. Therefore,
these household are considered as a light version of non-Ricardian households as we elaborate later.
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in the utility function, the same time discount rate, and the same depreciation rate
for durable goods.
As a result, we combine two approaches of inequality described before, namely
’incomplete market models’ and ’limited asset market participation models’. By this,
we create inequality within and between different groups which offers possibilities
to model inequality more realistically. The infinity-lived households, indexed by i,
are defined over an interval i ∈ [0, 1] while Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households
account for [0, λ] and (λ, 1] respectively. For a better differentiation, households are
further indexed with their respective type, namely, Ricardian households {R} and
rule-of-thumb households {N}. Figure 4.A.1 in the Appendix depicts a graphical
description of the model. Hereafter, the model is described in more detail.
4.3.1 Ricardian households
In the model, all households maximize their utility by choosing the optimal de-
mand for consumption goods and energy given the budget constraints. Households
can consume three type of goods: non-durable goods CN which are provided by
the goods production sector, durable goods CD in which agents can invest and
which is accumulated over time, and energy EH which is provided exogenously.
2
The utility function is assumed to have constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
between durable goods and energy which are nested within a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion with non-durable goods.3 Furthermore, it includes a separate additive penalty
function to fulfill the transversality condition which otherwise might be violated due
to occasionally-binding inequality constraints. Ricardian households consider the
following utility function:
UR,i,t = ln
[
CN γR,i,t
(
θCDζR,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
]
− φP (SR,i,t) (4.1)
where P (SR,i,t) =
1
(SR,i,t + b)2
with SR,i,t ≥ −b (4.2)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) determines the consumption share of the durable goods. Further-
more, to fulfill a complementary relationship between durable goods and energy, the
inverse of the elasticity of substitution ζ < 0 must hold while the substitutionary re-
lationship between this consumption bundle and non-durable goods imply γ ∈ (0, 1).
φ > 0 is a penalty parameter.
The asset market is incomplete because of having a heterogeneous agent model
with idiosyncratic shocks. Hence, employment risks are only partially insurable
and the budget constraint includes occasionally-binding inequality. By adding the
penalty function (4.2) to agent’s utility, this allows us to deal with the problem
2Hereafter, we omit the time index when describing variables.
3The elasticity of substitution between durable and non-durable goods is often set close to unity
in empirical literature (e.g. Ogaki and Reinhart, 1998).
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of non-negative constraints by formulating the optimization problem as an uncon-
strained one. Here, we take the penalty specification suggested by Preston and Roca
(2007).4 The idea is that any amount of consumption and asset holding is feasible
but the objective function faces undesired outcome when the constraint is violated.
When individual asset holding Si,t approaches the borrowing limit b, the penalty
function approaches infinity. For small φ, the borrowing constraint becomes similar
to Si,t + b ≥ 0 as in Aiyagari (1994). b ≥ 0 describes the natural borrowing limit
which avoids Ponzi-schemes.
Lemma 3. Strict concavity of utility
The partial derivatives for the utility function UR are:
U ′CN > 0, U
′
CD > 0, U
′
EH
> 0, U ′SR > 0
U ′′CNCN < 0, U
′′
CDCD < 0, U
′′
EHEH
< 0, U ′′SR,SR < 0
U ′′CNCD = U
′′
CDCN > 0, U
′′
CDEH
= U ′′EHCD > 0, U
′′
CNEH
= U ′′EHCN > 0.
Utility function Ut is overall strictly concave in CN ,CD , EH iff all the following
conditions hold:
φ > 0
0 < γ < 1
ζ, θ < 1.
Proof: Analogously to H.1.1 in Bergmann (2018).
According to Lemma 3, a rise in consumption of all three consumption goods
increases utility but with a diminishing rate. The complementary relationship be-
tween durable goods and energy implies the expenses for a certain amount of energy
which is require to consume the accumulated durable goods. Hence, energy can
be considered to be consumed to enhance the consumption of durable goods in a
non-perfect substitutable manner. Alternatively, the presence of energy is required
to consume durable goods. Overall concavity of utility function U is guaranteed if
Proposition 3 holds.
The maximization problem of Ricardian households is restricted by the budget
constraint below.
CNR,i,t + (pH)t(EH)R,i,t + (ICD )R,i,t + (IY)R,i,t = wtLR,i,t + rtSR,i,t−1 + πt (4.3)
According to that, Ricardian households gain wage income wt from the supply
of labor and capital rents rt from their accumulated savings.
5 On the expenditure
4For further penalty approaches, see Den Haan and Ocaktan (2009).
5Under the assumption of perfect competition in the goods market, goods-producing firms gain
zero profits, hence π = 0.
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side are non-durable consumption goods and energy as well as investments in the
capital stock and durable goods described by the following equations:
(IY)R,i,t = SR,i,t −
(
1− δY
)
SR,i,t−1 (4.4)
(ICD )R,i,t = CDR,i,t −
(
1− δCD
)
CDR,i,t−1 + IC (CDR,i,t,CDR,i,t−1)
where IC (CDR,i,t,CDR,i,t−1) =
ω1cd
1 + ω2cd
(
CDR,i,t − CDR,i,t−1
CDR,i,t−1
)1+ω2cd
(4.5)
Both investments are each diminished by a fixed depreciation rate while durable
goods investments also contain adjustment costs (IC ).6 These costs are assumed
to be quadratic in nature, hence, investment in durable goods goes along with an
increasing and convex cost of net investment. In other words, the costs of adjusting
investments increase proportionally faster than the amount of durable goods which
is adjusted. On the one side, adjustment costs help to lower the correlation between
investments and economic activity (Hayashi, 1982). On the other side, it captures
the fact that building up or changing durable goods is costly and takes time. So, it
avoids excessive changes in investments in the short run. In the long run, households
do not face much of adjustment cost when they keep investments infinity small. As a
result, households will respond by adjusting their investment decision continuously
and smoothly.
In this model, labor supply is determined exogenously by an idiosyncratic com-
ponent following an autoregressive process proposed by Preston and Roca (2007).
This is in contrast to Dhawan and Jeske (2008) and Bergmann (2018) who assume
labor to be endogenously determined. Hence, individual agents cannot choose the
amount of work they are likely to provide. Because the supply of labor is set exoge-
nously, it does not depend on the wage rate. This might describe a situation where
an employee is demanded to work short-time or over-time which is not compensated.
The stochastic autoregressive term for individual i follows:
LR,i,t = (1− ρL)L¯R + ρLLR,i,t−1 + εL,R,i,t, (4.6)
comprising the steady state L¯, adjustment coefficient ρL, labor opportunity of the
previous period, and a normally distributed variable εL,R,i
iid
∼ N
(
0, σ2L,R
)
describing
a bounded i.i.d. disturbance. This shock is not insurable and hence, it leads to a
variation in the income of the individuals, which has an impact on consumption.
However, by accumulating primary capital but also durable goods, the effect of
6By reason of the cross-sectional distribution of capital and the way to deal with it through
approximate aggregation, we do not consider adjustment costs along with investments in the capital
stock which holds the model simple.
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disturbances can be mitigated. Under the assumption of ρL < 1, (4.6) describing
labor supply is stationary distributed.
Opposite to traditional neoclassical models with homogeneous agents, the het-
erogeneous structure of the model allows us to examine the evolution of inequality of
outcomes such as income or wealth. As explained before, Ricardian households can
gain income from labor and capital supply. The (net-)income equation corresponds
to the income approach of an agent’s budget constraint (4.3) after depreciation and
is described by:
INCR,i,t = wtLR,i,t + rtSR,i,t−1 + rtSR,i,t−1 + πt. (4.7)
Agent’s wealth consists of income in the current period, equal to equation 4.13 and
the stock of accumulated assets. A further share of wealth is the stock of accumulated
durable goods, in contrast to Gali et al. (2003), Kim et al. (2005), Preston and Roca
(2007), and Den Haan and Ocaktan (2009). Both net-portfolios (after depreciation)
increase wealth which is denoted by:
WLTHR,i,t = wtLR,i,t + rtSR,i,t−1 +
(
1− δY
)
SR,i,t−1 +
(
1− δCD
)
CDR,i,t−1 + πt.
(4.8)
4.3.2 Rule-of-thumb households
Rule-of-thumb households share the same utility function like Ricardian households
by maximizing their consumption of non-durable goods, durable goods, and energy,
denoted by the following equation:
UN,i,t = ln
[
CN γN,i,t
(
θCDζN,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
N,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
]
(4.9)
The definitions and properties of all parameters comply with those from (4.1). Con-
sequently, overall strict concavity is satisfied as in Lemma 3. Theoretically, the
utility function also includes the penalty function (4.2) as described before. How-
ever, because rule-of-thumb agents are excluded from the financial asset market,
their asset holding is zero. Hence, they are not affected by it. The maximization
problem is confronted with the budget constraint:
CNN,i,t + (pH)t(EH)N,i,t + (ICD)R,i,t = wtLN,i,t, (4.10)
where rule-of-thumb households solely gain income from their labor supply. They are
barred from any access to the capital market and hence the possibility of intertem-
poral substitution. However, in contrast to Krusell and Smith (1998), Gali et al.
(2003), Den Haan and Ocaktan (2009), and Troch (2014), the possibility to invest
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in durable goods yields in an opportunity to smooth their consumption behavior
according to
(ICD )N,i,t = CDN,i,t −
(
1− δCD
)
CDN,i,t−1 + IC (CDN,i,t,CDN,i,t−1)
where IC (CDN,i,t,CDN,i,t−1) =
ω1cd
1 + ω2cd
(
CDN,i,t − CDN,i,t−1
CDN,i,t−1
)1+ω2cd
(4.11)
Concerning rule-of-thumb agents, adjustment costs in durable investments also fulfill
a further role. By construction, these households can use the durable goods stock to
intertemporally smooth consumption despite the exclusion from the financial asset
market. This is not only natural and legitimate but also reflects conditions from
reality. However, in this theoretical framework, the lack of access to the capital
market will cause excess volatility in durable goods investments. Hence, additional
costs makes it less efficient to use this investment possibility.7 In addition, because
rule-of-thumb agents can accumulated durable goods over time, this also means that
they are not equal to non-Ricardian agents which by definition consume their current
disposable income and are not able to smooth consumption. As a result, rule-of-
thumb agents are assumed to be a light version of non-Ricardian agents because
their smoothing capability is clearly limited, having no access to the asset market
and facing adjustment costs when using the durable goods stock.
There is a further difference between Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households in
the determination of the idiosyncratic employment opportunity equation following
Preston and Roca (2007) and Troch (2014). Unlike Ricardian households, the latter
do not only responds to the employment opportunity from the previous period but
also on variation in the productivity of the goods-producing sector.
LN,i,t = (1− ρL)L¯N + ρLLN,i,t−1 + ρL,A
(
At − A¯
)
+ εL,N,i,t (4.12)
Steady-state labor supply L¯N is equal to its counterpart of Ricardian households,
ρL indicates the variation coefficients, A¯ is steady state productivity and εL,N,i,t a
bounded i.i.d. disturbance with mean and variance (0, σ2L,N ). From the specification
of the idiosyncratic employment opportunity, it holds that Cov(εL,N,i,t, At) > 0
although the disturbances of this idiosyncratic shock and the productivity equation
are uncorrelated, such that Cov(εL,N,i,t, εA,t) = 0. Hence, opposite to Preston and
Roca (2007) and Troch (2014), rule-of-thumb households’ income shocks are only
partly uninsurable due to the existence of durable goods. But variation in their
income stream are still more volatile than those of Ricardian households.
Rule-of-thumb households gain income from labor supply only according to:
INCN,i,t = wtLN,i,t. (4.13)
7Alternatively, durable goods can be described to be a less-liquid factor stock.
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In contrast to pure non-Ricardian households, who consume all their current dis-
posable income and do not hold any wealth, in this model, rule-of-thumb agents
can hold wealth by accumulating a durable goods stock. However, adjustments of
this stock go along with additional costs, which is why it can also be described as
partly-illiquid. The wealth equation follows:
WLTHN,i,t =
(
1− δCD
)
CDN,i,t−1. (4.14)
4.3.3 Production sector
The production sector produces goods that are consumed by all households as non-
durable goods CN . Following Kim and Loungani (1992) and Dhawan and Jeske
(2008), the production function in a perfect competitive market is given by:
Yt = At
[
ηKνt−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν L1−αt , (4.15)
where A defines Hicks-neutral productivity, η ∈ (0, 1) measures the share of capital
in terms of energy and ν the elasticity of the substitution between capital and
energy. As ν < 0, there is a complementary relationship between both input factors
similar to (Dhawan and Jeske, 2008). Thus, the efficient use of capital K to produce
output requires some energy EY. In addition, the company employs people supplied
by households L. α ∈ (0, 1) indicates the elasticity of substitution of the capital-
energy bundle. As the elasticity of substitution between labor and the composition
of physical capital and energy is one, non-durable goods are produced with constant
returns to scale, characterizing a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Lemma 4. Concavity of final production
The partial derivatives for the final production function are:
Y ′K > 0, Y
′
EY
> 0, Y ′L > 0,
Y ′′KK < 0, Y
′′
EYEY
< 0, Y ′′LL < 0,
Y ′′KEY = Y
′′
EYK
> 0, Y ′′KL = Y
′′
LK > 0, Y
′′
EYL
= Y ′′LEY > 0.
The production function Yt is overall concave in A
Y ,K,EY, L > 0 iff all the following
conditions hold:
ν, η ≤ 1 or ν > 1, η ≥ 1 or ν = 1, η > 1
α < 1.
Proof: See H.1.1 in Bergmann (2018)
According to Lemma 4, final output increases with installed physical capital,
energy and labor but at a decreasing rate. Moreover, overall concavity of the pro-
duction function is satisfied. Actual alteration of investments in real capital takes
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place with a one-period delay, which is analogous to fixed investment. However,
capital is only supplied by Ricardian households.
Firms producing non-durable goods face the following profit function:
πt = Yt − rtKt−1 − wtLt − (pY)t(EY)t. (4.16)
The price of non-durable goods is normalized to one. Hence, revenues of firms are
equal to Y . On the expenditure side, the input factors capital, labor, and energy are
paid off with their respective marginal products w, rY , and pE. As the production
sector is modeled by consisting of infinitely small firms, the market participants act
under perfect competition. Rents of the input factors labor and capital (wage and
interest rate) are determined by the labor and capital market, while energy prices
are determined by an exogenous process. Hence, the profit of the production sector
is π = 0.
4.3.4 Market clearing
The model is in equilibrium when all markets clear. For the goods market, this
means that production equals the aggregated demand of households for non-durable
consumption, investment as well as exogenous expenditures that are made for energy
consumption. Hence, the aggregate resource constraint follows:
Yt − (pY)t(EY)t = CN t + (pH)t(EH)t + (ICD )t + (IY)t. (4.17)
By assumption, energy prices, which are exogeneously determined, are the same
for households and firms. Hence, (pE)t = (pH)t = (pY)t holds. Furthermore, the
simplification of the exogenous setting of energy prices is based on the assumption
that Germany is a small country in terms of energy consumption.8 Hence, it has
little market power to affect the world price of energy.
Next to the goods market, all factor markets have to clear. Consequently, the
labor market is in equilibrium when demand for labor by goods-producing firms
equals the labor supplied by households at the market wage rate. In the presence
of Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households, aggregate labor supplied is described by
the weighted sum of labor supply of both types which is exogenously determined by
idiosyncratic labor opportunity:
Lt =
∫ λ
0
LR,i,t +
∫ 1
λ
LN,i,t. (4.18)
To ensure an equal wage rate for Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households and con-
sequently the same labor productivity, labor market equilibrium is characterized by
Lt = LR,t = LN,t. Coenen and Straub (2005) illustrate this as a consequence of
unions which pool the wage income of both groups of households.
8According to BP (2017), Germany’s share of total primary energy consumption is 2.4%.
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Similarly, the aggregate demand for non-durable and durable goods is determined
by their weighted sum of consumption:
CNt =
∫ λ
0
CNR,i,t +
∫ 1
λ
CNN,i,t (4.19)
CDt =
∫ λ
0
CDR,i,t +
∫ 1
λ
CDN,i,t. (4.20)
The market clearing condition for energy is satisfied when the sum of energy
demand by the goods-producing sector and weighted sum of the household sector
equal energy supply where the latter is determined by an exogenous price formation:
Et =
∫ λ
0
(EH)R,i,t +
∫ 1
λ
(EH)N,i,t + (EY)t. (4.21)
The physical capital market is in equilibrium when Ricardian households’ supply
of capital equals the demand of capital by goods-producing firms at the market rental
rate:
Kt =
∫ λ
0
SR,i,t. (4.22)
Next to idiosyncratic labor supply shocks, there are two further shocks affecting
aggregate TFP in a firm’s production function and energy prices for all energy
consuming entities. Both, Hicks-neutral TFP and the price of energy are assumed
to be exogenous and follow stochastic AR(1) processes. The laws of motion are
described by the following log-functions:
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + εA,t (4.23)
ln (pE)t = ρP ln (pE)t−1 + εP,t, (4.24)
where ρA, ρP ∈ (0, 1) measures the sensitivity coefficients of persistence and εA, εP
the disturbance which is independent and identically distributed with zero mean
and variance σ2i , i ∈ (A,P ).
4.4 Competitive Equilibrium
4.4.1 Households
In the following, the dynamic optimization problem is solved by maximizing each
actor’s maximization problem. The equations are derived in detail in Appendix
4.C.1. All households decide about their consumption of non-durable goods, durable
goods, and energy to optimize their expected lifetime utility. In contrast to Dhawan
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and Jeske (2008) and Bergmann (2018), households cannot choose their supply of
labor in this model as it is fixed and only affected by an exogenously determined
variation of labor opportunity. Furthermore, this economy contains a continuum of
individuals who are ex-ante identical but ex-post different in their asset holding Si,t
and employment opportunity LR,i,t and LN,i,t. This leads to heterogeneity due to
incomplete insurance markets.
From this, the Ricardian households face the following optimization problem:
maxUR,i,0 =
CNR,i,t,CDR,i,t,
(EH)R,i,t,SR,i,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln
[
CN γR,i,t
(
θCD ζR,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
]
− φ
1
(SR,i,t + b)2
+λHt {CNR,i,t + p
H
t (EH)R,i,t + I
CD
R,i,t + I
Y
R,i,t − wtLR,i,t − rtSR,i,t−1 − πt}
}
,
(4.1)
while the rule-of-thumb households’ optimization problem is given by:
maxUN,i,0 =
CNN,i,t,CDN,i,t,(EH)N,i,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln
[
CN γN,i,t
(
θCDζN,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
N,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
]
+λHt {CNN,i,t + p
H
t (EH)N,i,t + I
CD
N,i,t − wtLN,i,t}
}
.
(4.2)
According to this, the corresponding first order conditions are written as:
1 = β
θ (1− γ)
γ
E
{
CD ζ−1R,i,tCNR,i,t
θCDζR,i,t + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t+1
}
+ βE
{
CNR,i,t
CNR,i,t+1
(
1− δCD
)}
for c ∈ (R,N)
(4.3)
(pH)t =
(1− γ) (1− θ)
γ
CNR,i,t(EH)
ζ−1
R,i,t(
θCDζR,i,t + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t
) for c ∈ (R,N) (4.4)
1 = βE
{
CNR,i,t
CNR,i,t+1
(
1 + rR,i,t+1 − δ
Y
)}
(4.5)
Equation (4.3) describes the intertemporal substitution of durable goods. Due to
its complementary relationship, it depends positively on energy consumption while
it is negatively affected by an increase in non-durable consumption. Equation (4.4)
determines the demand for energy and (4.5) equals the Euler equation describing
the intertemporal substitution of non-durable goods. The latter implies that current
marginal utility of non-durable goods is equal to the discounted utility of future
consumption. While (4.3) and (4.4) are the same for both types of households, rule-
of-thumb households are excluded from the possibility to use the capital market
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for intertemporal substitution of non-durable goods. Hence, (4.5) is only valid for
Ricardian households.
Aggregate supply of labor by the household sector can be derived with (4.18) in
combination with equations (4.6) and (4.12). As a result, it is determined by
Lt = L¯+
(1− λ)ρL,A
1− ρL
(At − A¯). (4.6)
Due to the properties of the variances σL,i, i ∈ (R,N) of zero mean, idiosyncratic
employment opportunity shocks are canceled out according to the law of large num-
bers.9 This leaves aggregate labor supply to the steady state of labor supply plus
the adjusted business cycle fluctuation of productivity. As a result, labor supply
behaves pro-cyclically.
4.4.2 Production sector
Goods production is maximized by optimizing over the employment of input factors
physical capital, labor, and energy whose prices equal their respective marginal
productivities. As the price of the aggregated (non-durable) goods is normalized to
one, all prices in the economy are real prices.
rt = αηAt
[
ηKνt−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν
−1
L1−αt K
ν−1
t−1 (4.7)
(pY)t = αηAt
[
ηKνt−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν
−1
L1−αt (EY)
ν−1
t (4.8)
wt = (1− α)At
[
ηKνt−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν L−αt (4.9)
While the prices for capital and labor are regulated by the market to match demand
and supply, energy prices are exogenously determined by (4.24). As commonly
assumed, all factor rents are putting negative pressure on the respective demand.
To derive the equilibrium of the model, agents must forecast future prices of
capital and labor to solve the optimization problem. Labor Lt, productivity At, and
energy prices Pt, are exogenous stochastic processes, while demand for durable goods
depends on the difference of households’ incomes, consumption of non-durable goods,
and energy. In contrast to that, the process that describes the evolution of capital
still has to be determined. Additionally, due to heterogeneity among households,
the stochastic properties of the stock of capital also depend on the distribution of
9Observing a large number of agents, the average of ε obtained from a large number of trials
should be close to the expected value, which is the mean of the variance.
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capital wealth. As a result, the cross-sectional capital distribution becomes a state
variable by its own which is described by:
Γt+1 = H (Γt,CD t, At, (pE)t) (4.10)
whereH(·) is the law of motion, including all state variables except labor. According
to (4.6), the latter is excluded, as aggregate labor supply is only dependent on
productivity fluctuations while all idiosyncratic labor shocks for households, as well
as lagged labor supply, are canceled out. Opposite to Den Haan and Ocaktan
(2009), in this model, capital distribution only concerns Ricardian households, as
the remaining agents do not intertemporally transfer physical capital.
In equilibrium, the economy is determined by a set of allocation and price paths
that satisfy the following conditions, where i ∈ (R,N):
i) solving the households’ problems {CN i,CD i, Si, (EH)i} given prices {r, w, (pE)}.
ii) solving the firm’s demand of {K,L,EY} maximizing the profit given the prices
{r, w, (pE)}.
iii) rents of input factors are equal to marginal productivity {r, w, (pE)} of each
factor, determined by (4.7),(4.9),(4.8).
iv) all markets clear according to (4.17),(4.18),(4.19),(4.20),(4.21). This includes
the aggregation of input factors for all agents j with K =
∫
SR,jdj and L =∫
Ljdj.
v) the distribution of (St−1,CD t, At, (pE)t) and hence, the probability distribu-
tion function (4.10) as well as the aggregated and idiosyncratic shock processes
(4.23), (4.24), (4.6), and (4.12) are stationary.
Next to uncertainty, this model includes non-linear and stochastic properties,
which is why it is not possible to obtain analytical solutions. The equilibrium can
alternatively be obtained using numerical methods. Unfortunately, the law of motion
for the capital distribution (equation 4.10) is a high-dimensional object, and leads
to a large state space.
4.4.3 Solution methods for capital stock
To deal with non-linear and stochastic properties of capital distribution, Krusell
and Smith (1998) propose a simplification by relying on a finite and discrete set,
as described in the following. Under the assumption of bounded rational agents,
they show that the distribution can also be summarized by a few moments only. As
described before, solving a macroeconomic model for an equilibrium is more difficult
since heterogeneous agents have to be taken into account. In a simple framework,
considering heterogeneity in the accumulation of capital, Krusell and Smith (1998)
notice that approximate aggregation is a helpful tool to determine all aggregated
Heterogeneity in an RBC Model with Durable Goods and Energy 143
variables, such as consumption and wealth. In their work, they notice that higher-
order moments of wealth distribution do not affect the evaluation of total capital.
The authors argue that the correlation between the marginal propensity to consume
out of wealth and levels of households’ wealth is close to zero. Only for very poor
households does this not hold. But as the fraction of wealth stemming from very
poor households is relatively small, a higher order of moments describing the wealth
distribution does not significantly improve the determination of the accumulation of
capital. In equilibrium, the agents’ decisions of how to accumulate capital is almost
independent of the distribution of aggregated wealth. With respect to the model at
hand, future prices only depend on the moments of the physical capital stock but
not on its distribution. As a result, it is sufficient to know the evolution of the total
capital stock to forecast its price.
Accordingly, the corresponding general transition law of aggregate capital can
also be described as:
Kt = ̺0(s) +
I∑
i=0
̺i(s)M(i) + ̺2At−1 + ̺3(pE)t−1 + ̺4CDR,t−1, (4.11)
where M(i) describes the cross-sectional average of assets of individual i, while s
represents a vector of aggregate state variables. In this paper, there are two more
state variables, in comparison to the general models by Den Haan and Rendahl
(2010). These variables are durable goods and energy prices which enter the law of
motion.
Given this extended and more precise law of motion, each individual household
can compute its optimal choice of consumption. There are several approaches to
solve for aggregate capital, of which we will present simplified summaries. For a
detailed description, we refer to Algan et al. (2014). But besides these approaches,
the remaining procedure is always similar and consists of the following five steps: (1)
selecting the order of moments by determining the approximation methodology, (2)
choosing the functional form of law of motion of aggregate capital, (3) calculating
individual policy functions by solving the decision problem, (4) updating the law of
motion of aggregate capital, (5) iterating steps (2)-(5) until convergence.
The order of moments is closely linked to the selection of algorithm to obtain the
aggregate law of motion. Above, it was pointed out that a few moments are sufficient
to numerically approximate the equilibrium of a macroeconomic model with hetero-
geneous agents. Even the first moment of the wealth distribution (mean), along
with the aggregated productivity shock, can be sufficient to describe all aggregated
variables very accurately, as first shown by Krusell and Smith (1998). According to
them, it is disputable that the model’s approximate equilibrium is significantly less
accurate in comparison to the true theoretical equilibrium given agents’ irrationality.
Alternatively, Preston and Roca (2007) investigate the approximation using the
second order of moments. They confirm the accurate determination of endogenous
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variables by using first-order dynamics only. Furthermore, they show that aggregate
variation is less affected by second order moments compared to first order moments
because of the virtually linear saving decision of agents. Nevertheless, the second
order moments can contribute to the determination of individual mean consumption
and saving when considering non-linear properties in the solution. In Preston and
Roca (2007)’s work, a comparison improves accuracy by 2%. On the downside, when
using second order moments in combination with the perturbation method, we need
auxiliary policy rules and new aggregate state variables, which complicates the model
by increasing its dimensionality. Therefore, because in our model the propensity to
save out of wealth is almost equal across all agents, first order moments will be used
in the model at hand.
As the law of motion of aggregate capital is derived from the individual policy
function, we will first focus on the determination of the latter. Numerically, there
are two methods to solve the policy functions: using the projection technique or the
perturbation technique. The first generally consists of three steps: defining a grid in
the state variables, calculating the conditional expectation of the optimized decision
equations such as the Euler equation by applying quadratic methods, followed by
solving the equation to find the coefficients of the approximating function for which
the errors on the grid are minimized. This procedure has a few advantages, especially
with respect to heterogeneous agents, because it captures the distributional aspect.
Furthermore, it can be applied to non-linear equations. However, the more state
variables there are in the model, the more difficult it becomes to solve the policy
function. The main difference between the projection and perturbation methods
is that the projection method is designed to derive a global approximation, while
perturbation techniques are designed to be a local method. Still the latter can also
give very close global approximations.
Perturbation techniques approximate policy functions around their steady state
values. Concurrent with that, there can be only one steady state, limiting the re-
sult to a local optimum. Furthermore, it can only be applied to sufficiently linear
equations, otherwise the results may be less robust and explosive. Technically, per-
turbation methods use the Taylor expansion, whose order is also determined by the
number of moments. In general, a higher-order approximation reduces the error of
a Taylor series, bringing it closer to the analytic function. First order perturba-
tion methods are widely used in economics as they are fast to compute and simple
to apply. While the order is primarily a technical issue for calculating the Taylor
approximation, the number of moments also describes the degree of rationality of
an agent. In the present paper, the first order perturbation approach will be used,
similar as in Troch (2014), and based on the findings of Krusell and Smith (1998).
On the one side, there is only a low contribution by an extension to second order.
On the other side, although using second moments increases the agents’ degree of
rationality, it also goes along with considering the evolution of cross-products, in-
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creasing the complexity of determining the aggregate capital stock. Hence, it is
questionable whether agents consider such higher moments in their decision making
about optimizing their asset accumulation.
Given the individual policy functions, we can derive the aggregate law of motion
of capital (4.11). Next to limiting the set of moments, Krusell and Smith (1998)
were also among the first to develop an approach to obtain the aggregate policy
function from a simulation procedure. After each step they solve for the individual
policy rule, they construct a time series of the cross-sectional moments. By applying
least squares, new coefficients for the law of motion Ξ can be estimated from it. This
process is iterated until convergence. On the downside, this approach is very compu-
tational and introduces sampling noise due to the long-run simulations. Subsequent
to the approaches described so far, further ones have been developed by Den Haan
(1996), Den Haan (1997), and Algan et al. (2008, 2010), all building on Krusell and
Smith (1998). The former Den Haan (1996) simulates the individual and aggregated
policy function of capital, using parameterization of the conditional expectation to
avoid the approximation of law of motion of the finite set of moments. The other
two, instead of using simulations, use projection techniques. However, this requires
knowledge of either the aggregate capital stock Kt+1 or the actual distribution,
which again increases the number of state variables and the complexity.
In this paper, we apply the approach of explicit aggregation by Den Haan and
Rendahl (2010). Compared to the simulation and projecting approaches, this ap-
proach is less computational. Moreover, with respect to the model at hand, it is
much simpler, as we use first order moments only. In general, the idea is to derive
the aggregated law of motion by integrating the individual policy functions. Along
with that, further information on the cross-sectional distribution does not have to
be considered.
The parameterized individual policy function of agent i is given by:
SR,i,t = ̟0 +̟1SR,i,t−1 +̟2Kt−1 +̟3At−1 +̟4(pE)t−1
+̟5LR,i,t−1 +̟6CDR,i,t−1 +̟7εP,t−1.
(4.12)
This function expresses the policy function of the individual capital stock (and
hence, its physical capital wealth) at the end of period t, after any realization of
shocks through labor participation, technological progress, and energy prices. Fur-
thermore, the function holds for both types of households, whereby the state variable
for all rule-of-thumb households is St = 0. With respect to the market clearing, we
can transcribe the heterogeneous law of motion to the law of motion of aggregated
capital by integrating (4.12):∫
SR,i,t = ̟0 +
∫
̟1SR,i,t−1+̟2Kt−1 +̟3At−1 +̟4(pE)t−1
+
∫
̟5LR,i,t−1 +
∫
̟6CDR,i,t−1 +̟7εP,t−1.
(4.13)
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Subsequently, the integrated terms can be substituted by the market clearing condi-
tions (4.22), (4.20), and (4.6). Solving the equation for aggregated capital Kt leads
to:
Kt = λ
(
̟0 +̟5L¯R
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ξ0
+ (̟1 + λ̟2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ξ1
Kt−1 + λ̟3︸︷︷︸
Ξ2
At−1+λ̟4︸︷︷︸
Ξ3
(pE)t−1
+ λ̟6︸︷︷︸
Ξ4
CDR,i,t−1 + λ̟7︸︷︷︸
Ξ5
εP,t−1.
(4.14)
Since physical capital can only be accumulated by Ricardian households and con-
sidering the fact that idiosyncratic employment opportunity shocks are canceled out
in equilibrium according to the law of large numbers, it holds that
∫
LR,i,t−1 = L¯.
By suppressing the constant coefficients, we derive the aggregated policy function
for capital in a straightforward manner.
Kt = Ξ0 + Ξ1Kt−1 + Ξ2At−1 + Ξ3(pE)t−1 + Ξ4CDR,t−1 + Ξ5εP,t−1 (4.15)
Hereby, we have taken advantage of being faced with a linear policy function includ-
ing first moments only. Considering higher order moments, further laws of motion,
who determines those variables, needs to be added as pointed out by Den Haan
and Rendahl (2010). Concurrent, this means that without any modification of the
approximation process, an infinite set of moments is required to find a solution for
those policy functions.
In accordance with the procedure to compute the optimal choice of consumers
with respect to the correct aggregated in equilibrium, the previous steps are iterated
until there is convergence within the coefficients of (4.15) (see Section 4.5.2).
4.5 Calibration & Determination of Law of Motion of
Aggregated Capital
In the following, we determine the parameters for the model. To do so, we either cal-
ibrate the values by calculating the values from the model in steady state condition,
by using empirical data to fit the model with plausible real data, or by obtaining the
values from existing literature. A derivation from the steady states can be found
in Appendix 4.C.1. The respective structural parameters which characterize the
properties of the model are summarized in Table 4.1, while Table 4.3 summarizes
the shock-related parameters.
The steady state condition of the model corresponds to the model with respect
to its long run historical averages from data. Only for labor supply do we set its
long-run steady state value to L = 0.3 as it is also standard in the literature. This
follows from the assumption that 30% of the available time of an agent is used for
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working. Although this goes along with Dhawan and Jeske (2008), it is also similar
to the value assumed for Germany (see Hristov, 2016).
According to Dhawan and Jeske (2008), we set the time discount factor and
the elasticity of substitution of the durable good/energy consumption bundle and
non-durable goods in the utility function of households equal to β = 0.99 and
ζ = −2.8748. For the elasticity of substitution within the non-durable goods produc-
tion function, we choose ν = −0.15 as in Kemfert and Welsch (2000). While Dhawan
and Jeske (2008) follow Kim and Loungani (1992) by choosing ν = −0.7 and per-
forming a sensitivity analysis for other values, Kemfert and Welsch (2000) estimate
the elasticity of substitution specifically for Germany using alternative nesting struc-
tures. As ζ, ν < 0, this leads to a complementary relationship between these factors
in the household and firm sectors. The capital income share in goods production
is set to α = 0.36, similar to Kydland and Prescott (1982), Hansen (1985), and
Maußner (1994). Inversely, this corresponds to a labor income share of 64% and ac-
counts for the average of the capital income parameter set by Marto (2014) and Flor
(2014) for Germany. Compared to lower values in earlier literature, the reduction of
labor income shares considers a more capital-intensive production which goes along
with Schmalwasser and Schidlowski (2006) who argue that capital shock grows faster
than production as labor is increasingly replaced with capital in recent time. The
elasticity of substitution between the energy-durable bundle and non-durable goods
is equal (unity), similar to Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011). According to
the derivation of the model in steady state using targeted ratios from empirical data
(see Appendix 4.C.1), γ is set to 0.781 which puts a higher weight on non-durable
goods. In comparison to Dhawan and Jeske (2008) who use target moments of the
US for calibration, the value is slightly lower for Germany.
Due to an initial value problem, the parameters ζ and θ in the utility function
and the production function cannot be simultaneously calibrated. Hence, either of
those must be predetermined, in our case the elasticities in these functions. Sub-
sequently, the particular share parameters are calculated to match empirical data.
Furthermore, we take the same depreciation rate of durable goods from Dhawan
and Jeske (2008) due to the assumption that the behavior of US households with
respect to durable goods does not distinguish from German consumers significantly.
Accordingly, δCD is set to 0.0683.
The cost function of accumulation of durable goods is assumed to be quadratic
according to Bruno and Portier (1995) and Dhawan and Jeske (2008). As the pro-
portional part of the adjustment costs ω2d does not affect the steady state condition
of the model, it is calibrated in order to closely match volatility of total fixed invest-
ment to that from data. The benchmark model does not involve any taxes, hence
τ = 0 holds.
Regarding the motion of the capital stock, used in the production sector, its
depreciation rate is calculated from the time preference rate and the steady state
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interest rate while the latter is calculated from the long-run first order condition
of the production function. The sensitivity parameter of the borrowing constraint
is set to φ = 0.5. According to Preston and Roca (2007), theory does not restrict
the setting of this parameter with respect to its magnitude. Hence, it is chosen to
ensure no essential violation of the borrowing constraint. By setting the natural
borrowing limit to b = 0, a household’s utility is negatively affected by any negative
asset holding.
Considering the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers, Mayer and Sta¨hler (2013)
assume its share to be 0.33 which satisfies a moderate crowding out of private con-
sumption for Germany in 2011.10 Sta¨hler and Thomas (2012) surmise a higher
share of 0.4 in Germany for the post-financial crisis period after 2008. For mod-
els covering the EU area as a whole, Coenen and Straub (2005) set the fraction of
liquidity-constraint agents to 0.25 which is in line with Coenen et al. (2008) while
others assume a significant higher fraction of 0.37 (Forni et al., 2009). In our model,
the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers is set to 1 − λ = 0.35 which is between
these two ranges. Such a sizable fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers helps to rec-
oncile the model with empirical evidence, in particular with respect to inequality
measurements. It is worth to mention that existing literature often assumes a bal-
anced weight between Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households, frequently referred
to the models by Gali et al. (2003) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989), while the
latter mainly relate this share to the pre-1990 period in the USA. An equal weight
distribution is usually taken as an initial value for further estimations. Hereby, the
USA is often observed as the underlying economy which reasonably differs from the
German economy in terms of capital and income distribution. For instance, Colciago
(2011) reports a higher fraction of 0.5 which is also consistent with Mankiw (2000),
Bilbiie and Straub (2013), Callegari (2007), Muscatelli et al. (2004), and Amato and
Laubach (2003). Considering the estimates based on Markov-chain Monte Carlo
methods by Di Bartolomeo et al. (2011), the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers in
the USA indeed are at the higher end of the G7 countries, only surpassed by France
and the UK. Overall, as Gali et al. (2003) notify that the introduction of liquidity
constraint consumers can alter the equilibrium dynamics of the model, we further
do some sensitivity checks for several values of λ in Section 4.7.
4.5.1 Calibration of shocks
The parameters for the shock process are summarized in Table 4.3. Technological
progress follows an AR(1) process. It is a common practice to assume a persistent
parameter of 0.95 as considered by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Hansen (1985).
With respect to that, Kydland and Prescott (1982) suggest a standard deviation of
10Di Bartolomeo et al. (2011) estimate a fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers which is at the lower
end with 0.075. Finding similar results for Japan, they explain these findings with psychological
and cultural factors of the countries as well as higher saving rates compared to other G7 countries.
However, they also do not rule out measuring errors.
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Table 4.1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Description
β 0.990 discount factor
ζ -2.875 elas. of substitution between durable goods and energy in households
θ 0.999 share of durable goods in consumption good bundle
γ 0.781 elas. of substitution of consumption
λ 0.650 Ricardian household share
φ 0.050 sensitivity of penalty constraint
α 0.365 final output elas. of VA
η 0.949 share of capital in capital-energy bundle
ν -0.150 elas. of substitution between capital and energy in production
δCD 0.068 depreciation rate of durable goods
δY 0.018 depreciation rate of physical capital
ω1d 2.410 parameter adjustment costs
ω2d 1.000 parameter adjustment costs (proportional part)
τ 0.000 tax rate
Ξ0 -0.664 coefficient of constant in aggregate capital accumulation
Ξ1 0.963 coefficient of Kt−1 in aggregate capital accumulation
Ξ2 0.988 coefficient of At−1 constant in aggregate capital accumulation
Ξ3 0.007 coefficient of Pt−1 constant in aggregate capital accumulation
Ξ4 0.084 coefficient of CDR,t−1 constant in aggregate capital accumulation
Ξ5 0.003 coefficient of ǫP,t−1 constant in aggregate capital accumulation
0.007 for the growth rate of the Solow residual. But there is little formal analysis of
that specific derivation. Gomme and Rupert (2007) re-estimate the Solow residual
process using three different regressions with varying numbers of capital stocks, by
also taking durable goods into account. The results are fairly similar, amongst
others, to those of Kydland and Prescott (1982) or Hansen (1985) and confirm that
a first order process provides a good rendering of the data. Furthermore, Gomme
and Rupert (2007) argue that the results are not sensitive to the number of capital
stocks.11 Their autoregressive coefficient of 0.9641 and volatility of the shock of
0.0082 are somewhat larger than the usual values. For the present model, we choose
a persistent coefficient of ρA = 0.964 for the technological process and a shock
volatility of σA = 0.0086 which is in line with Flor (2014) for the German economy
and only slightly differs from Gomme and Rupert (2007) who based their analysis
on US data.
The structure of energy market and hence the price formation processes differ
significantly among countries. Therefore, we cannot use the estimates from studies
like Dhawan and Jeske (2008) who consider the US economy. Alternatively, we do
a separate estimation to derive the energy price function based on German data.
Since the mid-1990s, Germany has imported more than 60% of its energy use (The
World Bank, 2019). To trace energy prices, we consider the evolution of monthly
11In fact, when calculating the Solow residual, Kydland and Prescott (1982) omit the capital
stock completely. They justify that capital series has a smooth process and hence less effect on the
Solow residuals.
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import prices of energy between 2005 and 2018. Next to a conservative AR(1)
process, we estimate an ARMA(1,1) process such as Dhawan and Jeske (2008) and
Kim and Loungani (1992). The results are summarized in Table 4.2 together with
the log-likelihood and Bayesian information criterion.
Table 4.2: Estimation of energy price function
AR(1) ARMA(1,1)
constant 110.300*** 112.8***
(6.40) (7.68)
AR(1) 0.984*** 0.974***
(73.09) (54.52)
MA(1) 0.355***
(5.00)
sigma 5.340*** 4.905***
(24.07) (22.69)
LLa -512.2475 -498.3773
BIC 1039.813 1017.178
a Log-likelihood (LL) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) are
used as estimators of the relative quality of the statistical model-
based.
level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
According to the two-quality estimators, ARMA(1,1) is preferred over AR(1),
although the dominance is only weak. Nevertheless, we continue with an ARMA(1,1)
energy price function despite the increase of complexity, due to an additional state
variable (in form of the moving average of the variance of energy prices). It is
thoroughly reasonable to assume that agents consider the price fluctuation of energy
as one of their essential products in their utility function to predict future prices
and consequently make a decision about their saving behavior.
Similar to TFP, labor supply or more precisely the employment shock follows
an AR(1) process. While Preston and Roca (2007) set a employment persistence
of 0.93 and for thumb-to-rule agents a persistence rate of current aggregate market
conditions of 0.7, most literature assume a higher persistence rate of individual
employment between 0.95 and 0.97 (e.g. Den Haan and Ocaktan, 2009; Lee and
Mukoyama, 2015; Lopez, 2010; Storesletten et al., 2004). In our model, we set
ρL = 0.96 for both groups of agents. For the variance, we follow general literature
with a variance of σEMP = 0.05 as in Den Haan and Ocaktan (2009) and Preston and
Roca (2007). Lopez assumes a significantly higher variance of 0.12 in the base state
and during recession an even greater variance to include a cyclical variation of the
risk-premium. In our model, this fact is covered by the aggregate market condition
term which has a persistence of ρL,A = 0.04 for rule-of-thumb households.
12
4.5.2 Law of motion of aggregated capital
The law of motion of aggregated capital is derived by the iteration algorithm de-
scribed in Section 4.4.3. The initial function contains arbitrary values which respects
12It seems reasonable to assume a slightly higher persistence and lower cyclical behavior due to
higher restrictions in the German labor market than in the USA.
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Table 4.3: Parameter values of shocks
Parameter Value Description
ρA 0.964 persistence technology shock of A
ρP 0.974 persistence energy price shock of P
ρPσ 0.355 persistence energy price shock of σP
ρL 0.960 persistence labor opportunity shock of L
ρL,A 0.040 persistence technology shock in labor opportunity L
σA 0.0086 volatility shock of technological progress
σP 0.049 volatility shock of energy prices
σL,R 0.050 volatility shock of labor (Ricardian agents)
σL,N 0.050 volatility shock of labor (rule-of-thumb agents)
the steady state values of capital and ensures a stable condition of the model. In
principle, the initial distribution should not influence the convergence of coefficients.
This is because the stationary density of the probability distribution function (4.10)
should be independent of the starting state variables as long as the steady state
values are respected. After each optimization process, the law of motion and its
coefficients are updated according to (4.14). We set the convergence speed of the
updating process of 10% to avoid explosive structures and instability. This means
that the former aggregated policy function of capital is updated by only 10% of the
new estimated coefficients. The number of simulations should be sufficiently large
to guarantee convergence to the stationary distribution. Altogether, the iteration
process is run over 150 periods. Figure 4.1 depicts the convergence of each coefficient
in the policy function of aggregate capital.
Clearly, convergence is reached after half of the iteration process. The same value
is approached regardless of the selected initial starting points. As a result, the final
law of motion of aggregate capital in consideration of the individual optimization
behavior of households is given by:
Kt = −0.6549 + 0.9630Kt−1 + 0.9782At−1 + 0.0067(pE)t−1 + 0.0833CDR,t−1 + 0.0024ǫP,t−1.
(4.1)
4.6 Results
The analysis of results is separated into three parts. First, we look at the simu-
lated moments of selected endogenous variables after running the model for several
times. By comparing the results with observations from the German economy, we
are able to validate and analyze the predictive power of the model. Because the
relevant statistics for capturing business cycles is the standard deviation, we focus
on 2nd moments to cover the volatility of variables. Second, we present some impulse
response functions (IRFs) that show the expected propagated path of standard de-
viation of the endogenous variables, conditional on a one-time shock in the initial
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Figure 4.1: Coefficients of law of motion of aggregated capital
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
-5
-4.5
-4
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
=0.7 =0.8 =0.9
(a) Coefficient Ξ0
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
=0.7 =0.8 =0.9
(b) Coefficient Ξ1
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
=0.7 =0.8 =0.9
(c) Coefficient Ξ2
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
=0.7 =0.8 =0.9
(d) Coefficient Ξ3
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0.08
0.09
0.1
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
=0.7 =0.8 =0.9
(e) Coefficient Ξ4
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8 10
-3
=0.7 =0.8 =0.9
(f) Coefficient Ξ5
The derivation of the coefficient of the final law of motion of aggregate capital is based on an iteration
process about the decision making of agents. As long as the initial starting points respect the steady state
value of capital, Ξi converge to stable values.
period. We focus on both aggregate shocks, namely a temporary increase in TFP
and energy prices, and the direction and shape of the response of selected model
variables. Studying IRFs is a handy tool to evaluate the responses to aggregate
exogenous shocks, which means that we can check the coherency with respect to
economic theory. However, studying IRFs to evaluate consequences of idiosyncratic
labor supply shocks does not work because of heterogeneous responses of agents.
Hence, the third part concentrates on the analysis of the evolution of the income
and wealth distributions, by inspecting several inequality metrics.
4.6.1 Simulated moments
Table 4.1 displays the simulated percent standard deviation of selected variables of
various simulations of the model and the corresponding observations from Germany
between 1991–2012 using an HP-filter to detrend the data. Next to the baseline
model discussed so far, which includes all shocks (column 2), we show the moments
of a simplified version of the model including Ricardian agents only (column 1)
as well as the moments of the model without adjustment costs in durable goods
investments (column 3). In addition, we look at the volatility or variables when the
model is affected by each shock separately (column 5–7).
The model with one class of agents, namely Ricardian agents (column 1), corre-
sponds to the baseline model with adjustment costs and durable goods by Dhawan
and Jeske (2008), but with one exception. In contrast to Dhawan and Jeske (2008),
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Table 4.1: Volatility of simulated variables (2nd moments)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable data simple baseline no IC diff wages only εA only εP only εL
Output 1.62 0.97 1.58 1.59 1.24 1.57 0.16 0.02
Non-durable goods 0.81 4.05 2.82 3.20 2.28 0.12 0.03 2.77
CNR 2.40 3.76 2.35 0.05 0.03 2.44
CNN 6.45 5.36 4.54 0.33 0.06 6.26
Durable goods 3.01 3.28 3.33 7.53 2.60 0.16 0.77 3.07
CDR 2.90 10.24 2.99 0.20 0.90 2.74
CDN 7.38 9.48 4.46 0.20 0.55 6.80
Total energy 1.76 3.00 2.95 2.97 2.60 0.74 3.08 0.09
Ey 2.92 2.86 2.86 2.52 0.74 2.98 0.01
Eh,R 0.14 0.13 0.28 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.08
Eh,N 0.23 0.26 0.15 0.01 0.08 0.20
Labor supply 1.31 4.52 3.46 3.46 3.46 0.02 0.00 3.48
LR 4.61 4.61 4.61 0.00 0.00 4.70
LN 4.44 4.44 4.44 0.06 0.00 4.33
Labor demand 1.31 4.52 0.28 0.28 0.19 0.28 0.00 0.00
Wage 1.07 2.06 1.15 1.28 1.32 1.13 0.33 0.04
Fix capital formation 4.01 4.68 4.54 5.04 4.59 0.83 0.15 4.53
Energy price 5.28 5.42 5.30 5.30 5.30 0.00 5.56 0.00
Data is based on observations from Germany between 1991-2012 using an HP-filter to detrend.
All simulation results denote the percentage standard deviation (2nd moment) over 1000 periods using an
HP-filter.
(1) includes Ricardian agents only (all agents have access to the asset market)
(2) shows results of baseline model
(3) shows results of model without adjustment costs in durable goods investments
(4) shows results under the assumption of different productivities for both classes of agents
(5-7) shows results of the baseline model with one specific shock only
labor supply is based on an idiosyncratic process and is determined exogenously in
this model. While output volatility explains 60% of its empirical target, agents fail
to smooth consumption because volatility of durable above all non-durable goods are
higher than the data values. This is due to the high volatility in the supply of labor,
which leads to fluctuation in income. All households have to choose between con-
sumption and asset allocation in order to smooth consumption expenditures which
are otherwise volatile due to the inconsistency of income because of the presence
of shocks in TFP and energy prices. However, agents cannot fully insure against
employment shocks, due to incomplete capital markets. This leads to income varia-
tions and affects those expenditures from which they can directly get utility, namely
non-durable consumption goods.
Investigating the baseline model (column 2), the volatility of output is in line
with historical values from Germany. The same applies to the standard deviation
of aggregated durable goods which is only slightly higher. Here, fluctuations are
significantly reduced due to the presence of adjustment costs. This is apparent in
comparison with the model without those costs on doing investments in durable
goods (column 3) in which volatility is more than twice as high. In contrast to that,
volatility of total non-durable goods is far above their empirical targets which is
mainly driven by the consumption fluctuation of rule-to-thumb agents. Similarly,
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volatility of durable goods of rule-of-thumb households is clearly above those of
Ricardian households. However, its effect on the volatility of total durable goods is
relatively low.
The reason for the high volatility of total non-durable goods is the missing pos-
sibility of intertemporal asset allocation to smooth consumption because rule-of-
thumb households are hindered to postpone income to later periods considering
their budget constraint (equation 4.10). The alternative of intertemporal income
allocation via durable goods is constrained by adjustment costs but has also a lower
attractiveness as it is linked to higher energy expenditures due to its complemen-
tary relationship. In cases where adjustments in durable goods are not constrained,
fluctuations are significantly higher for durable goods whose consumption is easier
to be experienced by households as it is only constrained with additional energy ex-
penditures. But opposite to non-durable consumption goods, there is no production
process that might limit the supply of durable goods. This is in line with Dhawan
and Jeske (2008) who also find excess volatility for durable goods without the pres-
ence of adjustment costs. However, this does not apply to non-durable goods, due
to endogenous labor supply in their model. Although volatility in idiosyncratic and
exogenous labor supply is significantly lower in the present baseline model in compar-
ison to the model without rule-of-thumb agents, volatility is still above its empirical
target. As a result, the higher fluctuation of labor income is transmitted to con-
sumption expenditures and physical capital investments (Ricardian agents). In sum,
matching the fluctuation of durable goods comes at the expense of overestimating
the fluctuation of non-durable goods similar to Alvarez-Parra et al. (2012).
The standard deviation of total (fixed) investment is close to that of the data
as we choose ω1cd to target the moments of durable goods and physical capital
investments. Similarly, the volatility of energy prices matches its empirical target as
we have estimated the energy price function by an ARMA(1,1) process. Similar to
Dhawan and Jeske (2008), labor demand volatility is well below the empirical value,
accounting for only 22% of its fluctuation.
Although we do not distinguish between Ricardian and rule-of-thumb agents in
terms of wages, it is visible that the volatility of consumption goods differs signif-
icantly due to the missing possibility to smooth expenditures by the latter group.
Therefore, we also check how the moments are affected by changing the labor pro-
ductivity of rule-of-thumb agents and hence the labor income relative to wages of
Ricardian households. The standard deviation of lowering wages of rule-of-thumb
households by 1/3 are displayed in column 4. Of particular interest are the values
of those variables that directly affect the agent’s utility. Volatility of both the total
durable and non-durable consumption goods, are far below those of the baseline
model. The available income of rule-of-thumb agents decreases and hence leads to
lower fluctuation values to impact the volatility of consumption goods. Hence, it is
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apparent that a different productiveness of labor improves the performance of the
model to match empirical targets.
Next, we look at the degree of influence of the variables due to different shocks
(columns 5–7). Unexpected shocks in TFP account for the origin of output volatility
as energy price shocks can explain only 10% of fluctuation in GDP (see column 5).
This is in line with the literature claiming that TFP is the main driver for business
cycle fluctuation despite the presence of energy price or more specifically oil price
shocks (Dhawan and Jeske, 2008; Finn, 2000; Kim and Loungani, 1992; Rotemberg
and Woodford, 1996). Opposed to that, consumption is hardly affected by TFP
shocks. Here, volatility in the supply of labor is the main driving force for durable
goods which can almost fully explain volatility in comparison to 24% by energy price
shocks. It is worth mentioning that the influence of TFP on consumption goods is
also held down due to an exogenous labor supply. According to Dhawan and Jeske
(2008), productivity shocks can attribute almost half to the volatility of non-durable
goods by fully endogenizing the labor stock.
The energy price shock (column 6) plays a prevailing indirect role in influenc-
ing the utility function as well as the production process by increasing their costs.
Furthermore, the energy share in producing output and generating utility for house-
holds is relatively small compared to capital, labor or consumption goods. But
unsurprisingly, energy has a larger effect on durable goods in the utility function in
comparison to capital investment in the production function as energy consumption
has a larger share in the former. This is in line with Dhawan and Jeske (2008) who
find the same results in a fully homogeneous economy model. In total, our results
confirm the limited direct role of energy price fluctuation to output volatility. TFP
is still the main driver of business cycles. However, they are not negligible in partic-
ular by explaining volatility in the consumption behavior of durable goods. Hence,
as proposed by Hamilton (2008), energy price shocks affect the economy through
other transmission channels such as postponing the purchase of durable goods.
4.6.2 Impulse response functions
In the following, we analyze the impulse response function to changes in the produc-
tivity process A and changes in the price of energy P . Responses are shown by their
deviation from the balanced growth paths. As we use log-differences, fluctuations
are mapped in percentages. The dynamic results are based on the calibrated val-
ues, hence the shocks are not normalized but correspond to the individual standard
deviations of positive shocks σA and σP as described in Table 4.3. The graphs aim
to explain two questions: Firstly, how do the endogenous variables respond to each
shock. Secondly, to what extent do the responses differ with respect to different
types of agents. For better comparability, we partly include the dynamics of both
agents in the same graphs. Ricardian agents are marked by a dashed line, rule-of-
thumb agents are marked by a dotted line, the production sector is marked by a
156 Heterogeneity in an RBC Model with Durable Goods and Energy
dot-dashed line, while a solid line represents the overall dynamics of a respective
variable.
4.6.2.1 Shock to TFP in the (non-durable) goods production sector
In this section, we investigate a positive productivity shock to the (non-durable)
goods production sector as depicted in Figure 4.1. Higher TFP lowers the marginal
costs of goods producers and shifts up the supply of output. Along with a more
productive production sector, marginal productivity of input factors increases as
the same unit of all input factors becomes more productive, other things equal. For
Ricardian agents, this has a positive income effect as wages increase in combination
with a stable supply of labor. As the latter is exogenous, there is no substitution
effect leading to a net increase in income. For rule-of-thumb agents, income also
rises. However, labor supply positively responds to boom phases in business cycles,
which additionally has a positive effect on their incomes. This stimulation is lagged
progressively expanding, hence the persistent effects lead to an inverse u-shaped
dynamic of labor supply. But opposite to Ricardian agents, they do not have access
to the capital market. Hence, all income is split into expenditures in durable goods,
in non-durable goods, and due to the complementary link in energy, which all share
the same expanding dynamics as income.
Next to consumption expenditures, Ricardian households use the additional
channel to enhance their asset investments because of the increase demand in capital
due to lower marginal costs and an increase in the factor price. As an immediate
response, a higher return on assets makes durable goods less attractive than capi-
tal. Consequently, Ricardian agents shift more of their investment portfolio towards
capital investments, causing crowding out of durable goods investment in the short-
term. Along with decaying productivity, the increase in capital stock eventually
puts downwards pressure on the interest rate in the midterm, which diminishes the
advantage of capital investments. Hence, durable purchases increase. After 30 peri-
ods, the capital market is saturated and households reduce their saving efforts. By
reason of asset savings, the volatility of expenditures for consumption goods and
energy for Ricardian households are relatively lower with respect to those of rule-
to-thumb agents. Furthermore, as the former do not face increases in labor supply
and positive income volatility declines until it returns to its balanced growth path.
As producers and households use more physical capital and durable goods, the
overall demand for energy increases which is mainly traced back to the production
sector due to their lower marginal costs. The price of energy which is equivalent to
the world market price is inelastic and hence stays constant over the time. In total,
we notice a significantly positive business cycle in the economy where all actors are
positively affected. By reason of different earning channels, the income of Ricardian
and rule-of-thumb agents evolves differently.
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Figure 4.1: Bayesian IRF: orthogonalized shock to εA.
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4.6.2.2 Shock to energy prices
Energy prices react inelastically to a change in the demand of energy as we have seen
in the previous scenario in Section 4.6.2.1. Hence, they behave like world market
prices which do not vary significantly with changes in the demand of a small country.
As a result, a positive energy price shock acts as an energy supply crunch in this
framework. Similarly, this goes along with a decline in productivity in the energy
generation process as in Bergmann (2018) or the traditional oil price setting by the
OPEC.13
Figure 4.2 shows the responses to a temporary exogenous increase in the energy
price. The instantaneous response of all economic entities leads to a reduction of
the demand for energy, which leads to a drop in the quantity of energy used by
households and producers. Note that according to the structure of the exogenous
process of price determination, the same stochastic shock affects the energy price
for two periods. Hence, in the second period, the quantity of energy continues to
drop before converging back to its balanced growth path in the long term.
The producer faces higher marginal costs in energy leading to a reduction of
output and consequently a fall in capital returns and wages. Due to the comple-
mentarity of capital and energy, there is less demand for assets. But opposite to
Dhawan and Jeske (2008) and Huynh (2016), labor supply is exogenously determined
(whose price formation process is not affected by energy price changes), whereas la-
bor demand stays constant and wages clearly fall relative to interests to balance the
market equilibrium. However, this also means that labor cannot be substituted for
the loss in the capital-energy bundle which puts additional downward pressure on
production.
For both groups of households, an increase in energy prices has impacts on
both, the expense and the income sides of the budget constraint. On the one side,
purchases of energy become more expensive which increase costs. On the other
side, lower returns for production factors decrease the income. However, the nega-
tive income effect distinguishes between both types of agents. While rule-of-thumb
households only suffer from lower wages, Ricardian households also face a decline
in capital income, leading to income losses, which are about twice as large. As a
consequence, consumption of durable and non-durable goods is cut by all agents
which happens with a delay due to the lagged structure of durables within the util-
ity function. Furthermore, the decline of the former is significantly higher given the
high complementarity of energy and durables. Moreover, non-durable consumption
goods can partly substitute the energy-consumption bundle which further increases
the differences. Concerning Ricardian households, the combination of a lower in-
terest rate and lower income budget also results in a reduction in its alternative
investment, namely financial assets. This contraction is persistent which leads to a
13The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) includes 15 countries account-
ing for 44% of global oil extraction and owning more than 80% of oil reserves.
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Figure 4.2: Bayesian IRF: orthogonalized shock to εP .
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decline in the negative impact of the interest rate. When the rental rate of capital
exceeds its steady state values, which happens after 40 periods, the change in the
reduction of physical capital investments turns around.
Figure 4.2 also depicts the various impacts on the demand of energy when com-
paring the household and the production sectors. Although both sectors use en-
ergy in their utility or production process and hence, are directly affected by price
changes, the latter has the predominant share in the decline of total energy demand.
This is essentially due to the weight of energy in the capital-energy bundle, which
is clearly higher in comparison to the equivalent bundle in the utility function.
In sum, the response dynamics after a positive energy price shock confirm the
results from Section 4.6.1 as output is significantly less influenced in comparison to
its response following a change in productivity as in Section 4.6.2.1. However, both
groups of agents clearly respond by dropping their investments in durable goods to
optimize their utilities. Fluctuations are particularly faced by Ricardian households
whose effective budget is stronger reduced due to the loss of capital returns.
4.6.3 Inequality
In the previous section, we have investigated the dynamic responses of the economy,
by looking at the impacts of each shock in isolation. Moreover, the exogenous stimuli
have been temporary and occurred only once. Now, we simulate the economy by
impacting the model with all shock simultaneously and continuously. We run the
simulation for 1000 periods considering 1000 different agents which are split up into
Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households and whose proportion is fix over the whole
time sequence. Furthermore, we launch the simulation by endowing each agent with
the same amount of labor, durable goods, and financial assets whereby the latter
only holds for Ricardian agents. Next to the TFP and energy price shocks, each
agent is additionally affected by an individual employment shock. The latter leads
individuals’ decisions to significantly differ from each other. The whole procedure
gives insight about the development of the distribution of all endowment factors.
Here, we are in particularly interested in the income and wealth distribution as they
are the main factors from which utility is gained. Therefore, in the following, we
focus the analysis by considering some inequality metrics which are often used in
relevant literature but also in the public perception.
4.6.3.1 Distribution
Figure 4.3 depicts the evolution of the income and wealth distribution after the
1st, 10th, 100th, and 1000th period. By assuming that all shocks act on the model
from the second period and capital returns are payed out with a lag of one period,
all agents receive the same wage earnings which also account for total income in
the initial period (see Figure 4.4(a)). Hence, the income is equally distributed. In
Heterogeneity in an RBC Model with Durable Goods and Energy 161
Figure 4.3: Distribution of income and wealth
(a) Income t=1 (b) Income t=10 (c) Income t=100 (d) Income t=1000
(e) Wealth t=1 (f) Wealth t=10 (g) Wealth t=100 (h) Wealth t=1000
Figures show distribution of income or wealth after t periods. Each bin-width is 10.
contrast, agents’ wealth consists of labor income, the stock of durable goods, and
possible assets. As only Ricardian agents are endowed with the latter, we can notice
an imbalance in its distribution, but only between both groups. From the second pe-
riod onwards, this does change as each agent is differently affected by employment
stimuli. Furthermore, productivity shocks influence the response of both groups
of households differently as rule-of-thumb employment is positively correlated with
TFP. Even energy price shocks have different consequences for the decision making
of agents as they affect the composition of utility by directly changing the price
of one consumption good. The direct consequence of this is an alternation of the
income distribution within both groups of agents, and thus also for wealth in sub-
sequent periods as each agent is using the intertemporal smoothing channels differ-
ently. Particularly in the initial periods, income and wealth reflect the property of
normal distribution from the idiosyncratic labor supply shocks within both groups.
Households, which can invest in productive financial assets, can accumulated more
capital in the long term due to positive capital returns. Hence, considering wealth,
the distribution dispersion is larger among Ricardian households as we see clearly
in Figure 4.4(f). In sum, we find convergence of the income and wealth distribution
over the long run which is also reflected in the evolution of inequality indices as we
will see later. Both, income and wealth distribution are right skewed which corre-
sponds to reality whereby the size of skewness of the latter is explicitly larger in the
long term.
Moreover, the wealth distribution of Figure 4.4(h) clearly shows the existence of
agents who are indebted in the long term despite the borrowing constraint in the
utility function, similar to Troch (2014). However, the share of those who have ac-
cumulated negative wealth is low with only 5% and relatively stable. Consequently,
the economy does not collapse by a Ponzi scheme. Furthermore, we can identify
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agents who are indebted to be Ricardian households. Because individual house-
holds’ policy functions are linear by construction, the same holds for the capital
accumulation equation of households,14 which is almost linear in their own holdings
of assets. Consequently, the propensity to save out of wealth is the same for all
Ricardian households as we discussed before in Section 4.4 and the saving behavior
of agents does not differ at both ends of the wealth distribution (for very rich and
very poor agents). However, this does hold for the poorest agents in real life. Nev-
ertheless, capital aggregation still holds because the share of these agents and the
fraction of wealth they hold are very small and have no significant implications on
the qualitative outcome of the simulation.
4.6.3.2 Inequality ratios
Inequality metrics are useful to determine the performance of the model to replicate
the income and wealth distribution of Germany. Opposite to the whole distribution,
ratios reflect the parts of the distribution with respect to each other and are a
good measurement of between-class inequality. Hence, it is a relative measure and
easier to interpret. Table 4.2 reports the 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 percentile income
ratios, comparing the income of the 90th, 50th, and 10th income group. According
to the results, the model findings are only slightly above the income distribution
of Germany but otherwise the model does a good job in predicting the income
distribution. As the deviations are mostly visible in the P90/P50 and P50/P10
ratios, this means that the baseline model lightly overestimates the income inequality
within the lower half. By looking at the income shares which show the income share
of a sub-population relative to its size, we can see that for the bottom 20% and next
20% earners, the results are somewhat lower but still close the the empirical targets.
Hence, the dispersion of income can attributed to the lower income groups or the
low income tail. Nevertheless, the finding can be assessed as good, in particular
with respect to the simplification of the model.
Furthermore, we consider the distribution of wealth by reporting the wealth
shares of three sub-population groups (see Table 4.2). Here, we can see a significant
deviation between the model predictions and the metrics reported by the OECD
(2019b). While the results for the bottom 20% are similar to the data, the baseline
model underestimates the actual inequality for the further sub-population groups.
This become apparent by looking at the richest households. For instance, the top
5% of wealthiest agents own 46% of total wealth while the model predicts a share of
only 18%. As a result, although the model’s prediction of income distribution comes
close to the empirical target and indicates a more unequal distribution for wealth,
which goes along with properties of the German economy, the model fails to predict
the targeted metrics for wealth inequality. In particular, the assumption of equal
14We use linear policy functions to numerically solve for the decision making of all agents on the
basis of all state variables in the simulation.
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Table 4.2: Inequality metrics
Baseline Dataa Source
Income ratios
P90/P10 5.93 3.58 OECD (2019a)
P90/P50 1.95 1.87 OECD (2019a)
P50/P10 3.04 1.93 OECD (2019a)
Income shares
buttom 20% 5.35 8.52 The World Bank (2019)
2nd 20% 10.67 13.2 The World Bank (2019)
Wealth shares
buttom 20% -0.2 0.0 OECD (2019a)
buttom 40% 4.8 0.5 OECD (2019a)
top 10% 31.1 59.8 OECD (2019a)
top 5% 17.6 46.3 OECD (2019a)
top 1% 4.5 23.7 OECD (2019a)
Gini
Income 0.327 0.330 The World Bank (2019)
Wealth 0.553 0.667b The World Bank (2019)
aWe use the average of the data from 1991 to 2013 to match the steady state moments of
the calibrated model.
b This data refers to the value from 2000 which lies in the middle of the observed time
period. More recent data indicate a significantly higher Gini index for wealth (77.5) in 2015.
productivity among agents but also the equal individual initial endowments among
and within both groups of agents seems to be too simplistic.15
4.6.3.3 Gini index
A further metrics to capture economy-wide dispersion of income and wealth is the
Gini index. This synthetic measure is the most widely used single indicator of
inequality because of its simplicity of calculation and interpretation (The World
Bank, 2014). The index which is generally scaled between 0 and 1 where a value
of zero expresses perfect equality and 1 shows maximal inequality.16 It reflects half
of the relative mean absolute difference or alternatively, the mean of the difference
between every possible pair of agents, divided by the mean size, hence, the relative
inequality within the economy:
G =
1
2n2µy
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|yi − yj| with µy =
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi
where yx denotes the income/wealth of agent x and n the total number of agents
(in our model n = 1000). The Gini index and the Lorenz curve are closely related.
The latter depicts the cumulative proportion of ordered individuals plotted onto
the corresponding cumulative proportion of their size while the former describes the
area between the Lorenz curve and its corresponding function with no inequality
(see Figure 4.4). In case of no idiosyncratic shocks and a single class of households
only, the Lorenz curve for income and wealth is described by a 45°-line (see red curve
in Figures 4.5(a) and 4.5(b)). Consequently, there is no inequality. In the baseline
15By simulating the model with lower productivity for rule-of-thumb agents, wealth inequality
indeed increases significantly.
16When allowing for negative values in the distribution (such as debt in case of wealth distribu-
tion), the Gini index can also theoretically become larger than 1.
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Figure 4.4: Lorenz curves
(a) Income (b) Wealth
The dashed (dotted) curve denotes the 45°-line description line of equity while solid blue line depicts the
Lorenz curve. The area between both curves amounts to the Gini coefficient G.
model, the income Gini index corresponds to the empirical target which confirms
the good performance of the model in this regard. However, the wealth Gini index
is significantly lower in comparison to the German data, which is in line with the
finding from before.
4.6.3.4 Theil index
The Gini index is handy to compare several distributions as it meets many axioms
according to Cowell (1985). These include anonymity, scale of independence, pop-
ulation independence, and the transfer principle (Pigou-Dalton transfer principle).
However, by not complying with the principle of decomposability, it can only de-
scribe the overall degree of inequality. Hence, it does provide any information about
the distribution within the economy. This also means that it is possible to have two
societies with the same Gini index but different distributions. Therefore, we also
consider the income and wealth distribution of the baseline model with respect to
the Theil index which allows to decompose inequality.
Applied to our model, the Theil coefficient describes inequality as the sum of
inequality between groups (Ricardian vs. rule-of-thumb households) and inequality
within these groups:
TT =
n∑
i=1
[
yi
ny¯
ln
(
yi
y¯
)]
= SRTR︸ ︷︷ ︸
within Ricardian
agents inequality
+ SNTN︸ ︷︷ ︸
within rule-of-thumb
agents inequality
+ SR ln
y¯R
µ
+ SN ln
y¯N
µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
between group
inequality
with Sm =
nm
n
y¯m
µ
, m ∈ (R,N) and µy =
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi
(4.1)
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where TR and TN are the decomposed Theil indices of both groups. This allows us
to make up for the main factor contributing to overall inequality as we can associate
the sources of inequality to the different parts of the decomposed Theil index. Table
4.3 includes the results for each component of the index. For the income distri-
bution, within groups inequality mainly contributes to total inequality. They are
at the same level as agents within both classes each share the same dispersion im-
pacts through idiosyncratic shocks which significantly affect the individual income.
These shocks have the same properties for both classes, so between groups inequal-
ity is hardly visible. On the contrary, within groups inequality significantly differs
as Ricardian agents can accumulate assets by having access to the financial capital
market. Income varies within this class whereby wealth accumulation evolves un-
equally. Rule-of-thumb households can only accumulate wealth through investments
in durable goods. Hence, the possibility of different wealth evaluation is limited. By
reason of the different market accesses, between groups inequality is naturally higher
in comparison with its respective index of income inequality. The same hold for the
total Theil index.
Table 4.3: Decomposition of Theil index
Theil index within between group total
Ricardian agents (TR) rule-of-thumb agents (TN ) inequality (TB) Theil (TT )
Income 0.1486 0.1483 0.0300 0.1761
Wealtha 0.2686 0.0410 0.2023 0.4528
share of total
Ricardian agents (SR) rule-of-thumb agents (SN ) share
Income 76.30% 23.70% - 100%
Wealth 92.04% 7.96% - 100%
a As the Theil index cannot be calculated for data containing negative values, we have neutralized the debt
(held by 5% of the population). Hence, the wealth Theil index of Ricardian agents and, consequently,
the total Theil index, do not reflect the proper values which are slightly higher.
Furthermore, we can point out a significant difference in the shares of income
and wealth held by both classes. Here, the latter is significantly shifted in favor for
Ricardian households due to the exclusive access to the financial asset market. In
the long term, the Theil indices even out at a constant level (see Figure 4.5). In
sum, income and wealth inequality are closely related while the latter is usually at
a higher level due to its higher persistency.
4.7 Sensitivity Analysis
In this study, we have set up a model that has been meant to present how inequality
develops in an RBC framework by using two heterogeneous classes of agents. As
such, we have particularly stylized the model i.e. by distinguishing between Ricardian
and rule-of-thumb agents, while holding the share of the different classes of agents
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Figure 4.5: Theil indices
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
 TR
TN 
Tbtw
 TT
(a) Income
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
 TR
TN
Tbtw
 TT
(b) Wealth
As the Theil index cannot be calculated with data containing negative values, we have neutralized the debt
(hold by ∼5% of population). Hence, the wealth Theil index of Ricardian agents and consequently, the total
Theil index, do not reflect the proper values which are slightly higher.
constant. This also means that the ability of intertemporal decision making of an
agent cannot be altered, as switching to the other class is not possible.
Hence, we examine a sensitivity analysis to shed a further light on the general
ability of this model to reproduce business cycles caused by exogenous stimuli. By
using alternative specification of some parameters, we cannot only look at the dy-
namic responses but also on their effects on inequality measurements. Here, we
focus on those parameters which are most likely to have an impact on an agent’s
decision making and which are not calibrated according to the equilibrium condition
of the economy. These include the share of Ricardian households λ,17 the presence
of adjustment costs in making an investment in durable goods ω2cd, as well as the
presence of each shock in isolation. The latter particularly allows us to find out the
notable source of impact on inequality measurements originating from exogenous
stimuli.
Because TFP is the main driver for business cycle fluctuation despite the pres-
ence of the energy price as we have previously confirmed in Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2.1,
we consider the IRFs of a temporary exogenous increase in productivity to the pro-
duction sector. Investigating the responses of income and wealth with various shares
of Ricardian agents and rule-of-thumb agents after a positive impact through TFP,
we can see that for the former, income is higher the less agents have access to the
capital asset market (see Figure 4.1a). In particular, having a Ricardian household
share of only 20% boosts earnings by 3.7 times larger in comparison to a household
share of 99%, while the increase is disproportionate. On the opposite, the rule-
of-thumb agents’ income proportionally increases the higher the share of Ricardian
17Gali et al. (2003) point out that the distinction between Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households
can alter the equilibrium dynamics of the model. In our model, we restrict the sensitivity analysis
to 0.2 ≤ λ < 1 as we find indeterminacy when λ < 0.2 and λ = 1. Other models find different
indeterminacy regions such as λ < 0.36 (Marto, 2014).
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Figure 4.1: IRFs of income with various λ’s
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Figure 4.2: IRFs of wealth with various λ’s
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households. By reason of the correlation of labor employment and productivity,
income diverges from its steady state value for several periods until it converges
back. The dynamics can be explained as the more households can access the asset
market, the more capital will be invested because it works as an additional channel
of intertemporal consumption smoothing. Simultaneously, productivity of capital
decreases and productivity of labor, hence wages, increases. The difference of both
groups are intensified with respect to the development of wealth. At its peak, the
dynamic of a Ricardian agent’s wealth at λ = 0.2 is 5.9 times as large as at λ = 0.99
(see Figure 4.2).
Table 4.1 depicts an overview of the results of the sensitivity analysis by showing
the outcome for some inequality measurements. In particular, we look at the Gini
coefficient of income and wealth, the income share of the bottom 10% of population,
and two income ratios. By comparing the these results, we get an impression of
what influences inequality and to what degree these changes appear. The results
from the IRF analysis are confirmed by these inequality measurements. The lower
the share of Ricardian households, the larger inequality in income according to the
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Table 4.1: Sensitivity
Income Wealth
Gini share bottom 20% P90/P10 P90/P50 Gini
baseline model 0.3265 0.0535 5.9317 1.9499 0.5526
λ = 0.99 0.3067 0.0526 5.6150 1.7491 0.4828
λ = 0.5 0.3401 0.0538 6.2699 2.1069 0.5862
λ = 0.2 0.4076 0.0500 8.5594 3.0293 0.6959
ω = 1 0.2692 0.0747 4.0821 1.7057 0.3912
only σA 0.1246 0.1288 1.8538 1 0.2694
only σP 0.1211 0.1308 1.8135 1 0.2693
only σL 0.3371 0.0490 6.4927 1.9869 0.5671
no energy price shocks 0.3323 0.0510 6.2487 1.9697 0.5611
Values correspond to the respective equivalent from Table 4.2.
Figure 4.3: Gini coefficients with various λ’s
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Shaded area mark indeterminacy when λ < 0.2 and λ = 1.
Gini index which is also reflected by the income share and income ratios (see also
Figure 4.3). This is consistent for the value set λ ∈ [0.2, 1). Furthermore, inequality
in wealth rises even more strongly.
Moreover, inequality declines significantly when eliminating costs in doing invest-
ment adjustments in durable goods. This is mainly due to the fact that the omis-
sion of costs enables rule-of-thumb households to use this channel to smooth their
consumption inter-temporally more effectively. In contrast, Ricardian households
can also continuously use the financial asset market for intertemporal consumption
smoothing.
By looking at the impact of each shock on the distribution of income and wealth,
presented in the last three column of Table 4.1, we cannot recognize a significant
difference between the results for a shock in TFP and energy prices. The Gini
coefficients for income and wealth are 0.12 and 0.27 respectively and apparently
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deviate from the baseline model. These are the pure effects of distinguishing between
Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households as individual employment variations are
omitted. In contrast, by looking at the presence of a temporary exogenous increase
in employment only, the inequality parameters are significantly higher and closer
to the baseline model. Hence, we can identify these shocks as the main source of
producing inequality in the distribution of income and wealth.
Since this model focuses on the presence of energy price shocks, we also look at
the impact of volatility of energy prices on inequality metrics. The analysis of IRFs
in Section 4.6.2.2 shows that the qualitative responses of both classes of agents are
qualitatively similar, because in both cases there is an aggregated shock that does
not differ between the entities. This particularly holds for responses to impacts from
energy prices, because both classes are energy purchasers and both receive payments
from the production sector (whose output is also affected by the quantity of energy
and its prices). Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that differences in
the income and wealth distribution in the scenario of no energy price fluctuations
are relatively small in comparison to the baseline model with energy price shocks.
The last row of Table 4.1 describes both distributions by their respective inequality
indices. All measurements are slightly above those of the baseline model. This means
that the presence of volatility in energy prices has a positive impact on income and
wealth inequality, which means that both decrease marginally. The reason for these
dynamics is the complementary relationship between durable goods and energy.
The richer the agent, the higher the consumption of this consumption bundle. The
presence of volatility in energy prices leads to adjustments in the durable goods
stock, re-optimizing the agents’ maximization problems (4.1) and (4.2). This goes
along with additional expenditures due to the investment cost function (see equations
(4.5) and (4.11)), which are sunk costs. As a result, the wealthier the agent and the
larger the durable goods stock, the higher these sunk costs.
Based on this complementary relationship between durable goods and energy,
and the consequences as described above, we conclude that it is not the low-income
agent who benefits from volatility in energy prices, but instead it is the high-income
agent who looses due to higher absolute sunk costs. However, this claim only holds
when the proportionality coefficient of the complementary factors durable goods and
energy increases when consumption of this bundle increases.18
4.8 Policy Implication Through Taxation
So far, existing RBC frameworks, which implement energy consumption through
their main economic entities, are mainly based on the assumption of homogeneous
agents. This model is predominantly designed to extend this field of literature by
heterogeneity in the capability and endowments of agents. As we have seen in the
18The income effect is larger for durable goods than for energy. Hence, the ratio CD/EH increases.
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results of this model, different forms of heterogeneity can lead to inequality in income
or wealth which each have implications on the current utility and intertemporal
choice of agents. It is likely to avoid unequal distributions as they can lead to
negative impacts for the society which can be transferred to many spheres in public
life. For instance, inequality can enhance polarization, alienation and social friction
but it can also encourage crime with negative consequences for the rest of society.
As a result, all members of society would lose out. A free-market system does
not necessarily respond to the wants and needs of individuals who are socially and
economically worse off, especially not if they have insufficient economic votes to have
any impact on market demand.
It should be the responsibility of policy makers of a country using its exceptional
position by having organized control over a human community to meet these chal-
lenges. Hereby, various policy-making tools are available which have different effects
but also a varying degree of support from miscellaneous community groups. How-
ever, we do not discuss the feasibility of a specific policy intervention with respect
to its acceptance in society. There is a particular field in literature that is dealing
not only with the electoral behavior of voters but also the decision making of policy
makers with respect to upcoming elections (e.g. Nordhaus, 1975).
One of the government’s most powerful tools to tackle inequality is fiscal policy.
On the one hand, this directly affects households’ decision making about consump-
tion though taxes or transfers. On the other hand, this can not only indirectly
influence agents by the provision of public goods and services but also promote the
incentive to work. In particular, the role of tax policy plays an important role in
times of increasing pre-tax inequality according to OECD (2019b). Therefore, we
discuss the impacts of one possible instrument to induce a redistribution channel
of income in a simplified form. By assuming that rule-of-thumb households belong
to social group which is, by average, worse off in terms of income and wealth, we
implement a one-way transmission channel of income from Ricardian households to
rule-of-thumb households. This is done by taxing income of former agents whose
revenues are directly re-distributed to the latter. We consider a non-progressive,
constant tax rate which is put on overall income, hence capital returns plus wage
income.
The budget constraints of both groups of agents (4.3) and (4.10) are altered
accordingly:19
Ricardian households:
CNR,i,t + (pH)t(EH)R,i,t + (ICD )R,i,t + (IY)R,i,t
= (1− τ) (wtLR,i,t + rtSR,i,t−1 + πt)
(5a)
19Obviously, equations (4.7), (4.8), (4.13), and (4.14), describing the income and wealth of both
classes of agents, alter respectively.
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Rule-of-thumb households:
CNN,i,t + (pH)t(EH)N,i,t + (ICD)N,i,t
= wtLN,i,t + τ (wtLR,i,t + rtSR,i,t−1 + πt) .
(10a)
The direct responses of the income and wealth of both groups of agents are
depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Again, we consider the IRFs after an exogenous
impact on TFP. Unsurprisingly, taxation of income leads to a decline of Ricardian
households’ earnings in comparison to the baseline model. However, the positive
impulse from the increase in the marginal productivity of capital and labor still
results into a boost of income. A 0.86% increase in TFP leads to an immediate
1.02% increase in income at 20% income tax (0.95% when τ = 0.25) while income
increases by 1.27% with government intervention. The redistribution leads to an
instantaneous increase of rule-of-thumb agents’ budget by 0.71% (τ = 0.2) and
0.77% (τ = 0.25) while without taxes, income rises by only 0.46%. As clarified in
Section 4.6.2.1, the rise of income is persistent for rule-of-thumb households due to
the positive correlation of productivity and employment.
Figure 4.1: IRFs of income after taxation
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Similarly, the wealth of Ricardian agents increases over a longer term. The
difference between the scenarios with and without taxes are significantly visible in
subsequent periods as the retraction of investments results in impacts of wealth only
later. At its peak, wealth has reduced from +16.8% to +14.4% (20% income tax)
and +13.8% (25% income tax) while the increase in the income of rule-of-thumb
agents leads more investments in durable goods. As a consequence, wealth increases
from +3.3% to +3.8% (20% tax) and +3.9% (25% tax).
This policy intervention led to redistribution between classes, and not within
classes, and was thus aimed at reducing inequality between groups, not within
groups. Nevertheless, within inequality is also affected because we consider a linear
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Figure 4.2: IRFs of wealth after taxation
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Table 4.1: Taxation
Income Wealth
Gini share bottom 20% P90/P10 P90/P50 Gini ∆ output
baseline 0.3265 0.0535 5.9298 0.5526 1.9496 -
τ = 0.20 0.2869 0.0636 4.5433 1.7169 0.5581 -0.06%
τ = 0.25 0.2811 0.0644 4.3995 1.6790 0.5620 -0.08%
Values correspond to the respective equivalent from Table 4.2.
tax rate. Consequently, each Ricardian agent has to pay the same taxes relative
to its income while each rule-of-thumb agent receives the same amount of subsidy.
This subsidy is relatively more valuable with respect to its total income for a poor
recipient than for richer agent (see Table 4.A.1). Note that we look at average in-
equality measurements over a longer period. In Table 4.1, we present the results
in accordance to the sensitivity analysis by looking at the same selected inequality
parameters as well as at changes in economic performance. According to this, the
Gini income index indicates a reduction by 3.96 points in case of a 20% income tax
on Ricardian households (4.54 points for a tax rate of 25%).
The income share and both income ratios confirm the developments of lower
income inequality. This is not surprising as the redistribution of income is permanent
and hence rule-of-thumb households also profit by a positive investment portfolio in
assets. As after-tax income decreases for Ricardian households, this also means that
durable goods and asset investments declines and hence, personal savings diminish.
Figure 4.A.2 depict the corresponding shifts of the Lorenz curve for both income
and wealth.
According to Table 4.1, this goes along with an increase of the Gini wealth
index by 0.55 points (τ = 0.2) and 0.94 points (τ = 0.25) stating a light rise in
inequality of wealth. Previous literature confirms these findings (i.e. Berman et al.,
2015; Cagetti and De Nardi, 2008). Doing a simulation, Berman et al. (2016) show
that a positive average tax rate reduces net income and consequently savings. But
simultaneously, the authors find that the saving rate for capital is essential to model
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wealth inequality. They detect that an imperfect correlation between wealth and
income leads to the non-trivial effect of a reduction of the relative gap between
deciles.
The following modified example by Berman et al. (2016) demonstrates these dy-
namics:
Assuming that Ricardian households’ wealth is WR,t+1 = WR,t + sDt + aR,t+1WR,t
where WR is wealth (capital asset + durables), sD is the share of income that is
saved, and aR is the value change rate of wealth (i.e. gains from capital returns). Re-
spectively, rule-of-thumb households’ wealth is WN,t = ωWR,t with ω < 1. Opposite
to Berman et al. (2016), rule-of-thumb households have a different value change rate
of wealth aN which is strictly smaller to the one of Ricardian households (aN < aR).
This is because they are excluded from the asset market, so they cannot gain capital
returns.20
As a result, the relative wealth is:
1
ω
=
WR,t+1
WN,t+1
=
WR,t + sDt + aR,t+1WR,t
ωWR,t + sDt + ωaN,t+1WR,t
⇔ s =
ωWR,t (aR,t+1 − aN,t+1)
(1− ω)Dt
with s < 1.
In case of a decrease in the saving rate s, we can solve for the relative wealth
that increases. Hence, the relative gap between the ”rich” (or Ricardian) and the
”poor” (or rule-of-thumb) agent becomes wider when personal savings from income
are smaller with respect to the remaining terms. In case of an income tax, we can
still have an increase in the ratio between individual wealth values despite a shift
from the ”poor” agents to the ”rich” agents, dependent on the difference of aN and
aR. Of course, this example hold not only for the comparison between classes but
also within a class, in particular the Ricardian agent class. However, the tax policy
does not redistribute income among agents of the same group. Therefore, a decrease
in s always leads to an increase in the wealth ratio when a2 < a1.
We have seen that the implementation of a constant income tax rate to induce
the redistribution of income from the high income group to the low income group
indeed has impacts on economic inequality, but with different responses. Inequality
in income can be diminished, while inequality in wealth expands, but to a lower
extent. As a consequence of this trade-off, it should first be evaluated which of the
two outcomes to aim at. In terms of output, the economy is only marginally harmed
by 0.06% (20% tax) or 0.08% (25% tax). As reported by Piketty and Saez (2003),
Neckerman and Torche (2007), and Biewen and Juhasz (2012), the minor change
in wealth inequality is traced back to the fact that since the 1980s, disparate labor
income has mainly driven inequality rather than capital gains. But in our model,
20Of course this assumption holds only if the capital returns for Ricardian households are strictly
positive.
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we assume an equal wage rate for both groups of agents. We leave this investigation
for future research.
4.9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have constructed an RBC model with heterogeneous agents with
idiosyncratic properties which belong to two sub-classes, namely either Ricardian
households or rule-of-thumb households. Agents can consume durable goods, non-
durable goods, and energy. Energy, provided endogenously and in unlimited quan-
tity, is needed in order to either gain utility from durable goods, or to be able
to produce goods through capital. To handle heterogeneity on the macro level of
the model, explicit aggregation as developed by Den Haan and Rendahl (2010) is
applied in order to solve the cross-sectional capital distribution, and hence the ag-
gregate policy function for capital. The model has been calibrated on the basis of
data from the German economy. Next to analyzing the model and its aggregated
outputs, we have performed a separate simulation to investigate the evolution of
individual heterogeneous outputs and their distributions.
We confirm findings from existing literature that TFP is the main driver for
output fluctuation even though the presence of energy price shocks and resulting
increases have a contractionary effect on output. Moreover, we show that the dis-
tinction between non-durable and durable goods leads to a significant improvement
in matching most of the moments, with the exception of non-durable goods, because
agents receive an additional channel of adjusting their investment decisions. It fol-
lows that energy mainly causes disruptions in durable goods investment. Thanks
to heterogeneous characteristics of the model, we are able to make predictions of
inequality in income that are close to the empirical target while inequality in wealth
remains underestimated. This underestimation is mainly attributed to the absence
of idiosyncratic productivity differences of agents, but also to the simplification that
labor is supplied exogenously. With respect to energy price shocks, inequalities in in-
come and wealth decrease, due to the complementary relationship between durable
goods and energy, as well as sunk costs that arise along with adjustments in the
durable goods stock. Hence, we conclude that it is not the low-income agent who
benefits from volatility in energy prices. Instead, it is the high-income agent who
looses in both income and wealth, due to higher absolute sunk costs.
In a brief policy analysis, we have taxed Ricardian agents’ incomes with a con-
stant tax rate, with revenues directly redistributed to rule-of-thumb agents, which
is a simple possible policy instrument that induces a change in inequality. This has
resulted in a reduction of income inequality, with the distribution of wealth becom-
ing more unequal but to a lower extent. Furthermore, only between-inequality is
affected because there has been no redistribution within agent classes. Aggregate
economic performance in terms of output is only marginally harmed by this form of
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taxation. Nevertheless, we deduce that it should be evaluated carefully what kind
of effect on inequality should be aimed for. Society can be quite sensible to the
implementation of policy tools because agents are differently affected given their
financial endowments, social standing, or education.
In future research, it would be worth analyzing the responses in the case that
agents can optimize their labor supply, given the simplification of labor supply by
agents in this model. In addition to uncertain idiosyncratic shocks, this might
decrease the volatility of non-durable goods consumption in order to close the de-
viation from observational data. Furthermore, endogenizing energy generation such
as in Bergmann (2018), while at the same time introducing a separate production
of durable goods such as Baxter (1996) and Huynh (2016) can help to improve the
description of energy within the economy. Both adaptations can have significant im-
plications on the optimal allocation of labor and capital because agents would have
further channels to shift mobile factors. With respect to modeling heterogeneity,
robustness can further be verified by increasing the set of moments as done in Pre-
ston and Roca (2007). Additionally, a further subdivision of agents’ classes in terms
of their access to asset markets, but also a higher degree of differentiation between
classes through heterogeneity in preferences, might help to improve the prediction
of wealth inequality.
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Appendix
4.A Additional Figures and Tables
Figure 4.A.1: Model overview.
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Figure 4.A.2: Comparison of Lorenz curves with taxation
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The dashed (dotted) curve denotes the 45°-line description line of equity while the remaining curves depict
the Lorenz curves described by the legends.
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Table 4.A.1: Decomposition of Theil index with taxation
Theil index within between group total
TR
a TN
b inequality (TB) Theil (TT )
Income
τ = 0 (baseline model) 0.1486 0.1483 0.0300 0.1761
τ = 0.2 0.1547 0.1003 0.0028 0.1403
τ = 0.25 0.1566 0.0935 0.0004 0.1357
no energy price shocks 0.1542 0.1450 0.0308 0.1827
Wealth
baseline model 0.2686 0.0410 0.2023 0.4528
no energy price shocks 0.2776 0.0430 0.2034 0.4625
share of total
SR
c SN
d share
Income
τ = 0 76.30% 23.70% - 100%
τ = 0.2 68.48% 31.52% - 100%
τ = 0.25 66.22% 33.78% - 100%
Theil index is calculated according to (4.1).
a TR is Theil index of Ricardian agent class.
b TN is Theil index of rule-of-thumb agent class.
c SR is share of Ricardian agents.
d SN is share index of rule-of-thumb agents.
4.B Accuracy Checks
In general, it is difficult to find analytical solutions of stochastic general equilibrium
models with rational expectations. Hence, simulations are helpful instruments to
solve those models numerically. However, as a downside, simulations can also be
inefficient numerical tools as they vanish sampling uncertainty as well as white noise
which might arise along with approximation methods. Nevertheless, they are helpful
to analyze complex models but need to be checked for accuracy. For instance, in
our model, inaccuracies can appear in the process of explicit aggregation to deter-
mine the law of motion of aggregate capital as we look at first moments only. But
also approximating the policy rules of each individual can contribute to inaccurate
results.
A simple accuracy test proposed is the R2 along with the standard error by
Krusell and Smith (1998) who estimate the aggregate law of motion of capital with
least-square regression. However, Den Haan (2010) has shown that this test is
inadequate as it scales the errors which runs the risk of underestimating large errors.
Therefore, we will perform two alternative accuracy tests to evaluate the accuracy
of our solution method.21 We concentrate on the χ2-test by Den Haan and Marcet
(1994) and the Euler equation error test originally based on Judd (1992).22
21See Algan et al. (2014) for a discussion of the weakness of the R2 accuracy test and an overview
about several alternative accuracy tests.
22We refer to Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2016) for a detailed technical discussion of both accuracy
tests.
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Table 4.B.1: DHM-statistics with different simulation lengths
t=200 t=500 t=1000 t=10000
DHM-statistics 0.85769 0.26129 0.13564 1.05466
Values present χ2-distribution with simulation length t.
Lower 5% critical value of χ2 is 0.0039, upper 5% critical values. of χ2 is 3.8415.
The DHM test considers the accumulated error residuals of the Euler equation
along the simulated path. By theory, the residual that expresses the deviation of
the Euler equation should be zero at all points in state space. Hence, it holds that:
f(·) ≡ E
{
CN−1R,i,t − βCN
−1
R,i,t+1
(
1 + rR,i,t+1 − δ
Y
)
+
2φ
γ
S−3t
}
(4.B.1)
E {f(·)h(xt) | It} = 0, (4.B.2)
where It is the information set of information available in the period t and h(·) is an
arbitrary function. We compute the residual of the model which has been simulated
for T periods to obtain an empirical distribution according to:
BT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(·)⊗ h(xt), (4.B.3)
which converges to a χ2-distribution.23 Subsequently, we check the closeness of this
distribution to the χ2 distribution of the true policy function. However, according
to Den Haan (2008), the DHM statistic is also limited in its accuracy power. On the
one hand, the computational time for this test can be very high depending on the
simulation length. On the other hand, this test is sensible to the simulation length
as accurate solutions can be rejected more often than 5% for a high enough time
range. Therefore, we compare the results of the DHM test with a different length of
simulations. The results are summarized in Table 4.B.1. According to the outcomes,
(4.B.2) is satisfied for all observed simulation lengths.
Due to the limitations of the DHM statistics, we do a second accuracy test by
testing for one-period ahead forecast errors according to Den Haan (2010). It is simi-
lar to the definition of the normalized Euler equation error proposed by Judd (1992).
To be more specific, we compute the Euler equation errors (EEE) by comparing the
numerical approximation with the result of the optimal decision (equation 4.B.1)
such as:
EEE(St) = 1−
u′CN,t((βE
{
u′CN,t+1(1 + rt+1)
}
− δY ) + 2
φ
γ
S−3t )
cˆt
, (4.B.4)
where cˆt is the optimal decision under assumed calibration and St denotes the set
of states. In other words, we check the degree of irrationality of an agent to use the
23Note that if T →∞ than BT → 0.
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approximation rule. To do so we compute the Euler equation error at many points
in the state space defined by Gauss-Hermite nodes in the numerical integration.
Den Haan and Ocaktan (2009) note that increasing the number of nodes has only
negligible effects, hence we limit its amount to 10 for each state variable. The
bounds of the grid defining the 8-D state space are obtained by the simulation
to get reasonable values. The test statistics shows that agents make an average
1.233% error in their decision about consumption with a maximum of 3.263%. These
values are higher than in standard homogeneous DSGE models. However, this is
not surprising with respect to the higher amount of state variables as well as more
shocks which increase the degree of uncertainty. In sum, the model seems to be
an effective framework to consider incomplete markets, heterogeneous agents, and
different consumption goods.
4.C Mathematical Appendix
4.C.1 Optimization
Under the assumption that prices for final energy are equal for households and final
goods-producing firms pE = pH = pY, the households’ problems of Ricardian and
rule-of-thumb agents, the decision making of firms, and the corresponding first order
conditions with respect to the decision variables are:
Household sector (Ricardian agents)
LHR,i =E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
log
[
CN γR,i,t
(
θCDζR,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
]
− φ
1
(SR,i,t + b)2
+ λHR,i,t [wtLR,i,t + rtSR,i,t−1 + πt − CNR,i,t − (pE)t(EH)R,i,t
−CDR,i,t +
(
1− δCD
)
CDR,i,t−1 −
ω1cd
1 + ω2cd
(
CDR,i,t − CDR,i,t−1
CDR,i,t−1
)1+ω2cd
−SR,i,t +
(
1− δY
)
SR,i,t−1
]}
(4.C.1)
• Non-durable goods:
∂LHR,i
∂CNR,i,t
= βtϑγ
CN γ−1R,i,t
(
θCDζR,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
CN γR,i,t
(
θCDζR,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
− βtϑγ
1
CNR,i,t
− βtλHR,i,t
!
= 0
⇔ ϑγ
1
CNR,i,t
− λHR,i,t
!
= 0 ⇔ λHR,i,t = ϑγ
1
CNR,i,t
(4.C.2)
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• Durable goods:
∂LHR,i
∂CDR,i,t
= βt+1E

ϑ (1− γ) ζθ
ζ
CN γR,i,t+1
(
θCDζR,i,t + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
) 1−γ
ζ
CDζ−1R,i,t
CN γR,i,t+1
(
θCDζR,i,t + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
) 1−γ
ζ

+ βt+1E
{
λHR,i,t+1
[
1− δCD + ω1cd
CDR,i,t+1
CD2R,i,t
(
CDR,i,t+1 − CDR,i,t
CDR,i,t
)ω2cd]}
− βtλHR,i,t
[
1 +
ω1cd
CDR,i,t−1
(
CDR,i,t − CDR,i,t−1
CDR,i,t−1
)ω2cd]
!
= 0
⇔ λHR,i,t
[
1 +
ω1cd
CDR,i,t−1
(
CDR,i,t − CDR,i,t−1
CDR,i,t−1
)ω2cd]
= βϑθ (1− γ)E
{
CDζ−1R,i,t
θCD ζR,i,t + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
}
+ βE
{
λHR,i,t+1
[
1− δCD + ω1cd
CDR,i,t+1
CD2R,i,t
(
CDR,i,t+1 − CDR,i,t
CDR,i,t
)ω2cd]}
(4.C.3)
• Energy consumption of households:
∂LHR,i
∂(EH)R,i,t
= βtϑ (1− γ)
CN γR,i,t
(
θCD ζR,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
CN γR,i,t
(
θCD ζR,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
(1− θ) (EH)
ζ−1
t−1
− βtλHR,i,t(pE)t
= βtϑ (1− γ) (1− θ)
(1− θ) (EH)
ζ−1
R,i,t
θCD ζR,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t
− βtλHR,i,t(pE)t
!
= 0
⇔ λHR,i,t(pE)t = ϑ (1− γ) (1− θ)
(1− θ) (EH)
ζ−1
R,i,t
θCDζR,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t
(4.C.4)
• Euler equations for asset stock:
∂LHR,i
∂SR,i,t
= βt+1E
{
λHR,i,t+1
(
1 + rt+1 − δ
Y
)}
− βtλHR,i,t + β
t φ
γ
2
(SR,i,t + b)
3
!
= 0 (4.C.5)
Household sector (Rule-of-thumb agents)
LHN,i =E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
log
[
CN γN,i,t
(
θCD ζN,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
N,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
]
+ λHN,i,t [wtLN,i,t − CNN,i,t − (pE)t(EH)N,i,t
−CDN,i,t +
(
1− δCD
)
CDN,i,t−1 −
ω1cd
1 + ω2cd
(
CDN,i,t − CDN,i,t−1
CDN,i,t−1
)1+ω2cd]}
(4.C.6)
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• Non-durable goods:
∂LHN,i
∂CNN,i,t
= βtϑγ
CN γ−1N,i,t
(
θCDζN,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
N,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
CN γN,i,t
(
θCDζN,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
N,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
− βtϑγ
1
CNN,i,t
− βtλHN,i,t
!
= 0
⇔ ϑγ
1
CNN,i,t
− λHN,i,t
!
= 0 ⇔ λHN,i,t = ϑγ
1
CNN,i,t
(4.C.7)
• Durable goods:
∂LHN,i
∂CDN,i,t
= βt+1E

ϑ (1− γ) ζθ
ζ
CN γN,i,t+1
(
θCDζN,i,t + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
) 1−γ
ζ
CDζ−1N,i,t
CN γN,i,t+1
(
θCD ζN,i,t + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
) 1−γ
ζ

+ βt+1E
{
λHN,i,t+1
[
1− δCD + ω1cd
CDN,i,t+1
CD2N,i,t
(
CDN,i,t+1 − CDN,i,t
CDN,i,t
)ω2cd]}
− βtλHN,i,t
[
1 +
ω1cd
CDN,i,t−1
(
CDN,i,t − CDN,i,t−1
CDN,i,t−1
)ω2cd]
!
= 0
⇔ λHN,i,t
[
1 +
ω1cd
CDN,i,t−1
(
CDN,i,t − CDN,i,t−1
CDN,i,t−1
)ω2cd]
= βϑθ (1− γ)E
{
CDζ−1N,i,t
θCDζN,i,t + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
t+1
}
+ βE
{
λHN,i,t+1
[
1− δCD + ω1cd
CDN,i,t+1
CD2N,i,t
(
CDN,i,t+1 − CDN,i,t
CDN,i,t
)ω2cd]}
(4.C.8)
• Energy consumption of households:
∂LHN,i
∂(EH)N,i,t
= βtϑ (1− γ)
CN γN,i,t
(
θCDζN,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
N,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
CN γN,i,t
(
θCDζN,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
N,i,t
) 1−γ
ζ
(1− θ) (EH)
ζ−1
t−1
− βtλHN,i,t(pE)t
= βtϑ (1− γ) (1− θ)
(1− θ) (EH)
ζ−1
N,i,t
θCDζN,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
N,i,t
− βtλHN,i,t(pE)t
!
= 0
⇔ λHN,i,t(pE)t = ϑ (1− γ) (1− θ)
(1− θ) (EH)
ζ−1
N,i,t
θCD ζN,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
N,i,t
(4.C.9)
Goods production sector
π0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
At
[
ηKνt−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν L1−αt − rtKt−1 − wtLt − (pE)t(EY)t
}
(4.C.10)
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• Capital demand:
∂π0
∂Kt−1
= Atαη
[
ηKνt−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν
−1
L1−αt K
ν−1
t−1 − rt
!
= 0 (4.C.11)
• Energy consumption of final goods production:
∂π0
∂(EY)t
= Atαη
[
ηKνt−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν
−1
L1−αt (EY)
ν−1
t − (pE)t
!
= 0 (4.C.12)
• Labor demand:
∂π0
∂Lt
= At (1− α)
[
ηKνt−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν L−αt − wt
!
= 0 (4.C.13)
By rearranging the conditions above, the optimized decisions as well as the market
clearing equations are calculated which define the complete model (19 equations).
Household sector (Ricardian agents)
• Durable Euler equation: combining (4.C.2) and (4.C.3)
1 +
ω1cd
CDR,i,t−1
(
CDR,i,t − CDR,i,t−1
CDR,i,t−1
)ω2cd
= βE
{
θ
(1− γ)
γ
CNR,i,tCD
ζ−1
R,i,t
θCDζR,i,t + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t+1
}
+ βE
{
CNR,i,t
CNR,i,t+1
[
1− δCD + ω1cd
CDR,i,t+1
CD2R,i,t
(
CDR,i,t+1 − CDR,i,t
CDR,i,t
)ω2cd]}
(4.C.14)
• Non-durables vs. energy: combining (4.C.3) and (4.C.4)
βtϑγ
(pE)t
CNR,i,t
= βtϑ (1− γ) (1− θ)
(EH)
ζ−1
R,i,t
θCDζR,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t
⇔ (pE)t =
(1− γ) (1− θ)
γ
CNR,i,t(EH)
ζ−1
R,i,t(
θCDζR,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
R,i,t
) (4.C.15)
• Labor supply: Ricardian agents
LR,i,t = (1 − ρL)L¯R + ρLLR,i,t−1 + εL,R,i,t (4.C.16)
• Euler equation of capital in final production: combining (4.C.2) and (4.C.5)
βtϑγ
1
CNR,i,t
= βt+1E
{
ϑγ
1
CNR,i,t+1
(
1 + rt+1 − δ
Y
)}
+ βt
φ
γ
2
(SR,i,t + b)
3
⇔
1
CNR,i,t
= βE
{
1
CNR,i,t+1
(
1 + rt+1 − δ
Y
)}
+
φ
γ
2
(SR,i,t + b)
3
(4.C.17)
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Household sector (Rule-of-thumb agents)
• Durable Euler equation: combining (4.C.7) and (4.C.8)
1 +
ω1cd
CDN,i,t−1
(
CDN,i,t − CDN,i,t−1
CDN,i,t−1
)ω2cd
= βE
{
θ
(1− γ)
γ
CNN,i,tCD
ζ−1
N,i,t
θCDζN,i,t + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
N,i,t+1
}
+ βE
{
CNN,i,t
CNN,i,t+1
[
1− δCD + ω1cd
CDN,i,t+1
CD2N,i,t
(
CDN,i,t+1 − CDN,i,t
CDN,i,t
)ω2cd]}
(4.C.18)
• Non-durables vs. energy: combining (4.C.8) and (4.C.9)
βtϑγ
(pE)t
CNN,i,t
= βtϑ (1− γ) (1− θ)
(EH)
ζ−1
N,i,t
θCD ζN,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
N,i,t
⇔ (pE)t =
(1− γ) (1− θ)
γ
CNN,i,t(EH)
ζ−1
N,i,t(
θCDζN,i,t−1 + (1− θ) (EH)
ζ
N,i,t
) (4.C.19)
• Labor supply: rule-of-thumb agents
LN,i,t = (1− ρL)L¯N + ρLLN,i,t−1 + ρL,A
(
AYt − A¯
Y
)
+ εL,N,i,t (4.C.20)
Goods production sector
• Final goods production output (= non-durable goods)
Yt = At
[
ηKνt−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν L1−αt (4.C.21)
• Capital demand of final goods production: rearranging (4.C.11)
rt = Atαη
[
ηKνt−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν
−1
L1−αt K
ν−1
t−1 (4.C.22)
• Energy demand of final goods production: rearranging (4.C.12)
(pE)t = Atαη
[
ηKνt−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν
−1
L1−αt (EY)
ν−1
t (4.C.23)
• Labor demand of final goods production: rearranging (4.C.13)
wt = At (1− α)
[
ηKνt−1 + (1− η) (EY)
ν
t
]α
ν L−αt (4.C.24)
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Market Clearing
• Aggregate market constraint:
Yt − (pE)t(EY)t = CN t + (pE)t(EH)t + CD t −
(
1− δCD
)
CD t−1 +Kt −
(
1− δY
)
Kt−1
(4.C.25)
• Aggregate non-durable goods:
CNt =
∫ λ
0
CNR,i,t +
∫ 1
λ
CNN,i,t (4.C.26)
• Aggregate durable goods:
CDt =
∫ λ
0
CDR,i,t +
∫ 1
λ
CDN,i,t. (4.C.27)
• Aggregate capital market:
Kt =
∫ λ
0
SR,i,t. (4.C.28)
• Aggregate labor market:
Lt =
∫ λ
0
LR,i,t +
∫ 1
λ
LN,i,t. (4.C.29)
with (4.C.16) and (4.C.20), the law of large numbers hold for ∨t :
∫ λ
0 εL,R,i,tdi ≃∫ 1
λ
εL,N,i,tdi ≃ 0
Lt =
∫ λ
0
(1− ρL)L¯N
1− ρL
+
∫ 1
λ
(
(1 − ρL)L¯N
1− ρL
+
ρL,A
(
AYt − A¯
Y
)
(1− ρL)
)
= λL¯ + (1− λ)
(
L¯+
ρL,A
(
AYt − A¯
Y
)
(1− ρL)
)
= L¯+
(1− λ)
(1− ρL)
ρL,A
(
AYt − A¯
Y
)
(4.C.30)
• Aggregate energy market:
Et =
∫ λ
0
(EH)R,i,t +
∫ 1
λ
(EH)N,i,t + (EY)t (4.C.31)
Formation of shocks
• Productivity shock in final goods production:
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + εA,t (4.C.32)
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• Productivity shock in final energy generation:
ln (pE)t = ρP ln (pE)t−1 + εP,t (4.C.33)
4.C.2 Steady states
In the following, we can construct the steady state conditions from the model.
Household sector
• Durable Euler equation (4.C.14) and (4.C.18) (same for both types of agents):
1 = βθ
(1− γ)
γ
CNCDζ−1
θCDζ + (1− θ) (EH)ζ
+ β
(
1− δCD
)
(4.C.14.SS + 4.C.18.SS)
• Non-durables vs. energy (4.C.15) and (4.C.19) (same for both types of agents):
pE =
(1− γ) (1− θ)
γ
CN (EH)
ζ−1(
θCD ζ + (1− θ) (EH)ζ
) (4.C.15.SS + 4.C.19.SS)
• Labor supply (4.C.30)
Lt = L¯+
(1− λ)
(1− ρL)
ρL,A
(
At − A¯
)
(4.C.30.SS)
• Euler equation for capital of final production (4.C.17)
1 = β
(
1 + r − δY
)
+
φ
γ
2
(S + b)
3CN
consequently
r =
1
β
− 1 + δY −
φ
βγ
2
(S + b)
3CN (4.C.17.SS)
Goods production sector
• Final goods production output (= non-durable goods) (4.C.21)
Y = A [ηKν + (1− η) (EY)
ν ]
α
ν L1−α (4.C.21.SS)
• Capital demand of final goods production (4.C.22)
r = Aαη [ηKν + (1− η) (EY)
ν ]
α
ν
−1
L1−αKν−1 (4.C.22.SS)
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• Energy demand of final goods production (4.C.23)
pE = Aαη [ηK
ν + (1− η) (EY)
ν ]
α
ν
−1 L1−α(EY)
ν−1 (4.C.23.SS)
• Labor demand of final goods production (4.C.24)
w = (1− α)
Y
L
(4.C.24.SS)
Market Clearing
• Aggregate market constraint (4.C.25)
Y − pEEY = CN + pEEH + δ
CDCD + δYK (4.C.25.SS)
• Aggregate non-durable goods market (4.C.26)
CN = λCNR + (1− λ)CNN (4.C.26.SS)
• Aggregate durable goods market (4.C.27)
CD = λCDR + (1− λ)CDN (4.C.27.SS)
• Aggregate asset market (4.C.28)
K = λSR (4.C.28.SS)
• Aggregate energy market (4.C.31)
E = λEH + (1− λ)EH + (EY) (4.C.31.SS)
4.C.3 Log-linearized equations
In contrast to Chapter 3, we feed Dynare with the numerical steady state values
of all endogenous variables derived in Section 4.C.2, which makes the calculation of
log-linearized equations obsolete.
4.C.4 Calibration
The calibration of parameters is carried out analogously to Bergmann (2018), except
for the parameter δY .
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Given r and, we can rearrange (4.C.17.SS) to get:
δY = 1 + r −
1
β
+
φ
βγ
2
(S + b)3
CN (4.C.34)
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